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vPreface
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters. Each chapter
starts with brief introduction to the subject matter. The chapters are
divided into several sections, each with a distinct objective. An
outline of these sections, presented at the beginning of each chapter,
is intended to serve as a road map for the reader. The first chapter
states the problem, objectives, scope and methodology used in the
study. Performance of selected central public sector undertakings
forms the subject matter of second chapter. Performance of public
sector undertakings extent and causes of sickness and privatization
as remedy to sickness have been discussed. The concept of
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with central public sector
enterprises and Government as introduced to review the
performance of these undertakings has also been presented. Chapter
three contains a comprehensive discussion about global steel
industry. International steel trading environment and steel industry
of India in global perspective have been discussed in detail. Growth
of stainless steel industry in India has also been presented. A detailed
analysis of financial performance of SAIL has been carried on in
chapters four and five. The emphasis in chapter four has been laid on
important aspects like procurement and utilization of funds,
management of working capital and state of profitability in SAIL.
Chapter five examines the financial health of company where non-
parametric analysis and multiple-discriminant analysis have been
used. Operational performance of SAIL forms the subject matter of
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sixth chapter. Operational performance has been studied with the
help of important indicators like installed and utilized capacity,
different components of cost like raw material, manpower, fuel and
power, depreciation and others. Pricing and quality control process
though not in detail have been presented in the end. The last and
seventh chapter contains some of the main findings and concluding
observations. Besides, it also suggests some useful measure which
would improve the performance of SAIL in particular and some
other CPSUs in general.
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1The Frame Work
• Overview
• Identification of the Problem
• Review of Literature
• Need and Scope
• Hypotheses
• Objectives
• Methodology used
• Limitations
• Plan of the Study
Chapter-I
2Overview
For four decades after the Second World War, most
economies around the world witnessed historically unparallel
progress. However, after the early 1970s, growth in most of the
industrialized economies began to slow down, affecting much of
the developing world particularly adversely during the 1980s and
1990s. There were varieties of causes of this change in the
trajectory of growth, some of a macro economic nature, other in
the structure of corporate organization and in the inter-firm
linkages. The response to these pressures has been a significant
change in macro economic policies. Throughout the world it has
been a surge towards deregulation and a freeing of barriers to
global flow of many resources. For some countries, this has
resulted in a significant enhancement to economic growth, but for
others, globalization has done little to enhance living standards
and security,. Thus, the gains from globalization are not automatic;
they depend on the response of producers to the changing
competitive environment. One critical area of change is to be
found in the organization of production. To cope up with new
competitive pressures, firms have to deliver not just low-priced
goods and services, but also products of greater quality and
diversity. This requires in the first instance that they reorient their
internal organization, change production layout, introduce new
3methods of quality assurance and institute processes to ensure
continuous improvement. But these changes in themselves are not
sufficient. They need to be complemented by alternatives in the
relationships among firms, particularly with suppliers. These
changes are generic, relevant across sectors and countries and they
are a challenge to be confronted by the industrialized world.
Many developing countries such as India are entering a path
of change, which provides the potential for attaining sustained
industrial and economic growth, and the opportunities and
challenges which this has put forward. ‘India after adopting the
policy of liberalization and deregulation in 1991, has been striving
hard for global excellence, better performance and to achieve a
sustained growth at the rate of 7-8 per cent per annum. Many
efforts like opening of more and more sectors for private sector,
removing of import restrictions, making rupee fully convertible,
allowing MNCs to enter Indian economy and complete
participation in Indian capital market have been undertaken.
Opening up of more sectors for private sector and MNCs, has been
with the major objective of increasing competition between public
and private sector undertakings which will have far reaching
impacts in terms of quality production, lowering per unit cost,
improving export and better services to consumers in India and
abroad.1  Making PSUs viable and competitive several steps have
been initiated. Companies are inherently unstable and they will
come to a halt. It needs continuous energy. Such energy is
normally provided through business restructuring. Restructuring
4of PSUs can be considered as important step in this direction. In
this era of revival and growth, the performance of almost all PSUs
in all sectors is being reviewed. The Government is reviewing
financial sector and services sector also and steps are being
initiated to restructure or revive the sick undertakings.
Restructuring of any undertakings could be done many ways
and by following different methods. The focus of the present
research will be to study the existing position of CPSUs and
suggest the effective measures to revitalize them. Before going in
detail about restructuring process, let us know in nutshell about
restructuring and different methods of restructuring suggested in
the theory.
Corporate restructuring may be defined as an episodic
exercise, not related to investments in new plant and machinery,
which involves a significant change in one or more of the
following:
(1) Pattern of ownership and control.
(2) Composition of liabilities.
(3) Asset mix of the firm.
The restructuring of business is done to take care of
following symptoms of bad health of a company:
• Loosing money from an operating profit standpoint,
• Steady decline in market share,
• Competent employees are leaving,
• Company pride is greatly diminished,
• Overall condition of the installed facilities is declining,
5• Having hard time in generating cash or eating it,
• Increasing levels of inventory, and
• Operating at less than 60 per cent of the capacity.
‘In restructuring of business, the management takes
continuous action for bringing out significant re-orientation in
assets and/or liabilities with the objectives of drastic improvement
in the quality and quantity of future cash flow streams.2
Companies undertake restructuring as a response to external
forces, poor performances due to industrial condition and financial
difficulties. Some companies restructure just for the purpose of
imitating those companies who are doing well. The company may
do external or internal restructuring and sometimes it may be
necessary to do both.
The External Restructuring involves asset-based restructuring,
financial or capital restructuring and changes in ownership structure
while Internal Restructuring means portfolio restructuring and
organizational restructuring.
Forms of Corporate Restructuring
Business firms engage in a broad range of activities
including expanding, shrinking and otherwise restructuring asset
and ownership structures. To provide overviews of these many
kinds of practices, they are summarized as follows. The Grouping
is somewhat arbitrary but indicates the direction of the emphasis
in these various practices.
Forms of Restructuring Business Firms
Expansion:
Merger and Acquisition
6Tender Offers
Joint Ventures
Sell-offs:
Spin-offs
Split-offs
Divestitures
Equity Carve-outs
Corporate Control:
Premium Buy-backs
Standstill Agreements
Anti-takeover Amendments
Proxy Contests
Changes in ownership Structure:
Exchange Offers
Share Repurchases
Going Private
Leveraged Buy-outs
Expansion
From a legal standpoint, there are many distinctions between
types of merger and acquisition. Most, merger means any transaction
that forms one economic unit from two or more previous ones.
Several alternative forms of merger have been distinguished. A
horizontal merger involves two firms operating in the same kind of
business activity. Thus, merger between two steel firms would
represent horizontal merger. Vertical merger involves different stages
of production operation. In the oil industry distinction are made
7between exploration and production activity, refining operation,
and marketing to the ultimate consumer. In the pharmaceutical
industry, one could distinguish between research and the
development of new drugs, the production of drugs, and the
marketing of drug- products through retail drugstores.
Conglomerate merger involves firms engaged in unrelated types of
business activity. Finally, a pure conglomerate merger involves
unrelated business activities that would not qualify as either
product-extension or market-extension mergers.
In a tender offer, one party—generally a corporation seeking a
controlling interest in another corporation – asks the shareholders
of the firm, it is seeking to control, to submit, or to tender their
shares of stock in the firm. If one firm wishes to gain control over
another, it typically seeks approval for the mergers from other
firm’s management and board of directors.
An alternative approach is the bear hug. In this approach, a
company mails a letter to the directors of the takeover target,
announcing the acquisition proposal and requiring the directors
make a quick decision on the bid. If approval cannot be obtained,
the acquiring company can appeal directly to the stockholders by
means of the tender offer, unless the management and the
directors of the targets firm hold enough stock to retain control. If
the shareholders respond favourably to the tender offer, the
acquiring company will gain control and have the power to
replace the directors who have not cooperated in the takeover
effort (this referred to as a hostile takeover). The target firm may
8seek to avoid being acquired or may seek to join with another firm
with which it would rather be associated. The target firm,
therefore, may seek to elicit an offer from a partner, it considers
more desirable, a white knight or the target firm may engage in a
form of restructuring such as offering to pay shareholders a large
cash dividend financed by debt. Shareholders to the outside offer
may prefer this restructuring and restructuring may make the
target less attractive to the bidder.
Joint ventures involve the intersection of only a small fraction
of the activities of the companies involved and usually for a
limited duration of 10 to 15 years or less. They may represent a
separate entity in which each of the parties makes cash and other
forms of investment.
Sell-Off
The literature describes several kind of sell-offs. The two
major types are spin-off and divestiture. A spin-off creates a separate
new legal entity, its shares are distributed on a pro-rata basis to
existing shareholders of the parent company. Thus, existing
stockholders have the same proportion of ownership in the new
entity as in the original firm. There is, however, a separation of
control, and eventually the new entity as a separate decision-
making unit may develop policies and strategies different from
those of the original parent, the original parent receives no cash. In
a sense, a spin-off represents a form of a dividend to existing
shareholders. A variation of a spin-off is the split-off, in which a
portion of existing shareholders receives stock in a subsidiary in
9exchange for parent company stock. Still a different variation of
the spin-off is a split-up, in which the entire firm is broken up in a
series of spin-offs, so that the parent no longer exists and only the
new off- springs survive.
In contrast to the class of spin-offs in which only shares are
transferred or exchanged is another group of transactions in which
cash comes into the firm-divestiture. Basically, a divestiture
involves the sale of a portion of the firm to an outside third party.
The divesting firm receives cash or equivalent consideration.
Typically, the buyer is an existing firm, so that no new legal entity
results. It simply represents a form of expansion on the part of the
buying firm.
A variation on divestiture is the equity carve-out. An equity
carve-out involves the sale of a portion of the firm via an equity
offering to outsiders. In other words, new shares of equity are sold
to outsiders which give them ownership of a portion of the
previously existing firm. A new legal entity is created. The
equityholders in the new entity need not be the same as the
equityholders in the original seller. A new control group is
immediately created.
Corporate Control
The third grouping of activities is referred to as corporate
control. Premium buy-backs represent the repurchase of a substantial
stockholder’s ownership interest at a premium above the market
price (called green-mail). Often in connection with such buy-backs,
a standstill agreement is written. This represents a voluntary
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contrast in which the stockholder who is bought out agrees not to
make further attempts to take over the company in the future.
When a standstill agreement is made without a buy-back, the
substantial stockholder simply agrees not to increase his or her
ownership, which presumably would put him or her in an
effective control position.
Anti-takeover amendments are changes in the corporate by
laws to make an acquisition of the company more difficult or more
expansive. These include (1) supermajority voting provisions
requiring a high percentage (for example, 80%) of stockholders to
approve a merger, (2) staggered terms for directors which can a
delay change of control for a number of years, and (3) golden
parachutes which award large termination payments to existing
management, if cont4rol of the firm is changed and management is
terminated.
In a proxy contest, an outside group seeks to obtain
representation on the firm’s board of directors. The outsiders are
referred to as “dissidents” or “insurgents” who seek to reduce the
control position of the “incumbents” or existing board of directors.
Since the management of a firm often has effective control of the
board of directors, proxy, and contests are usually regarded as
directed against the existing management.
Changes in ownership structure
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Changes in ownership structure represent the fourth group of
restructuring activities. One form is through exchange offers
which may be the exchange of debt or preferred stock for common
stock, or conversely of common stock for the more senior claims.
Exchanging debt for common stock increases leverage.
A second form is share repurchase which simply means that
the corporation buys back some fraction of its outstanding shares
of common stock. Tender offers may be made for share
repurchase. The percentage of shares purchase may be small or
substantial. If the later, the effect may be to change the control
structure in the firm.
In a going-private transaction, the entire equity interest in a
previously public corporation is purchased by a small group of
investors. The firm is no longer subject to the regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, whose purpose is to protect
public investors. Going-private transactions typically include
members of the incumbent management group who obtain a
substantial proportion of the ownership of the newly private
company. When the incumbent management initiates the
transaction, it is referred to as a management buy-out (MBO).
Usually a small group of outside investors provides funds and,
typically, secures representation on the private company’s board
of directors. These outside investors also arrange other financing
from third-party investors. When financing from third parties
involves substantial borrowing by the private company, such
transactions are referred to as leveraged buy-out (LBOs).
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Clearly, many forms of business and financial restructuring
activities are covered above. These activities have stirred much
controversy. Are they good or bad for the economic health of the
nation? Do they divert the energies of managers from bonfire
economic activity to financial manipulation? Do they use up
financial resources which otherwise would be employed in “real”
investment activities? Why has such heightened restructuring
activities been phenomenon of a last 20 years?3 All these questions
are important to be understood before the talk about restructuring
of corporates.
Waves for Restructuring: Some Reasons
One of the main reasons of restructuring is the pressure of
investors to deliver shareholder value. The increasing pressure to
slash cost is also responded by restructuring the business and
many mergers and acquisition have been taking place because of
low valuation of companies. The consolidation of fragmented
industries is also attempted through restructuring. Sometimes
companies go for restructuring to undo certain bad managerial
decisions. Thus, the reasons for restructuring can be summarized
as, to cut cost, to achieve focus, to eliminate intra-group conflicts.
In spite of good intentions, all companies do not get success
in restructuring the business. Some of the reasons why
restructuring fails can be enumerated as, too late to wake up, no
soul searching, active inertia, IR taken for granted, declining
morale of employees, penny wise – pound foolish.  In the context
of present study several questions can be raised.
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Who runs the organization? Can you fight for PSU better
with old tools? Are new tools required? The other important issues
are:
• What is performed by CPSU’?
• Which core area is to be restructured?
• Why it is to be restructured?
• Is there any other alternative than restructuring?
• Is restructuring successful?
• Cost factor keeps in mind.
• Information Technology adopted by PSU’s is required or
not?
• What is activity-based performance?
• What problem is with PSUs?
• Is same problem  not with privatisation?
• In core area, why a particular area is selected?
• Can a model developed on SAIL may be fit on other PSUs. If
yes, then how?
• How this model helps other organizations?
• What type of skilled people are required?
• What type of development is required in PSUs?, and what
value should be created by CPSU?
Identification of the Problem
The public sector has played a pivotal role in the economic
and industrial development of India by providing capital, strong
14
infrastructure, modern technology, economies of scale and
employment generation. It has attempted to implement the
objectives of planning through reducing the regional disparities
and checking the concentration of economic power. The public
sector has been potent factors in the import substitution and
export promotion, thus making India more self reliant.
Judging the performance of public enterprises is,
undoubtedly, a more ticklish problem, as compared to private
enterprises. This is because these enterprises are required to fulfil a
multiple of objectives, which is quite conflicting in nature.
Moreover, their objectives have not been stated clearly so far. In
the absence of clear-cut objectives, there are difficulties in judging
their performances. Profitability in term of return on investment
alone cannot be the efficiency. However, they are expressed to give
an adequate or reasonable return on investments made in the
theory.
The government as well as parliament is quite concerned
with capacity utilization of production of these enterprises, as it
has not been quite satisfactory. The concept and determination of
capacity utilization itself is not very clear especially in those
enterprises where the products are multiple and certain facilities in
the shop are common. The broad picture of capacity utilization, at
macro level, is presented in three ranges, namely (a) units which
have recorded capacity utilization more than 75 per cent, (b) units
where capacity utilization is between 50 to 75 per cent, and (c)
units where capacity utilization is less than 50 per cent. The
15
capacity utilization of manufacturing/producing enterprises
indicating the number of enterprises for 2006-07 and previous six
years is given in Table 1.
Table 1.1
Capacity utilization in public enterprises
Number of EnterprisesCapacity
Utilisation
(%)
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
More than
75
133
(58%)
119
(50.85%)
118
(55.39%)
126
(59%)
122
(56%)
121
(55%)
Between
50-75
30 40 37 32 48 47
Less than
50
65 69 58 56 49 52
Total 228
(100%)
228
(100%)
213
(100%)
214
(100%)
219
(100%)
220
(100%)
Source: Public Enterprise Survey.
It is clear from the table that nearly 58.01 per cent units were
operating above 75.00 per cent capacity utilization during the year
2006-07 as compared to 50.85 per cent in 2005-06 and 55.39 per cent
during previous years.
The objectives of private enterprises are quite clear but this is
not true of public enterprises. Even after so many years, we are
still grappling with this issue and the government has not yet
come forward with clear-cut objectives of these enterprises. In the
absence of clearly designed objectives of these enterprises, it is
16
indeed a great problem to judge their efficiency properly and
correctly.
Further, the achievement has to be viewed against the
background of the multidimensional objectives of public
enterprises and also the fact that these enterprises are functioning
in different segments of industry and facing divergent constraints
including those of location, non-availability of inputs like raw
materials, power, fuel and infrastructure facilities, inherited
industrial sickness from private sector, pricing restrictions due to
public policy etc. The profitability of steel, coal and lignite,
fertilizers, heavy engineering, textiles, telecommunication services
and tourist services have recorded a decline.
The main point is that accountability of PEs at present is very
weak. If detailed corporate plans and performance budgets are
prepared keeping in view the well-known management
methodology and techniques, and are discussed and accepted in
advance, most of the problems would be sorted out. But this does
not happen. Most of the PSUs are weak with respect to managing
their resources of men, materials, machines and money. One is
horrified while going through the report of the Comptroller and
Auditor  General of India, Union Government (Commercial)
which gives a resume of the auditors report on fovernment
companies. For example, according to an estimate over 40 PSUs
did not have maximum and minimum limits and reorder levels of
operation, or it is not effective, or no system of standard cost has
been introduced or norms of consumption for major raw materials
17
have not been fixed. In about 40 enterprises there is no system of
ascertaining idle time for labour and machinery specifying the
reason thereof.
It would be unreasonable to imagine that all is well in the
public undertakings. There is much scope for improving the
efficiency and working of public sector enterprises. The main
points which needs consideration are mounting losses, political
factors influencing decisions about location, delays in completion
and increase in cost of construction, over capitalization, price
policy, use of more manpower resources than actual requirement,
capacity utilization, faculty controls, inefficient management,
higher capital intensities leading to lower-employment generation.
In brief, it may be pointed out that picture of the public sector
generally painted by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce
and Industry, Forum of Free Enterprises, and such other
organizations is too black. Most of the public sector enterprises are
not functioning efficiently. The competitiveness of the private and
public sector projects should act as the motivating mechanisms for
improving efficiency in the both sectors.
As the result of deliberate policy of encouraging public
sector, heavy investments were made in the public sector, so as to
facilitate the process of industrialization, by establishing heavy
and basic industries and create infrastructure of power, electricity
and transport. But for the short span of five years (1968-74), the
average rate of growth of investment was of the order of about 19
18
per cent during 1980-81 to 1995-96, the growth rate of investments
was still significant at 16.5 per cent per annum.
Hence, the critical question arises:
Will the Indian public enterprises be able to survive under the pressure
that they currently face?
The poor performance of some of our enterprises is, mostly
due to substantial underutilization of capacity and at the same
time we have still not been able to evolve a personnel policy for
our public sector undertakings which would recognize, attract,
and build up our reward for talents. The task of public sector
enterprises management is indeed a difficult one as they are
expected to harmonize the plans and results of the operations of
their enterprises and do them with the large rational goals that
would directly promote the economic well being of the
community. It is those responsibilities, which distinguish most of
public sector. The sickness in certain sectors of the economy is
mainly due to the shortsighted policies of government which
render these units helpless. Some other non-financial problems are
also there, like the role of labour, multiplicity of unions and the
lack of autonomy.
Public enterprises in India are under unprecedented
pressure. One major cause of this is the increasingly difficult
public finance situation of the government and of local authorities.
Take for example, the central government’s budgetary support to
finance central public enterprises plan outlays. Another major
19
source of pressure on public enterprises is the new economic
policy, with its focus on increasing competition through:
(a) relaxation of barriers to entry expansion for both Indian
and foreign firms, as a result of changes in the rules of
industrial licensing and direct foreign investment.
(b) large import due to reduced import duties.
(c) easier access to efficient technologies and other relatively
less costly inputs.
A large number of public enterprises are doing very poor,
but can be saved. Further, there is a group of profit-making public
enterprises, which may face difficulties in the emerging economic
environment. Take, for example, those in the petrochemical sector.
They are now operating in a regime of high import duties on the
products they produce. This enables them to generate a value
addition substantially higher than they would be generated under
low import duties. Wages and salaries account for a good part of
this relatively high value addition with a part of the balance
reported as profit. Will these enterprises be able to pay current
wages and salaries and still report a profit in a regime of import
duties ranging between say 5 and 30 per cent? No, indeed, they
may be wiped out if they do not attain competitive advantage.
Given the challenges that India faces on fronts of public
sector finance and balance of payments, it has been pointed out
that for public enterprises profit is not the objective but public
good is the motivating factor. However, the need for making
20
profits is recognized now and restructuring and returns have been
undertaken thereof.
Review of Literature
In order to have proper insight into the various aspects of the
problem under study, it will be useful and imperative to review
the studies conducted in the past. Till now, many studies have
been conducted on the different aspects of centre and state public
undertakings but it has been rarely tried to work on the problems
of these undertakings and suggested for taking out these
organizations from distress.
Narender Gupta,4 studied the financial management of
selected sick cotton textiles mills with special reference to
Maharashtra.
Ramakant,5 highlighted some behavioral determinants of
organizations performance in selected industrial undertakings in
India.
Krishana Murti,6 has studied business corporate strategies of
public enterprises in a competitive environment.
Pattanaik Saroj Kumar,7 has argued on personnel, social and
organizational correlates of management effectiveness in the
public sector undertakings.
Suresh Inderchand Khurana,8 has discussed performance
evaluation of public utility undertaking Mumbai.
Mukesh Mathur,9 has undertaken an enquiry into the nature
and causes of underutilization of capacity in public sector steel
industry of India.
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Vannmala, M.10 has stated an enquiry into the corporation of
public sector for water sections for Andhra Pradesh.
Brijesh Kumar,11 has analysed performance budgeting in
central government undertakings in India.
Krishna Nandan Prasad,12 has very lucidly discussed the
problems of growth of investment and capacity utilization of
public sector enterprises in India with special reference to the state
undertakings of Bihar.
H. Venkateshwar,13 has emphasized on marketing
management in public enterprises in his study of selected
undertakings.
Marketing Management of Iron and Steel Industry in India
has been studied by Ghosh and Kamal,14 with a case study of
Central Marketing Organisation of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Siva Prasad,15 has worked on Administration of Centre
Public Enterprises in India with special reference to the
organization and working of the Hindustan Cables Limited.
Sharma, Vinod Kumar,16 has observed the performance of
state trading in mineral and metals in India with reference to an
appraisal of working of the Minerals and Metals Trading
Corporation of India Ltd. and its subsidiaries.
Sadhana,17 has outlined performance of selected public
enterprises in India.
Sen Gupta, Palav Ranjan,18 has studied social efficiency of
Indian Public enterprises.
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Mohan Reddy, Rama A,19 worked on a study of growth,
structure and performance of Andhra Pradesh enterprises.
Jitendra Kudsia,20 observed public undertakings in India
with a case study of public undertakings of Delhi Administration.
Dubey, Ram Shanker,21 has very lucidly analysed
performance evaluation of State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.
Lal Manohar,22 has undertaken a comparative study of
financial health of SAIL and TISCO.
Madhavi C.V.,23 has indicated management of change in
Steel Authority of India Limited.
Edward Elgar, Wright Mike,24 has discussed the role of
management, buy-outs and venture capital into the millennium.
Matoo P.K.,25 has highlighted the role of corporate
restructuring in the Indian business scenario.
J. Fred Weston, Kwang & S.Chang and Susan E.Hoag,26 have
worked on mergers, restructuring and corporate control.
Vasant Satne,27 has analysed the need of restructuring of
public sector in India.
C.R. Anada Rao,28 has studied the public enterprises and
parliamentary committees in India.
B.C. Tondon,29 has studied the management of public
enterprises in India.
Sankra T.L. and Reddy Y. Venugopal,30 have raised some
issue, like political economy of economic-liberalisation and
diversification of ownership of public enterprises. They suggest
that privatization in the U.K. is a lesson for India.
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Sankar T.L.,31 worked on productivity in public enterprises.
Standing conference of public enterprises32 has some
recommendations from report of the committee (The Arjun Sen
Gupta Committee Report) to review policy for public enterprises.
Mahajan Y.S. and Virmani M.R.,33 concluded in a seminar
held under the auspices of Parliamentary Forum of Public Sector
and Centre for Public Sector Studies and analysed productivity in
the use of changing technology.
Hickman Craig R.,34 has worked out a strategic game, ‘an
interactive business game when you make or break the company.’
Humphrey John,35 has emphasized on corporate
restructuring in the organization and drew some models with the
experience of Crompton Greaves Ltd.
Sange Peter M.36 has highlighted the art and practice of the
learning organization.
Bhattacharya K. Ashish,37 analysed that corporate
governance is a system that effectively enforces accountability
relationship between the executive management and the board of
directors and also between the board of directors and shareholders
of a company. This concept in corporate management has potential
of significantly improving corporate performance.
Chattopadhyay P.38 has suggested that export from the
government controlled companies could have been better if they
were free to operate in a manner that non-government companies
do.
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Biswasray Prasanna39 has observed that the need of states
sick units is not merely finance but in many cases guidance on
restructuring management and judicious restructuring
programmes.
Murugan M. Sathivel40 has argued that Human Resource
Management and Evaluation is vital for growth and profitability of
business and economy.
Prakash Om41 has stated that public sector is set to retain
much of the commanding heights of the Indian economy over the
foreseeable factors.
Kumar Ashok42 has highlighted that the public sector
enterprises desiring for turnaround, should come out on
commercial ways of managing. Through planning and
implementation they must concise the government and other
shareholders.
Chattopadhyay43 has observed that government at the centre
is in favour of unloading the government stakes especially in the
sick companies. The move for delimiting IISCO from SAIL should
not be read as a move towards privatization.
Jalal M.L.44 has stated that privatisation through
sisinvestment is a painful process, which must be executed with
the most prudence, and transparency failing which this process
may be labelled as an exercise of “naturalizing losses” and
privatizing gains of PSUs.
Singh Yogesh Kumar45 has highlighted that transport is one
of the three priority sectors to be developed as an essential
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infrastructure for the accelerated growth of the economy, the other
two being power and communication. Quoting the rates in
competitive market determinant should be railway’s variable
costs, rates of competing modes of transport, total cost of the users
and the quality of service.
Nageshwar Rao and R.P. Das46 have suggested that
globalization calls for better management of multicultural
environment, fast response to change and, subscription to globally
accepted standards of quality, delivery and price, SAIL has to
change the mindset of their employees. It should withdraw from
those business activities that do not add value to their core activity
of making steel.
Chakaraborty Pradip Kumar47 has analyzed that SAIL and
TISCO were earning profits whether below or above their
expectations and also confirms lack of consistency and uniformity
in the managerial efficiency to some extent in TISCO and is full in
SAIL.
Agarwal R.S. and Garg Chetra48 have worked on Value
Added Statement. They have observed that an organization
performs well till they add value during a particular period to the
providers of capital, employees, government for the growth and
expansion.
Mathur B.L.49 has highlighted that restructuring of PSUs
covering all the aspects i.e. legal, financial and physical should be
given top priority. Disinvestment would serve the twin objectives
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of mainly PSUs competitiveness and obtaining funds for their
restructuring.
Kumar Brijesh50 has stated that public sector enterprises have
been set up in India with multidimensional objectives which are
conflicting in nature. The objectives are unlike private enterprises,
economic as well as non-economic, and often it is not possible, in
practice, to fulfil both simultaneously.
Beigh Nafees51 has argued that the accountability of PEs at
present is very weak. Most PSUs are weak with respect to
managing their resources of men, material, machines and money.
If detailed corporate plans and performance budgets are prepared
keeping in view the well-known management methodology and
techniques, and are discussed and accepted in advance, most of
the problem would be sorted out.
Choudhary A.K.52 has observed that both private and public
sectors are valuable national assets assiduously built over decades
of sustained efforts and dismantling or weakening them will be
against country’s interest.
Chattopadhyay P.53 has highlighted that Standing
Committee of Industry has suggested that the outstanding loans
given to the units which have not done well should be converted
into equity so that the financial structure of these units got a face
lift.
Srivastava D.K.54 outlined that India embarked upon the
path of structural adjustment of its economy. As a result of the
opportunities and threat posed by the new economic polices, there
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has been any change in the structure of industrial relations in
general and public sector in particular.
Bhattacharya K. Ashish55 has suggested that Corporate
Governance Models are systems and practices that minimize the
agency problem.
Azad R.R. 56 has discussed the concept and performance of
joint ventures which indicates the reality of economic cooperation
within the developing countries and indicates to its untapped
potential.
Verma Sawalia Bhiari,57 has highlighted that the primary
cause of industrial sickness in a majority of courses is bad and
inapt management. Judicious and officious understanding of the
crisis on the part of the turnaround players can only entail the
development of an appropriate strategy of turnaround.
Kumar Brijesh58 has observed that as B.P.C.L. becomes a sick
unit, it was referred to B.I.F.R. in 1992-93. After discussions at
various levels a rehabilitation scheme for revival of B.P.C.L. was
sanctioned.
Mehta Versha59 has analysed that adopting information
technologies is at ‘evolutionary’ stage in the organization rather
than ‘revolutionary’. The impact of IT is more on operational level
than a strategic/top level.
Swamy P. Sardanand, Mishra R.K.60 has discussed that
executive will differ in their perceptions about organizational
climate dimensions, according to the ownership of their
28
companies/organizations centrally-owned and state-owned
enterprises.
Azad R.R. 61 has outlined the main thrust to setting up joint
ventures abroad, provided by acquisition of technology and its
adaptation to Indian ambitions and the experience governed
through industrialization.
Deb Kaushik62 has suggested that collaboration between the
public and private sectors is essential in planning future research
strategies. The strategies which are global in coverage and
requisite cooperation by all the major entities in biotechnological
research in industrial and developing countries.
Lall Madhurmia63 has observed that from the course which
appears similar in nature generally, we expect the similar effects.
The model takes account the cases, which are primitive and
provide a simple axiomatisation of a decision rule that chooses the
best act based on its past performance in similar cases.
Sharma A.K. 64 has stated that there should be insistence on
the need to examine the relevance, worth and effectiveness of all
restructuring activities undertaken by the government. Time has
come when the revival of these undertakings has become
imperative and for making them competitive organizations.
Dutta Gautum65 is of the view that optimal utilization of
companies resources is one of the most important problems in the
area of operation management. The determination of optimal
product axis is an extremely difficult task for an organization with
multiple tasks producing multiple products in multiple stages,
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sharing a set of common plant resources and experiencing a
fluctuating market over time.
Mangaraj Sujata66 has analysed HRD as an integrated system
with many subsystems and HRD practices in RSP is fairly good,
giving a substantial scope for improvement.
Srivastava A. 67 has observed that change is inevitable in the
history of any organization. Organisations that do not change or
keep pace with the changing environment suffer from entropy and
soon become different, to function effectively, organizations have
to achieve equilibrium between its internal and external
environment. However, this equilibrium is not static but dynamic.
Bagal Kotler Suhas S., Ganga S.68 have discussed,
management of government bodies which are representatives of
diverse groups is difficult to manage and equally difficult is
evolving a model for addressing public grievances.
Gupta Kumar K. 69 has stated that strategic planning is one
such approach by which an organization achieves its goals and
objectives. The rational is to decide upon adequate resources
allocation for various functions and programmes of the enterprise.
Jha S.70 has analysed that Memorandum of understanding
(MoU) is the latest device for evaluation and improvement in the
efficiency of public enterprises. The new ‘MOU’ has been drafted
in a manner so that the performance of public enterprises on
various aspects could be added up and a composite score be
arrived at.
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Bhatia Saceeta and Verma Satish71 have highlighted that
profitability of the banks depends both on exogenous i.e. policy
determined variables such as reserve requirements, direct credit
programmers and on endogenous variables such as composition of
deposits, establishment expenses, spread and burden etc.
Gupta S.P.72 has stated that India has to transform itself from
a controlled planned economy to a market economy. The country
must also allow mergers and acquisitions since none of the Indian
firms have world scale operations. For competition, there is an
imperative need for improving total factor productivity in India.
Raipuria Kalyan73 has highlighted the growth rate of the
country has much to do with structural, allocational and efficiency
or productivity factors than large credit.
Shetty S.L.74 has observed that the scenario of consistent
structural deterioration since the mid-sixties was primarily the
result of a series of policy actings and inactings including the
downgrading of the planning process.
Ahammed M. Aziz75 is of the view that transparency and
people’s participation in regulatory and developmental
administration is very much desirable, not only in bridging the
gap between the administration and the public but also in nation
building by way of reading the corruption and complaints against
the system. Further, it helps the people to understand the
condition of the administration at different levels.
Kumar Prabhat,76 has worked on the critical role of the state
in the delivery of public goods and services and can be realized
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only through an efficient, effective but responsive administration
delivering quality public service.
Gupta K.N. 77 has highlighted that besides accountability of
public servants in the government department, it is much
important in public sector undertakings and government
companies to achieve governance, productivity and profitability. A
well regulated control system is essential.
Thomas Paul G. 78 has suggested that there is no single best
approach to the management of change in the public sector. We
would continue to witness policy failures, ineffective and
inefficient programmes and dependence of the public enterprises
on government.
Garg Sturgess79 has analysed that among the four resources,
even if many materials and machines are available in an
organization, human resources need to provide a vital link for all
these recourses towards enhanced productivity. A rational
thinking for creating thinking for creating a new system or at least
restructuring the existing system is needed now.
Robinson Mark80 has observed that the underlying
assumption is that the state is bloated, unaccountable and largely
ineffective in discharging development tasks and responsibilities.
This gave rise to a series of prescriptions designed to reconfigure
state institutions by rendering them smaller, cleaner and more
accountable.
Ramaswamy P.R.81 has suggested that long-term
implementation of TQM will help in the continuous evolution of
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norms and improvement of standards to ensure real satisfaction of
the people in a dynamic environment.
Lamjermath T.M.82 has highlighted that The Hong Kong
Government (1995) published a guide to Human Resource
Management which explained how human resource management
worked in the Hong Kong civil services. The HRM framework in
Hong Kong operates in a quasi democratic system when the
government is not directly elected and the legislature is limited in
power.
Chandra, Amitabh83 has observed that many times the
success of a leader/manager depends upon his/her ability to
communicate effectively with the other team members. In order to
have effective communication in any organization it is important
to ensure that all members strive to improve their communication
skills.
Ramaswamy P.R. 84 has analysed that there has been a
general decline in efficiency and effectiveness of various organs of
government considering the general deterioration in quality and
standards. It is high time that TQM is started within the
government even though several obstacles are there on the way.
Narang A.S., and Singla M.L.,85 have studied that the
Decision Support System (DSS) draw heavily upon the
quantitative technique and management science models. The level
of acceptance of DSS in the Indian Public sector organization has
been verifying.
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Raghavulu C.V.86 has observed that markets are not of
natural creating, they are always legal and public or private but
which of many possible mixed public-private structures work best.
Verma Kush,87 in liberalization and work force restructuring
policy has stated that the Government’s experience on the issue of
work-force restructuring best be termed as a missed opportunity.
In 1991, the time was ripe to amend entry and exit rules so as to
bring India in line with international practice.
Ramanandhan V.V.88 has observed that experiences show
that the process of privatization, though not simple has worked.
This is true for various enterprises, including low-income
countries government on privatization faced a challenge. The
benefits of efficiency and innovation only materialize if lessons are
heeded and privatization is done correctly.
Chatterjee Samiredra89 has worked on essential requirements
of market and economy. There should be free entry and exit for
any industry. Thus, inefficient units should be closed down and
new efficient units should take their place. It is not important
whether the units are in private sector or public sector.
Bourgault Jacues90 has observed that interaction is becoming
necessary at the highest levels of government administrative units.
Horizontal integration aims at first for improving the quality of
policies and decisions by maximizing the interface between the
various sectors of the organization.
Elam L.B.91 has stated that privatization movement has
increasingly led to experimentation with the replacement of civil
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service personnel with contractors in the delivery of a range of
public services.
Das K.L.92 analyses that when employees are identified with
the organization they are induced to use the goals of the
organization as the basis of their action. Such identification
restrains corrupt behaviour.
Swaminathan93 has remarked that a turnaround in
agriculture is imperative for a higher growth projector but not
without a revival of investment demand.
C. Rangarajan94, former RBI Governor, has described that the
thrust of the new economic policy has been towards creating a
more competitive environment in the economy.
Ganesh G.95, member secretary Disinvestment Commission,
has stated that unless public cooperation is solicited through an
effective campaign, there is bound to be cynicism about the
motives for privatization.
Ramachandran Sushma96 is of the view that the success is
global trade in any area will depend largely on the extent to which
Indian exports are added to remain competitive in the world
markets.
Sethi Sudhir97 has viewed that one must admit that there is
shortage in India of experienced VCS (Venture Capital) who have
gone though the complete cycle of fund raising investment and
disinvestment.
Sampath R.98 has observed that AAI (Airports Authority of
India) agrees that for a Greenfield project, the best option will be
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BOT or Boot with a foreign investor, but an agreement has to be
tied up on the equity stake and sharing of costs.
Dikshit Sandeep99 has discussed and argued that in the
telecom services sector, it is now clear that BSNL’s nationwide
suzerainty will be challenged by at least two or three major
players.
Likhi K. Dinesh and Kumar Sanja100 have studied that
liberalization and globalization privatisation and decentralization
will see the emergence of networked corporates in the metal
industry through phases of consolidation and alliances.
Muthuraman B.101 has studied with the onset of steelenniam,
the domestic CR product minaret has been newer entrants setting
up substantial capacity with capabilities to cater to high end
applications.
Mehra J.102 has observed that an opportunity to export flat
steel has emerged from the growing markets in South-East Asian
countries, however the industry will have to trigger domestic
demand in order to exhaust the surplus capacity. He studied the
performance of Essare Steel.
Sampath R.103 has highlighted that the problem of cheap
imports is caused by the lower tariff regime in the current era of
liberalization and the unrestricted import of all iron and steel
materials under the new Export-Import Policy.
Prasannan, R.K.104 has stated that E-commerce is not merely
a mass action but it is information dissemination too. Every e-
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commerce company will have to provide information base to
attract and facilitate business.
Ananthanarayanan P.S.105 analysed the growth of the Indian
lubricants industry has been vigorous since the 1990s, thanks to
liberalization of the economy and globalization.
Cherian Dilip106 in the cover feature, ‘how to guarantee
failure’ has highlighted that chief executives of Indian corporate
scenario payout by grouping insecurity of tenure cut harassed by
increasing official interference, the public sector is rapidly loosing
its best people.
Puri Anil107 analysed how public sector of the economy is
managed, including some controversial issue like current wage
policy, workers participation and the problem of multiplicity of
unions. A demand for greater autonomy in management and less
political interference was also raised by the participants.
Thapar Ramesh108 has observed the need of foreign
consultants to the rescue the public sector. He projects the need to
introduce a firm of foreign consultants to the public sector to locate
the production hold-up and to offer guidelines for effective
management.
In the interview A.L. Roongta, President of the Council of
State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation of
India, (COSIDICI) has observed the sickness in certain sectors of
the economy is mainly due to the shortsighted government
policies and suggest reintroducing the credit rating system of the
managing agencies. If one company in the group defaults, then the
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other companies will find it difficult to raise facts as their credit
rating also gets bad. 109
Bhaskar R.N.110 has analysed that TCI, which was set up in
1958, India’s largest road transport company, today has become a
family owned and run company. Now it plans to go public by
diluting 20 per cent of its holding.
Vasuki S.N. 111 has highlighted that National Textile
Corporation declares with 123 composite mills located throughout
the country. The National Textile Corporation is freely a public
sector giant, but its problems are also of majestic proportionate
losses of Rs.717 crore and insufficient funds for indenisation,
among many others. The government belated efforts at the
corporations revival are, not unexpectedly resulting in a series of
unrealistic policy directives.
Chandra Perez112 has analysed that in the focus on ONGC,
S.P. Wahi, Chairman of ONGC, trying hard to push through his
reorganization plan. He raised some vital issues like structural
specialization, common basic approach, commercial working
relationship functionally autonomous support group etc.
Maitra Dilip113 has worked on one of the oldest public sector
enterprises in the country, Hindustan Cables Ltd. One had a
virtual monopoly over the cable market, it now has to think on its
fact if it is to face the turmoil of double competition that has
emerged. After making profit consistently over its 31 years, the
public sector company Hindustan Cables Ltd. is feeling the beat of
competition and changes.
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Puri Anil114 has highlighted that BHEL plans to increase the
power generation capacity from the current 35,000 MW to around
1,05,000 MW by 1995, there has been a corresponding element for
increasing the unit size of thermal power plants. However, the
benefits to reap from the larger units critically depend on a
number of the strengthening of the grid system and the availability
of an adequate coal supply.
Minocha Naresh115 convinced the commerce ministry that
MMTC should be given a free hand to the decisions on when to
buy, how much to buy and from where to buy. Decision-making is
becoming decentralized. The biggest mistake that Indian
companies made is to include overhead costs in the export price.
They should determine the prices on the basis of variable cost
only.
Kannan R. 116  has observed that there are several aspects of
the ports management that require constant attention in order to
enhance the attractiveness of containerization, minimize
formalities and paper work that continue to irritate users. It is a
feature, common to all aspects of the Indian government, be it the
administration or the public sector, particular to the container
terminal.
Vasuki S.N.117 has outlined a market leader in basic
chemicals, the public sector Hindustan Organic Chemicals, has
now begun looking beyond its traditional business. It virtually
eliminates the need for imports HOC’s products serve a wide
range of industries – Textiles, automobiles, cosmetics, and plated,
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but competition is fierce. HOC is planning several other
diversifications.
Ganguli Budhisatva118 has worked on Petronet LNG Ltd., a
joint venture between ONGC, IOCL COIL and BPCL which aims
to build facilities for the import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and
related infrastructure facilities.
Ravindernath Sushila119 has observed that the navaratnas
and mininavratnas will face pure carnage without any benefit of
privatization and they will be confiding out on the Indian capital
market. The public sector needs a skilful drive to negotiate the
difficult track. It is important to know what to divert and also how
much to divert. The Disinvestment Commission set up an advisory
body in August, 1996, has exceeded its period by going into the
restructuring aspects and giving suggestions on, what should be
done with disinvestment proceeds. Whether, there should be
restructuring before or  after disinvestment is a controversial
subject.
Pathania Ramesh120 studied after a long spell of
liberalization, disinvestment is acquiring popular currency. A well
planned programme of selling public sector undertaking can lift
the market from the debuts of government and bring in a new
breed of investors. Government would dilute its share in non-
strategic PSUs down to 26 per cent, shunt unviable units and sell
their assets to meet pending liabilities. The process of identifying
chronically sick units was underway in order to close them down
or sell them outright.
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Ray Mehasweta Ghosh121 observed Dabur (India) is going
through a major restructuring exercise on the advice of Mckinsey
& Co. The American Management Consultancy firm concentrates
on a few business to improve the supply chain and procurement
processes and reorganize the appraisal and compensation systems.
The Steel Re-rolling Mills Association of India (SRMA) is
protesting against the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) entering
into purchase deals with traders, under which billets are being
sold with after steel items to the traders who sell these billets to re-
rollers at high prices.122
Thomas Eapen123 has studied that it may be necessary to
grant some concession to the industry either in the form of duty
relief on imported strips or a reduction in excise duties on mini
steel unit’s final products. In the long run, however, the health of
the industry depends on letting inefficient units die and allowing
the others to modernize.
Sarkar Raju124 has analysed after SAIL’s loss of Rs.1,574 crore
in 1998-99.  The first in the last 12 years the morale in the company
is low. Mckinsey & Co. and Arvind Pande, Chairman SAIL, have
submitted a plan of reconstructing to the Union Ministry of steel in
October 1998. In their views reconstructing will not only help to
get over temporary problems but will also address the structural
problems. SAIL could easily convert its huge losses into net profit
of Rs.1,000 crore per annum in 5 years.
Mazumdar Rakhi125 has studied that the multiplicity of
lobbies has already led to the Union Steel and Commerce
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Ministries being pincer by the conflicting interests of the different
lobbies. Essar Steel, Ispat, Lloyds Steel and Jindal Iron & Steel
decided to set up Indofer. Indofer will speech as one voice for the
steel industry. Restricting the competition to the market place
would be a smooth way for steel giants such as the Steel Authority
of India, TISCO, Essar Steel, Ispat, Coal Lloyds steel to understand
their steel strategies.
Gupta P. Anand126 analyzed that public enterprises in India
are under unprecedented pressure. One major source of this is the
increasingly difficult public finance situation of the government
and of local authorities. Many public enterprises may have to be
privatized. But we should not privatize in a hurry not without
doing homework. There is an urgent need for public enterprise
reform.
Kumar K.G. 127 has observed that statistics reveal that in
Kerala, a state not renowned for industrial dynamism, many
public sector companies have consistently performed poorly.
Saxena, Anoop128 has observed that ministers and
bureaucrats alike treat even the heads of public sector
undertakings with scant respect, apparently without realizing the
disastrous consequences that civil follow if some 2,50,000 CPSU
officers decide to immobile the vast public sector. A higher salary
is not the only way to motivate an executive, Authority’s power
and respect is quite important.
Need and Scope of the Study
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The review of literature presented in the preceding part of
discussion testifies that many studies have been conducted in the
past on the public sector undertakings, both central and state but
no study seems to be conducted on revival of PSUs. In the present
scenario where business world has become highly competitive,
public sector undertakings are finding it very difficult to cope up
with this race. It has been observed that many organizations of the
manufacturing sector in the public sector suffer from decline in
sales of their product, mounting inventories, consequent heavy
loses due to excess human resources as well as outdated
technology and lack of competitive work culture. Time has come
when the revival of these undertakings has become imperative and
for making them competitive, Government need to take some
effective steps accepting the fact that the present time is the time of
change towards betterment.
Not only a change seems to be tumultuous, it is also said to
be continuous to the extent that organizations and individuals
have no longer time to think about the impacts of one set of
changes before another wave washes over them. The pace, scope
and depth of changes taking place in the public sector are said to
require a fundamental retaining of the conceptual models or
paradigms upon which public base accuracy have been built in the
past. More pragmatically, there is an insistence need to examine
the relevance, worth and effectiveness of all activities undertaken
by the government.
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In view of this, the present study intends to examine the
overall performance of central public sector undertakings in
general and Steel Authority of India in particular. On the basis of
findings of review of the performance, the researcher has
attempted to develop a model for restructuring of Steel Authority
of India Ltd. and at the same time intends to suggest it for other
similar organizations. The study covers a time period of 12 years
beginning 1995-96 and ending 2006-07, the last year for which data
are available.
Hypotheses of the Study
1. Financial planning and control in SAIL is effective with
respect to:
(i) Procurement and deployment of funds between
fixed and current assets.
(ii) Management of working capital.
(iii) Profitability.
2. Company has been effectively achieving its targets with
respect to production and sales.
3. Strength of the human resources of the company is
judicious viz-à-viz its manufacturing and sales operations.
Objectives of the Study
The study has been conducted with the following objectives.
1. To review the overall performance of Central Public
Sector Undertakings in general through select indicators.
2. To review the overall performance of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. since its inception.
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3. To test the validity of objectives of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. in the present scenario.
4. To evaluate the planning, execution and control of capital
expenditure programmes for identification of various
shortcomings and problems faced by the organization.
5. To study the justification of human resources with the
Steel Authority of India Ltd. and their productivity.
6. To design a comprehensive model for restructuring of
Steel Authority of India Ltd.
7. To suggest the restructuring for the similar other central
public sector undertakings.
Research Methodology
The study being descriptive in nature, mainly rely upon
secondary data. To support the secondary information, primary
data has also been collected.
Secondary information mostly collected from existing
sources like publications of various ministries, namely, Ministry of
Steel, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Sector Undertakings, Government of
India, Confederation of Indian Industries, Chamber of Commerce
and Industries, and Bureau of Public Enterprises. Some important
national libraries namely Indian Council of Social Science and
Research, Ratan Tata Library (Delhi School of Economics,
University of Delhi), Central Secretariat Library, Department of
Culture, Government of India, Library of Corporate House of SAIL
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(Ispat Bhawan), were regularly visited to extract the relevant
information.
For extracting the detailed information about the Steel
Authority of India Ltd., the annual accounts and audit reports, the
annual administrative reports and the act under which the
organization was established were scanned. The regular bulletins
of Bureau of Public Enterprises, Reserve Bank of India, and
statistical abstracts published by National Sample Survey
Organisation have been used. Miscellaneous sources such as,
studies conducted earlier, research papers, articles published in
the various journals, magazines were thoroughly scanned.
For collecting the primary information, a schedule
containing relevant questions was used. Personal discussions and
intensive interviews with the concerned officials were conducted
with a view to understand the rational of the various concepts and
reliability of data.
Head office of Steel Authority of India Ltd. at New Delhi and
other concerned offices were visited several times by the
researcher. The data collected from diverse secondary sources
have been tabulated, analysed and interpreted. Besides various
statistical techniques emphasis has been laid to management
accounting technique also. The performance of SAIL has been
compared on time series as well as cross sectional basis. The
important techniques used for the analysis include:
(i) Financial ratio analysis;
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(ii) Exponential function for computing compound growth
rate, i.e.,
Y = abx
(iii)    Non-Parametric Analysis
(iv) Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Z = 0.012 X1 + 0.014 X2 +0.033 X3+0.006 X4 + 0.999 X5
Z = discriminate function score of a firm.
X1 =  net working capital / total assets (%)
X2 = retained earning / total assets (%)
X3 = EBIT / total assets (%)
X4 = market value of total equity/book value of debt
         (%)
X5 =  Sales/total assets (times)
(v) Trend Analysis
Current value
   Base value
(vi) Simple averages;
(vii) Co-efficient of range; i.e.,
L – S
L + S
These techniques have been explained wherever used.
The performance of Steel Authority of India Ltd. is
compared with its past information, steel manufacturing units in
the private sector and with other central public sector
undertakings.
Limitations
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Though the study has been conducted with utmost interest
and devotion still some limitations exist which the researcher is
aware about.
1. In the financial performance analysis focus lacks on
financial planning and control in SAIL. This is due to the
fact that despite repeated persuasions SAIL officials have
not revealed the budgeting as well as financial control
process.
2. In the operational performance training and development
process in SAIL could not be attended due to time
constraints.
3. Pricing process in  SAIL has not been discussed in detail
due to non-dissemination of relevant information by SAIL
officials being secrete in nature.
Plan of the Study
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters. Each
chapter starts with brief introduction to the subject matter. The
chapters are divided into several sections, each with a distinct
objective. An outline of these sections, presented at the beginning
of each chapter, is intended to serve as a road map for the reader.
The first chapter states the problem, objectives, scope and
methodology used in the study. Performance of selected central
public sector undertakings forms the subject matter of second
chapter. Performance of public sector undertakings extent and
causes of sickness and privatization as remedy to sickness have
been discussed. The concept of Memorandum of Understanding
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(MoU) with central public sector enterprises and Government as
introduced to review the performance of these undertakings has
also been presented. Chapter three contains a comprehensive
discussion about global steel industry. International steel trading
environment and steel industry of India in global perspective have
been discussed in detail. Growth of stainless steel industry in India
has also been presented. A detailed analysis of financial
performance of SAIL has been carried on in chapters four and five.
The emphasis in chapter four has been laid on important aspects
like procurement and utilization of funds, management of
working capital and state of profitability in SAIL. Chapter five
examines the financial health of company where non-parametric
analysis and multiple-discriminant analysis have been used.
Operational performance of SAIL forms the subject matter of sixth
chapter. Operational performance has been studied with the help
of important indicators like installed and utilized capacity,
different components of cost like raw material, manpower, fuel
and power, depreciation and others. Pricing and quality control
process though not in detail have been presented in the end. The
last and seventh chapter contains some of the main findings and
concluding observations. Besides, it also suggests some useful
measure which would improve the performance of SAIL in
particular and some other CPSUs in general.
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Overview
India has a mixed economy. The state has been assuming a
greater role in the economic development of India. The higher the
degree of economic backwardness, the greater is the role of the
state. Further, only the state can afford investments that are huge
by normal standards for developing basic industries and
infrastructural facilities. Finally, the investment by the government
directly and indirectly stimulates investment and expansion in the
private sector. From the social point of view, public sector
enterprises can prevail upon a policy and thereby reduce the
concentration of wealth and income.
The public sector has played a pivotal role in the economic
and industrial development of India by providing capital, strong
infrastructure, modern technology, economies of scale and
employment generation. It has attempted to implement the
objectives of planning through reducing the regional disparities by
checking the concentration of economic power. The public sector
has been a potent factor in import substitution and export
promotion, thus making India more self-reliant.
There is no such thing as ‘Public sector technology’ or
‘Private sector technology’.  It is the same with project planning,
execution and control costing, research, marketing and the rest.
The public sector must stand or fall, like the private sector’s, task
of efficiency, profit, service and technology advancement. The
philosophy might be different, the operation is similar.
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We advocate a public sector for three reasons:
1. To gain control of the commanding heights of economy.
2. To promote critical development in terms of social gain or
strategic value rather than primarily in consideration of
profits.
3. To provide commercial surplus with which to finance
further economic development.
There can be no stereotype for the public sector. It must
grow, evolve and change with the times. It would also be useful to
study the working of public sector in other countries. Italy, for
example, has a large and flourishing public sector, which is highly
competitive and often works in partnerships with private
enterprises. Also, it has embarked upon an ambitious programmed
for developing Southern Italy which is the less developed half of
that country. Sweden offers another pattern of public enterprises
and initiative. In France, large successful corporation like Renault
and Sud Aviation are state-owned. In Germany, Volks Wagon has
been developed in the public sector. We should keep all these
examples and developments in mind and never shut our eyes to
the possibilities of improvement and change. Many pioneer
thinkers have talked about the public sector. Those, whose creeds
disapprove of the public sector as a whole, naturally saw nothing
but failure about them.
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Public sector must be run well, must produce results, must
create new resources, and that we should try our utmost to give a
new orientation to the public sector, which would increase its
efficiency and all round profitability. It must modernize its
management, consolidate its investment and make efficiency its
watchword. We have invested hundreds of crore rupees in our
public sector projects. Their money does not belong to capitalists
or industrialist. It is public money and profits made by the public
sector undertakings are spent on public welfare for building roads,
schools, hospitals etc. It is our duty to ensure that public sector
projects are run efficiently and successfully and yield profits. The
entire Indian public are partners in these companies (enterprises).
Workers and managers employed in public undertakings have a
special responsibility. It has been pointed out that for public
enterprises profit is not the objective, but public welfare is the
motivating factor. However, the need for making profit is
recognized now, restructuring and returns have been undertaken.
Thus, we have to create a new atmosphere in the country to give a
certain feelings of confidence to our people that all those who are
involved in this are deeply concerned and committed.
Having conceded this, we may now empathetically add that
the profit criterion is certainly not the most important criterion for
assessing the performance of these units, much less it is the only
criterion. In the first instance, it may be noted that in many cases
pubic sector enterprises had to be started, because due to various
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factors, these enterprises were expected to earn very low profits or
even losses. It was absolutely necessary to start such government
enterprises due to consciousness of its duty to the community.
They started such companies and took on the consequent low
profits or losses. To present the logic in a different form, we would
say that from a larger social angle, the performance of an
enterprise should be judged not by what the enterprise earns in the
form of profits but by the total addition it makes to the flow of
goods and services in the economy as measured by GNP. In these
terms, it is the total value of sales of the enterprise and not its
profits that should be taken as a measure of its contribution to the
economic well being and progress of society.
To say all this in defence of the PSEs is not to undertake the
great importance and need for earning adequate returns on capital
invested in them does not take a back seat. Indeed, strenuous
efforts are being made in that direction and would continue to be
made. All that is sought here is to place whole issue of the ‘return
on capital’ in a proper and wider perspective.
In our country, before independence, the role of public
enterprises was limited. Only the railways, defence production,
post and telegraphs, the port trust, ordinance, aircraft, coalmines
and few state undertakings like the government’s salt factories,
quinine factories etc. were under government control. Even after
independence, policies and policy resolution before 1956 did not
specify the area of operation of the public sector clearly. The
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industrial Policy Resolution (1956) laid down that all Industries of
basic and strategic importance should be in the public sector. Only
during the 2nd plan period measures were adopted to fill up the
lacuna in the Indian industrial structure. As discussed in chapter-I,
India has about 230 public sector organizations. It will be
imperative to review the performance of these undertakings before
any attempt to review the performance of SAIL in detail is
initiated.
Performance of Public Sector Undertakings
Public Sector has played a pivotal role in the planned
economic and industrial development of the country. For the
purpose of planning and national accounting, public sector in
India includes all activities funded out of the government budget.
Thus, the size of the public sector is indeed very large. It includes
not only government departments but also government
companies, whether in the centre or the state like irrigation and
power projects, railways, posts and telegraphs, ordinance factories
and other departmental undertakings, banking, insurance,
financial and other services.
In order to appreciate the role of the public sector as a
strategic choice for economic development, it might be necessary
to recapitulate the state of economy at the time of India’s
independence in 1947 and the problems confronting the country
which needed to be tackled in a planned and systematic manner.
India was basically an agriculture economy with a weak industrial
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base, low level of savings and investment and near absence of
infrastructural facilities. A vast percentage of population was
extremely poor. There existed considerable inequalities in income,
low level of employment opportunities, serious regional
imbalances in economic attainments and lack of trained man-
power in various fields of management. It was, thus, obvious that
if the country was to speed up its economic growth and maintain it
in the long run at a steady level, a big push was required. As such
state intervention in all the sectors of the economy was inevitable
because private sector had neither the necessary resources in terms
of funds, managerial and scientific skill, nor the will to undertake
risks involved in large long-gestation investments. Among the
imperatives were removal of poverty, better distribution of
income, expansion of employment opportunities, removal of
regional imbalances, accelerated growth of agricultural and
industrial production and a wider ownership of economic power
to prevent its concentration in a few hands. Given the type and
range of problems faced by the country on its economic, social and
strategic fronts and the imperatives just mentioned, it became a
pragmatic compulsion to deploy the public sector as an instrument
of self-reliant economic growth so as to develop a sound
agricultural and industrial base, diversify the public economy and
overcome the economic and social backwardness.
The predominant considerations for continued large
investments in public sector enterprises were to accelerate the
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growth of core sectors of economy; to serve the equipment needs
of strategically important sectors like railways,
telecommunications, nuclear power, defence, etc., to enable the
government to exert countervailing power on the operations of
private monopolies and multinationals in selected areas and to
provide a springboard for the economy to achieve a significant
degree of self-sufficiency in the critical sectors. Another category of
a large number of public enterprises are essentially the consumer-
oriented industries such as drugs, hotels, food industries, etc. The
rationale for setting up such enterprises was to ensure easier
availability of vital articles of mass consumption, to introduce
check of prices of important products and services of emerging
areas like tourism, etc. Then, again a large number of enterprises
belonging to ‘sick units’ taken over from the private sector in order
to sustain production and protect employment. There are large
number of public enterprises operating in national and
international trade like consultancies, contracts and constructions
services, inland and overseas communications etc. The overall
profile of public sector enterprises in India is, thus, a
heterogeneous conglomerate of basic and infrastructural
industries, industries producing consumer goods and industries
engaged in trade and services, etc.
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 has been the
guiding factor which gave the public sector a strategic role in the
economy. Massive investments have been made over the past four
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decades to build a Public Sector. Many of these enterprises
successfully expanded production, opened up new areas of
technology and built up a reserve of technical competence in a
number of areas. Nevertheless, after the initial concentration of
public sector investment in the key infrastructure areas, public
enterprises began to spread into all areas of the economy,
including non-infrastructure and non-core areas. This has
sometimes adversely affected the overall performance of the
public sector, which has manifested itself in low or negative
returns to public investment.
The Government of India announced on 24th July 1991 as a
part of the ‘Statement on Industrial Policy’ a statement on Public
Sector Policy also. The statement aimed at improving the portfolio
and performance of public sector enterprises. The statement
contains the following decisions:
1. Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed
with a view to focus the public sector on strategic,
high-tech and essential infrastructure. Whereas some
reservation for the public sector is being retained, there
would be no bar for area of exclusivity to be opened up
to the private sector selectively. Similarly, the public
sector will also be allowed entry in areas not reserved
for it.
2. Public enterprises which are chronically sick and
which are unlikely to be turned around will, for the
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formulation of revival/rehabilitation schemes, be
referred to the Board for Industrial Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR), or other similar high level
institutions created for the purpose. A social security
mechanism will be created to protect the interests of
workers likely to be affected by such rehabilitation
packages.
3. In order to release resources and encourage wider
public participation, a part of the Government’s share-
holding in the public sector would be offered to
mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and
workers.
4. Boards of public sector companies would be made
more professional and given greater powers.
5. There will be a greater thrust on performance
improvement through the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) system through which
managements would be granted greater autonomy and
will be held accountable. Technical expertise on the
part of the government would be upgraded to make
the MoU negotiations and implementation more
effective.
6. To facilitate a fuller discussions on performance, the
MoU signed between Government and the public
enterprises would be placed in Parliament. While
focusing on major management issues, this would also
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help place matters on day-to-day operations of public
enterprises in their correct perspective.
As per the announcement in the Industrial Policy Statement
and also in the Budget Speech of July, 1991, in order to raise
resources, encourage wider participation and promote greater
accountability, the government equity in selected public
enterprises was to be offered to mutual funds, financial investment
institutions, workers and general public. In pursuance of these
announcement, the government so far has disinvested its equity
shareholding in 39 PSUs. A total amount of Rs.10,341 crore has
been realized from sale of 153.84 crore shares in these PSUs up to
the end of March 1997.
Some of the major objectives of setting up of public
enterprises as envisaged originally could be broadly summarized
to include the following:
• To help in the rapid economic growth and industrialization
of the country and create the necessary infrastructure for
economic development;
• To earn return on investment and, thus, generate resources
for development;
• To promote redistribution of income and wealth;
• To create employment opportunities;
• To promote balanced regional development;
• To assist the development of small-scale and ancillary
industries; and
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• To promote import substitutions, save and earn foreign
exchange for the economy.
Product Profile of CPSUs
The range of product and activities of Central Public Sector
Enterprises include manufacturing of steel, mining of coal and
minerals, extraction and refining of crude oil, manufacture of
heavy machinery, machine tools, instruments, heavy machine
building equipment, heavy electrical equipment for thermal and
hydel stations, transportations equipment, telecommunication
equipments, ships, sub-marines, fertilizers, drugs and
pharmaceuticals, petro-chemicals, cement, textile and a few
consumer items such as bread, newsprint, paper, footwear and
contraceptives, operation of air, sea, river and road transport
operation in national and international trade, consultancy, contract
and construction services, inland and overseas telecommunication
services, hotel and tourists services, etc.
Coverage
As the public enterprises are expected to run on commercial
lines, the financial appraisal continues to be an important
yardstick to measure the performance of these enterprises. An
analysis of performance of these enterprises with reference to
some important ratios such as gross profit to capital employed,
sales to capital employed, etc. has been attempted. Considering the
fact that the public sector have to discharge a number of other
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socio-economic obligations, the performance appraisal also covers
items like internal resource generation for financing the Plan
outlay, contribution to the public exchequer, management
development, development of backward region, employment and
employee’s welfare measures, foreign exchange earnings, import
substation effort and such other related matters, so as to present a
comprehensive picture.
Growth of Investment
The investments i.e. share capital and long-term loans
including deferred credits in Central Public Enterprises have
grown appreciably over the years.
The plan-wise growth of investment in public enterprises
from 1.4.1951 is given in Table 2.1
Table 2.1
Plan-wise Growth of Investment in Central Public Enterprises
Particulars Total
Investment
(Rs. in crores)
No. of
Enterprise
At the commencement of the 1st Five Year
Plan (1.4.1951)
29 5
At the commencement of the 2nd  Five Year
Plan (1.4.1956)
81 21
At the commencement of the 3rd  Five Year
Plan (1.4.1961)
948 47
At the end of the 3rd Five Year Plan
(31.3.1966)
2,410 73
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At the commencement of the 4th  Five Year
Plan (1.4.1969)
3,897 84
At the commencement of the 5th Five Year
Plan (1.4.1974)
6,237 122
At the end of 5th Five Year Plan (31.3.1979) 15,534 169
At the commencement of the 6th Five Year
Plan (1.4.1980)
18,150 179
At the commencement of the 7th Five Year
Plan (1.4.1985)
42,673 215
At the end of the 7th Five Year Plan
(31.3.1990)
99,329 244
At the commencement of the 8th Five Year
Plan (1.4.1992)
1,35,445 246
Growth of Investment in the 8th Five Year
Plan
As on 31.3.1993 1,47,587 245
As on 31.3.1994 1,64,960 246
As on 31.3.1995 1,73,292 245
As on 31.3.1996 1,77,599 243
As on 31.3.1997 1,93,121 242
(At the end of 8th Five Year Plan)
As on 31.3.1998 2,31,024 240
As on 31.3.1999 2,39,167 240
As on 31.3.2000 2,52,554 240
Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2000.
It is quite clear from the Table 2.1 that growth of PSEs in
India in terms of investment and number over about 40 years has
been quite significant and unprecedented. This shows the
Government’s keenness to bring about speedy development of the
country and attain various other objectives with the help of these
enterprises.
Sources of Investments
Table 2.2 shows the source of investment at the end of the
Financial Years of 2005, 2006-07.
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Table 2.2
Sources of total Investment
(Rs. In crore)
Particulars Central
Govt.
State
Govt.
Holding
Company
Foreign
Parties
FI/banks
and other
Total Share
application
money,
pending
allot time
Total
invest-
ment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
As on 31.3.2005
Equity 61,692 775 6,910 634 1,949 71,960     -
Loan 38,363 10 10,838 5,218 1,00,105 1,54,433     -
Total 99,954 785 17,748 5,852 1,02,054 2,26,393 4,631 2,31,024
As on 31.3.2006
Equity 64,495 967 8,760 503 2,179 76,904
Loan 38,554 14 11,492 6,066 1,02,728 1,58,854
Total 1,03,049 981 20,252 6,569 1,04,907 2,35,758 3,409 2,39,167
As on 31.3.2007
Equity 69,513 1,089 8,971 655 2,206 82,434
Loan 41,545 22 11,726 7,346 1,07,465 1,68,104
Total 1,11,058 1111 20,697 8,001 1,09,671 2,50,538 2,016 2,52,554
Source: Public Enterprise Survey 2006-07
The increase in the total investment has mainly been
accounted for the following sectors given in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3
Cognate Groups in PSEs
S.No. Cognate Group Investment (Rs. in
crore)
1. Financial Services 3,742
2. Steel 3,038
3. Petroleum 1,571
4. Construction 1,401
5. Chemical & Pharmaceutical 1,350
6. Fertilizers 1,146
7. Industrial Development & Technical
Consultancy Services
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8. Telecommunication Services 861
9. Power 740
Source: Public Enterprise Survey 2006-07.
Capacity Utilization
The Government as well parliament is quite concerned with
capacity utilization of production enterprises as it has not been
quite satisfactory. The concept and determination of capacity
utilization itself is not very clear especially in those enterprises
where the product is multiple and certain facilities are common.
The broad picture of capacity utilization, at macro level, is
presented in three ranges, namely (a) Units which have recorded
capacity utilization more than 75 per cent, (b) units where capacity
utilization has between 50 to 75 per cent, and (c) Units where
capacity utilization is less than 50 per cent.
Sales Performance
Growth of Sales
Growth of sales by public enterprises has been quite
consistent and satisfactory. The sales/turnover of public
enterprises has grown significantly over the period as be evident
from Table 2.4.
Table 2.4
Growth of Sales
(Rs. in crores)
Year No. of
operating
enterprises
Sales Annual
Growth
Rate of
Sales in
percentage
Capital
Employed
Percentage
of sales to
Capital
Employed
1995-96 - - - - -
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1996-97 237 1,33,906 - 1,17,991 113.49
1997-98 239 1,47,266 9.98 1,40,110 105.11
1998-99 240 1,58,049 7.32 1,59,836 98.88
1999-2000 241 1,87,355 18.54 1,62,450 115.33
2000-01 239 2,26,919 21.12 1,73,948 130.45
2001-02 236 2,60,735 14.90 2,31,178 112.79
2002-03 236 2,76,002 5.86 2,49,855 110.46
20003-04 235 3,10,179 12.38 2,65,093 117.01
2004-05 232 3,89,310 25.51 3,03,411 128.31
Source: Public Enterprise, Survey 2004-05
It is clear from the Table 2.4 that the volume of sales has
increased considerably, from Rs. 1,33,906 crores in 1996-97 to Rs.
3,89,310 crores during 2004-05. The increase in sales during these
periods work out to 191 per cent and 25.5 per cent in the current
year over the previous year.
Gross Sales (Group Wise)
It may be worthwhile to study gross sales/turnover (group
wise) with percentage of growth or decline. Distinction may be
made between ‘gross turnover’ and ‘net turnover’. Net turnover
may be arrived after deducting excise duty, commission, discounts
and rebates from the gross turnover. Position of the gross turnover
of 2003-04 and 2004-05 may be seen from table 2.5 given below.
Table 2.5
SAIL’s Gross Turnover (Group-wise)
(Rs.in crore)
TurnoverS.
No
Cognate Group
2004-05 2003-04
Increase/
Decrease over
2003-04
Percentage
Increase/
Decrease
over 2003-04
I Enterprises Producing/Selling Goods
1 Steel 20,661.89 19,169.39 1,492.50 7.79
2 Minerals & Metals 7,073.96 6,175.07 898.89 14.56
3 Coal & Lignite 18,027.97 17,626.91 401.06 2.28
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4 Power 19,925.34 17,474.23 2,451.11 14.03
5 Petroleum 2,10,938.65 1,47,051.88 63,886.77 43.45
6 Fertilizers 8,917.48 8,420.74 496.74 5.90
7 Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 5,892.63 4,765.86 1,126.77 23.64
8 Heavy Engineering 7,389.45 7,784.98 395.53 5.08
9 Medium & Light Engineering 7,897.56 6,375.61 1,521.95 23.87
10 Transportation Equipment 7,823.09 4,352.87 3,470.22 79.72
11 Consumer Goods 1,206.57 1,399.49 192.92 13.79
12 Agro-Based Industries 134.08 130.53 3.55 2.72
13 Textiles 913.14 908.53 5.11 0.56
Total (1 to 13) 3,16,801.81 2,41,635.59 75,166.22 31.11
II Enterprises Rendering Services
1 Trading & Marketing 32,324.26 31,287.71 1036.55 3.31
2 Transportation Service 14,072.68 13,306.35 766.33 5.76
3 Contract & Construction 1,748.66 1,542.71 205.95 13.35
4 Ind. Devel. & Tech. Cons. 4,015.19 3,480.81 534.38 15.35
5 Tourist Services 366.81 380.91 14.10 3.70
6 Financial Services 7,662.87 6,554.97 1,107.90 16.90
7 Telecom Services 12,149.80 11,863.93 28.87 2.14
8 Section 25 Companies 167.86 126.18 41.68 33.03
Total (1 to 8) 72,508.13 68,543.57 3,964.56 5.78
Grand Total (1+11) 3,89,309,94 3,10,179.16 79.130.78 25.51
Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2005
It is clear from the table 2.5 that the gross turnover of
manufacturing enterprises amounted to Rs.3,16,601.81 crore in
2004-05, which was higher as compared to 2003-04 when it
amounted to Rs.2,41,635.59 crore. Similarly, gross turnover of
service enterprises has increased from Rs. 68,543.57 crore in 2003-
04 to Rs. 72,508.13 crore in 2004-05. Growth rate of gross turnover
has been higher in case of manufacturing enterprises.
Transportation equipment, petroleum, section 25 companies,
medium and light engineering, chemicals and petrochemicals,
power, financial services, industrial development and technical
constancy services, contract and construction services, agro based
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industries, minerals and metals, steel, fertilizer, transportation
services and telecommunication services have recorded increase in
turnover in the case of consumer goods, heavy engineering and
tourist services. Industry-wise growth of gross turnover has been
highest in case of transportation equipment and lowest in case of
textile industry. Decline in growth of gross turnover was
maximum in consumer goods industry.
Top Ten in Terms of Sales/Turnover
A study of top ten enterprises in terms of turnover reveals
that top ten enterprises contributed 66.45 per cent of the turnover
of all the enterprises. Table 2.6 gives a picture of top ten
enterprises in terms of turnover during 2004-05.
Table 2.6
Top Ten Enterprises in Terms of Sales during 2004-05
(Rs. in crores)
Sr.
No.
Name of the Enterprises Amount Percentage of
total Sales
1. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. 94,140.55 24.18
2. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 33,830.87 8.69
3. Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 33.384.68 8.58
4. Food Corp. of India 22,523.57 5.79
5. Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. 20,093.56 5.16
6. Steel Authority of India Ltd. 16,388.15 4.21
7. National Thermal Power Corp. Ltd. 16,123.21 4.14
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8. Gas Authority of India Ltd. 8,415.31 2.16
9. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 6,967.60 1.79
10. I.B.P. Co. Ltd. 6,809.69 1.75
Total 2,58,677.19 66.45
Total turnover of CPSEs 3,89,309.94 100.00
Source: Public Enterprise Survey 2004-05.
Foreign Exchange Earnings
One of the objectives of setting up of the Public Enterprises
was to promote import substitutes, save and earn foreign exchange
for the economy. Public enterprises have been playing an
important role in the area of international trade. They have been
helping in earning valuable foreign exchange for the country.
Foreign exchange earnings by public enterprises during last three
years may be seen from Table-2.7.
Table 2.7
Foreign Exchange Earnings
(Rs. in crores)
Sr.
No.
Particulars 2004-05 2003-04 2002-03
1. Export of goods on FOB basis 15,563 14,516 16,203
2. Royalty, know-how,
professional and consultancy
fee
180 170 133
3. Interest and dividend 258 337 257
4. Other Income 3,613 3,805 3,890
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Total 19,714 18,828 20,483
Source: Public enterprise Survey 2004-05
Production
Cost of Production
An analysis of cost of production in 2004-05 and 2003-04 of
the manufacturing/producing and service group of enterprises is
given in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 respectively.
It may be observed from Tables 2.8 and 2.9 that more than 50
per cent of cost of production comprises purchase of finished
goods, raw materials and stores and spares in case of both
manufacturing and services sector.
Table 2.8
Element-wise Cost of Production of Manufacturing/Producing Enterprises
(Rs.in crores)
Manufacturing/Producing Enterprises
2004-2005 2003-2004
S.
No.
Details of Cost
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
1 Purchase of Finished
Goods
10,618.18 37.18 69,335.70 31.84
2 Consumption of Raw
Material
71,150.14 24.84 50,997.24 23.42
3 Stores and Spares 7,763.92 2.71 7,192.95 3.30
4 Salary, Wages and
Benefits
23,127.34 8.10 19,998.93 9.18
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5 Repairs and
Maintenance
3,877.73 1.35 3,209.32 1.57
6 Power and Fuel 17,359.02 6.06 15,342.50 7.04
7 Deferred Revenue
Expenditure
(DRE)/Prel. Exp.
Written off
454.67 0.16 345.09
0.16
8 Depreciation 16,037.07 5.60 3,197.41 6.06
9 Prior Period
Adjustments (Net)
163.68 0.60 66.67 0.03
10 Extraordinary Items
(Net)
245.61 0.09 -887.48 0.41
11 Interest 12,358.80 4.13 12,659.06 5.81
12 Other Expenses 27,334.09 9.54 26,132.06 12.00
Cost of Production 2,86,489.22 100.00 2,17,789.42 100.00
Source: Public Enterprise Survey 2004-05
Table 2.9
Element-wise Cost of Production of Service Sector Enterprises
(Rs.in crore)
Manufacturing/Producing Enterprises
2004-2005 2003-2004
S.
No.
Details of Cost
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
1 Purchase of Finished
Goods
36,287.74 49.17 29,474.67 46.17
2 Consumption of Raw
Material
1,430.46 1.94 1,176.11 1.84
3 Stores and Spares 1,405.97 1.91 1,170.52 1.83
4 Salary, Wages and
Benefits
7,135.98 9.67 6,254.74 9.80
5 Repairs and
Maintenance
1,112.43 1.51 1,163.26 1.82
6 Power and Fuel 2,179.12 2.95 1,857.88 2.19
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7 Deferred Revenue
Expenditure
(DRE)/Prel. Exp.
Written off
80.68 0.11 85.08 0.13
8 Depreciation 3,893.36 5.28 3,570.55 5.59
9 Prior Period
Adjustments (Net)
-62.04 -0.08 24.72 0.04
10 Extraordinary Items
(Net)
-389.16 -0.53 -51.11 -0.08
11 Interest 7,801.38 10.57 7,365.63 11.54
12 Other Expenses 12,918.24 17.51 11,743.10 18.40
Cost of Production 73,794.16 100.00 63,835.15 100.00
Source: Public Enterprise Survey 2004-05
Profitability
Performance of Selected Public Sector Undertakings
In 2005-06, 107 PSUs signed Memorandum of
Understandings (MoUs). On the basis of provisional data,
provided by the Department of Public Enterprises, out of 107
PSUs, 49 PSUs were rated excellent, 26 very good, 12 good, 12 fair
and 7 poor.  BALCO has been excluded from evaluation as it
ceased to be a PSU during the year. In 2005-06 the aggregate gross
margin (provisional) of MoU signing PSUs was 15.5 per cent
higher than that of 2004-05 and 12.8 per cent higher than the target
set for them. Profitability and performance indicators of CPSUs are
given in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10
Profitability of Central Public Sector Undertakings
S.
No.
Particulars 1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
1999-
2000
2000-
01
2001-
02
2002-
03
2003-
04
2004-
05
1 Number of units 237 239 240 241 239 236 236 235 232
2 Paid-up capital 53000 59300 63500 65300 67100 69800 72000 76900 82400
3 Net Worth 60300 70500 79500 90000 99200 113900 135100 148100 161100
4 Capital employed 118000 140100 159800 162500 174000 231200 249900 265100 303400
5 Gross profits 13700 16000 18600 22600 27600 30900 37200 39700 42400
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6 Profit before tax 4000 5100 6700 9800 13600 15400 19200 19700 22300
7 Profit after tax
(PAT)
2400 3300 4600 7200 9600 10200 13700 13200 14600
8 Gross profit to
capital employed
Ratio (%)
12 11 12 14 16 13 15 15 14
9 Pre-tax profit to
capital employed
Ratio (%)
3 4 4 6 8 7 8 7 7
10 PAT (Net Profit) to
Net Worth Ratio
(%)
4 5 6 8 10 9 10 9 9
Source: Economic Survey, 2004-05
Net Profit/Loss (Group wise)
Group wise profit/loss has been shown in Table 2.11. It is
clear from the table that minerals and metals, power, petroleum,
medium and light engineering, transportation equipment, trading
and marketing, transportation services, contract and construction
services, industrial development and technical consultancy
services and financial services have improved their profitability.
However, the profitability of steel, coal & lignite, fertilizer, heavy
engineering, textiles, telecommunication services and tourist
services have recorded a decline.
Table 2.11
Net Profit/Loss (Group wise)
(Rs. in crore)
S.
No.
Cognate Group 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
I. Enterprises Producing/Selling Goods
1 Steel -511.92 -2,396.20 -2,510.03
2 Minerals & Metals 746.19 427.90 638.81
3 Coal & Lignite 1,788.94 1,707.70 991.57
4 Power 2,743.76 3,540.78 3,638.73
5 Petroleum 7,420.74 807.30 9,569.79
6 Fertilizers -1,154.73 -1,417.66 -1,540.00
7 Chemicals and -8.26 -257.30 -213.84
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Pharmaceuticals
8 Heavy Engineering 457.60 541.27 193.84
9 Medium and Light
Engineering
-159.25 -139.52 67.39
10 Transportation Equipment 60.90 81.58 315.91
11 Consumer Goods -439.05 -773.71 -767.09
12 Agro-Based Industries -9.17 -12.62 -13.54
13 Textiles -1,128.94 -1,206.99 -1,476.48
Total ( 1 to 13) 9,806.81 8,722.53 9,195.14
II. Enterprises Rendering Services
1 Trading & Marketing 104.70 69.34 91.66
2 Transportation Service 532.58 500.60 699.29
3 Contract & Construction -449.21 -630.25 479.54
4 Ind. Devel. & Tech. Cons. 436.62 585.27 729.49
5 Tourist Services 60.32 9.22 -3.078.00
6 Financial Services 941.20 1,268.93 1,384.7
7 Telecom Services 2,098.04 2,622.20 1,928.12
8 Section 25 Co. 51.08 55.17 77.77
Total ( 1 to 8) 3,775.33 4,480.48 5,359.86
Grand Total (I+II) 13,582.14 13,203.01 14,555.00
Sources: Public Enterprise Survey 2004-05
Financial Performance
The Yardstick
Judging the performance of public enterprises is,
undoubtedly a more ticklish problem as compared to private
enterprises. This is because these enterprises are required to fulfil
multiple of objectives which are quite conflicting in nature.
Moreover, their objectives have not been stated clearly so far. In
the absence of clear-cut objectives, there are difficulties in judging
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their performance. Profitability in terms of return on investment
alone cannot be the efficiency, however, they are expressed to give
an adequate or reasonable return on investments made in theory.
The term ‘profitability’ has different conceptual connotations
and it may be viewed from different angles. The concept of gross
margin which does not take into account the elements of
depreciation usage advocated by economists to measure the return
on investment to national economy. The accountants lay greater
emphasis on the ‘gross profit’ concept which takes note of
depreciation but overlook the charge on account of interest. The
tax collector looks at the profit from his own viewpoint as a source
of revenue and hence is more concerned with pre-tax profits. Pre-
tax profits assume greater importance as a yardstick for judging
the operational efficiency of management since the level of tax
rate, at any given point of time, is determined by the exchequer
and, therefore, constitutes an extraneous factor, beyond the control
of management.
It may be observed from the Table 2.10 that there has been an
impressive improvement in the quantum of gross profit (PBDIT).
Gross profit (PBDIT) has increased from Rs.13,700 crore in 1996-97
to Rs. 42,400 crore in 2004-05, an increase more than three times.
The gross proit when viewed as a percentage of capital shows an
increment from 12 per cent in 1996-97 to 14 per cent in 2004-05.
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The pre-tax profit or profit before tax (PBT) has also recorded
substantial improvement, which increased more than five time
over the period under view.
Further, this achievement has to be viewed against the
background of the multi-dimensional objectives of public
enterprises and also the fact that these enterprises are functioning
in different segments of industry and facing divergent constraints
including those of location, non-availability of inputs like raw
materials, power & fuel and infrastructural facilities, inherited
industrial sickness from private sector, pricing restrictions due to
public policy etc.
Top Ten in Terms of Profit
A study of top ten profit making public enterprises reveals
that these ten enterprises have earned net profit of Rs.15,526.43
crore, which is 63.1 per cent of total net profit of Rs.24,614.66 crore
of 125 profit  making public enterprises. The list of top ten profit
making enterprises is given in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12
Top Ten Profit Making Enterprises during 2004-05
(Rs.in crore)
S. No. Name of the Enterprises Net Profit
1 Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. 3,629.47
2 National Thermal Power Corp. Ltd. 3,424.53
3 Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. 2,443.40
4 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 1,087.85
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5 Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 1,057.41
6 Gas Authority of India Ltd. 861.27
7 Hindustan Steel Works Corp. Ltd. 851.73
8 Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 840.27
9 Bharat Petroleum Ltd. 701.64
10 Northern Coal Fields Ltd. 628.86
Total 15,526.43
 Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2004-05.
Top Ten in Terms of Loss
A study of top ten loss incurring enterprises reveals that
these ten enterprises incurred net loss of Rs.6,292.12 crore which is
62.54 per cent of total net loss of Rs.10,059.66 crore of the loss
incurred by 106 enterprises. The list of top ten loss incurring
enterprises has been shown in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13
Top Ten Loss Incurring Enterprises during 2004-05
(Rs.in crore)
S. No. Name of the Enterprises Net Profit
1 Steel Authority of India Ltd. 1,720.02
2 Fertilizer Corp. of India Ltd. 854.99
3 Eastern Coalfield Ltd. 725.23
4 Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. 692.32
5 Hindustan Fertilizers Corp. Ltd. 564.23
6 Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 561.68
7 Konkan Railway Corp. Ltd. 384.69
8 National Jute Manufactures Corp. Ltd. 290.51
9 Hindustan Photo Film Mfg. Co. Ltd. 278.54
10 Cement Corporation of India ltd. 216.91
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Total 6,292.12
 Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2004-05.
Amount of dividend declared by public enterprises has also
been increasing from year to year. During the year 2004-05
Rs.5,456 crore were declared as dividend. The position of
dividends declared by the public enterprises between 1996-97 and
2004-05 can be seen from the Table 2.14.
Table 2.14
Dividend Declared by the End of 2005
(Rs. in crores)
Year Dividend Declared
1995-96 -
1996-97 687
1997-98 792
1998-99 1,028
1999-2000 1,436
2000-01 2,205
2001-02 2,836
2002-03 3,609
2003-04 4,932
2004-05 5,456
Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2005-06
Internal Resources
Internal Resources Generated
The role of public enterprises in generation of internal
resources is quite significant in view of the fact that they need
funds for their expansion, upgradation of technologies and
updating of capacities etc. This is also quite necessary for
replacement of maintenance of the present production and
services facilities. Generation of internal resources assume greater
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importance in a mixed economy like India, where these enterprises
have been assigned a major role for industrial development of the
country.
Internal resources constitute the depreciation, deferred
revenue expenditure written off, and retained profits during the
year. It may the noted that internal resources may be generated by
the operating enterprises only and the enterprises under
construction or engaged in development and promotional
activities cannot be expected to generate internal resources.
Moreover, the generation of internal resources by these
enterprises depends upon certain factors, chief of which are as
follows: (i) low return on investment on account of price
constraints, (ii) taking over of sick units from the private sector,
and (iii) technological complexities of these industries with long
gestation period.
Details of internal resources generated between 1997098 and
2004-05 may be seen from the Table 2.15.
Table 2.15
Details of Internal Resources Generated
(Rs.in Crore)
Details of Internal ResourcesYear No. of
Enterprises
Generating
Internal
Resources
Depreciatio
n
DRE
written
off
Retained
Profits
Total
1995-96 - - - - -
1996-97 - - - - -
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1997-98 146 7,184 1,199 6,409 14,792
1998-99 135 8,113 287 8,376 16,676
1999-2000 140 9,718 449 9,825 19992
2000-01 143 11,777 462 11,959 24,198
2001-02 144 12,827 299 12,428 25,554
2002-03 144 15,280 289 15,623 31,192
2003-04 136 14,411 285 16,606 31,302
2004-05 134 17,497 247 18,147 35,891
Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2005-06
It is evident from Table 2.15 that the number of public
enterprises generating internal resources has decreased from 146
in 1997-98 to 134 in 2004-05 whereas the amount of the internal
resources generated increased from Rs. 14,792 crore in 1997-98 to
Rs.35,891 in 2004-05. We find that major contribution has been
made by depreciation provision and retained profits. The
generation of internal resources by the public sector has assumed
greater importance because in addition to financing their own
plans they are also expected to generate surplus for financing
needs of other priority sectors. In this context, it is encouraging to
note that public enterprises have succeeded in increasing their
internal resources generation over the years.
It is, thus, obvious from the forgoing discussion that public
sector has played a pivotal role in the overall economic
development and growth of Indian economy. Performance of
Public Sector has reviewed and highlighted using diverse
indicators like production profile, investment (growth and
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sources), capacity utilization, sales, value addition, profitability,
foreign exchange earnings and employment generation, and many
other evidently highlight the achievements. As remarked earlier
performance of public sector cannot be viewed from financial
angle only but its overall growth which helps to understand the
contribution of this giant sector in the economy. Hence looking at
the overall scenario, performance seems to be satisfactory.
95
Global Steel Industry and Steel Authority of India
Limited – A Comprehensive Insight
• Overview
• International Trading Environment
• Global Production of World Crude Steel
• Steel Industry of India in Global Perspective
• Growth of Stainless Steel Industry in India
• Steel Scenario of India in the Post-Liberalization Era
• Manufacturing Process
• Industry Structure
• Prospects Abroad
• Sail – A Brief History, Its Objectives and Business
Chapter-III
96
Global Steel Industry – An Overview
The basic thrust of the process of economic liberalization that
was initiated in India in the right earnest in July 1991, was to
integrate the various industrial segments of the country with their
international counterparts. A series of path breaking measures
aimed at delicensing and deregulation were undertaken to enable
Indian industry to unshackle the rigors of a controlled regime and
initiate steps to look beyond the domestic market. Indian steel
industry took a lead in the process of economic liberalization and
export orientation become the major highlight of marketing
operations.
India, however, entered the international markets more than
three decades ago. During 1975 and 1976077 the then Hindustan
Steel Ltd. exported around 1 million tonnes of Pig Iron and 1.4
million tones of steel. The main characteristic of the steel export
effort during the earlier period was that export were confined to
surplus production only. As domestic demand continue to rise
leading to internal shortages, SAIL had to withdraw abruptly from
the international market and re-emerged only after abut  a decade
with exports of plates.
Between 1979 and 2000, India’s production of steel grew
from 9.5 MT to just over 24 MT and her share of world production
increased from 1.30 to 3.15 per cent.
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Compared to India’s share of 15 per cent in world
population, her share in steel production is still very low. The
reason for this is very clear. Steel consumption per capita is
generally related to national income per capita, which is quite low
in India, even lower than South Korea.
Further growth in steel consumption in India largely
depends on the general growth of economy. India has improved
its economic performance in the recent years after liberalization
and has achieved 6.5 per cent growth. Lawrence Summer, the US
Treasury Secretary, who visited India, has said that the Indian
economy could easily grow at the rate of 10 per cent a year if
economic reforms were implemented. This would increase India’s
living standards five-fold by 2020, provided the liberalization
process continues.
Steel consumption in a rapidly developing country can
exceed per capita level in comparison to a mature developed
economy. Per capita steel consumption in South Korea between
1990 and 1999 was higher than that of Germany, the USA and even
Japan. India’s current consumption of crude steel is 42 kg per
capita which is twenty times lower of South Korea and therefore
one can see the enormous potential for growth in India.
Growth in steel consumption does not necessarily imply
comparable growth in steel production. But for India, steel
production will grow along with the consumption due to her
strong comparative cost advantage in steel production.
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Indians are amongst the most talented people in this
universe. The two leading steel barons in London today are
Lakshmi Mittal and Swaraj Paul, belong to India. The Indian
contribution in the USA, particularly in Silicon Valley, is even
greater. Most of the Indian talents, however, still reside in the
Indian continent. India has several universities to produce good
engineers with skills required to grow its share in the world steel
production. Because of India’s relative poverty, the cost of both
skilled and unskilled labour is way below international levels
today but this difference will narrow down as India raises its
standard of living.
India’s another comparative advantage in steel production is
its raw materials. India is one of the major iron ore producers in
the world and has enormous reserves of high grade iron ore. It
also has many other minerals required for the steel industry. Such
as limestone and manganese ore. We have limited reserves of oil
and gas and do not have metallurgical coal, but many of the new
technological developments in iron production such as Corex
required in thermal coal only, which India has plenty. So, despite
some problems with the cost of power, this economy has a
favourable position with its natural resources.
The competitive cost and good availability of labour and raw
materials gives the Indian steel industry a very strong basis for
comparative cost advantage. In a rational world, we would see
integrated steel production concentrated in those countries which
have the raw materials and cost advantage, mainly Australia,
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Brazil, India, Iran, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine and
Venezuela, China has iron ore but of poorer quality. Steel
production from scrap has a future in countries such as the USA
and Western Europe, where so much scrap is generated, but to
make steel in integrated plants in the USA or Japan, or Western
Europe where nearly all the raw materials are to be imported and
labour costs are high, is of questionable rationality. These
established steel producers in the developed world have the
advantage of being close to big markets, but even so, basic
economics will drive them more and more to become re-rollers of
bought in semis and converters of rolled steel products such as hot
rolled coil. The USA is already a substantial steel importer and the
European Union moved last year from being as net exporter to
becoming a net steel importer.
India’s steel exports over the last 10 years have grown
rapidly and many of these exports have been directed towards
Europe and North America. India today has surplus to export.
Regrettably protectionism is raising its head in the steel
trade. Although the G7 group of countries is pushing the rest of
the world to open markets for their own exports, at the same time
they are imposing new barriers on imports from the Third World.
Third World countries are allowed to export the commodities or
raw materials G7 and the developed world need. They can slel
coffee beans but are not allowed to add value and export instant
coffee. They can sell iron ore but not add value and export steel.
The United States imposed 72 per cent antidumping duty on steel
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plates from SAIL. In Europe dumping duties are expected on both
HRC and plates. There are taxes imposed by the rich world on the
poor world instead of taxing the rich to redistribute to the poor.
The real problem of Europe or North America is that they cannot
compete with India’s lower costs of production and are resorting
to protectionism for their sectional interests which are being put
ahead of national and international interests.
International Trading Environment
The world steel industry was recently caught in an
unusually long speed of depressed demand, excess supply and
steeply falling prices. The recent crisis was triggered by the
complete collapse of steel demand in Asian Tiger economies
following financial turmoil, which began around mid-1997. The
troubles in the CIS countries and Brazil, which had followed
closely on the heels of the Asian melt-down, added further grist to
the world steel industry. Approximately three years have lapsed
since the downslide began, but the prospects of a sustained
recovery appear to be tentative this despite the historic sight in
imports by the USA and a fairly strong steel market in the
European Union during the considered period.
The recent crises can be related to number of structural
changes which dominated the course of international trade in iron
and steel during the last decade and a half:
I. Value of Trade – Quantum jump in world export during
the latter half of nineties:
The global iron and steel industry has grown manifold
during the last three decades and so has international exchange in
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the products of the industry. World steel trade as a percentage of
production increased from 22.5 per cent in 1975 to 38.1 per cent in
1997. Compound average rate of growth of exports as well as
percentage growth has also shown an acceptable trend.
The Table-1 clearly shows that the rate of growth in steel
exports in the latter half of the nineties, has far outstripped the
pace recorded in the preceding periods. The data also bring into
focus the remarkable degree of integration and interdependence
brought about by increased volumes of cross-border trade flows in
the world steel industry today. International trade expands due to
the emergence of a liberalized trade environment fostered by the
GATT and subsequently by the WTO. Tariff and quantity based
protective trade barriers in the members economies of the
multilateral trading organizations, have been progressively
decimated and global trade in iron and steel benefited immensely
by the changed policy.
Between 1975 and 1997, total global exports recorded an
annual growth rate of 3.8 per cent, which is more than double the
rate at which world production grew. Accordingly, the proportion
of exports in total production registered an almost continuous
increase from 22.5 per cent in 1975 to 38.1 per cent in 1997 – a jump
of 70 per cent over a period of 22 years. However, the increase has
been the most dramatic between 1991 and 1997 (Table 3.1) a jump
of about 41 per cent in merely six years (i.e. from 27.1 in 1991 to
38.1% in 1997). As far as export behaviour is concerned, the entire
time span can be split into two distinct sub-periods:
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Table 3.1
Trade as a Percentage of World Finished Steel Production
Year Production (mn tones) Exports (mn tones) Export (%)
1974-75 510.5 114.7 22.5
1984-85 616.8 171.0 27.7
1989-190 677.6 170.3 25.1
1990-91 649.0 175.8 27.1
1991-92 638.9 195.0 30.5
1992-93 648.7 218.3 33.7
1993-94 649.0 223.9 34.5
1994-95 659.0 236.9 35.8
1995-96 656.3 246.2 37.3
1996-97 701.7 267.3 38.1
CARG% (1975-91) 1.5 2.7 1.2
CARG% (1991-97) 1.33 7.3 5.8
CARG% (1995-97) 1.5 3.9 2.4
See Annexure-II
Source: Joint Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India
(a) Pre – 1991
Prior to 1991, annual rate of growth in exports was at 2.7
per cent that of global production was at 1.5 per cent.
(b) Post - 1991
Global exports expanded at an unprecedented pace,
recording an annual growth rate of 7.9 per cent while
growth in world production slowed down to 1.3 per cent.
Global Production of World Crude Steel
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Some of the emerging economies, taking advantage of the
increased availability and mobility of international finance,
invested heavily in iron and steel and became highly steel active.
Most notable among these newly steel active economies are China
and South Korea in Asia and Brazil in South America. So much so,
that China has now become the world leader in terms of tonnage
production with 1,23,155 thousand tonnes (Table 3.2) of crude steel
in the year 1999. It was good 7.9 per cent growth over previous
years crude steel production (1,14,090 thousand tonnes).
Meanwhile, South Korea emerged as the foremost supplier of
quality steel competing with the earlier market leader Japan. The
new breed of steel producers has the capability of satisfying not
only their domestic demand but also of exporting beyond their
national borders.
Apart from these large-scale producers of primary steel,
some other members of the developing world invested in
secondary downstream processing facilities, especially in the areas
of flat products. The late eighties and the early nineties saw the
emergence of yet another source of augmented international
supplies namely the steel producing economies of the erstwhile
Soviet Union. Toiling under resource constraints, these transition
economies have started off loading huge quantities of cheap steel
in the international markets, thereby posing a formidable
challenge to the established global suppliers. Production for
exports has become an absolute compulsion in many of these
104
economies seeking to export their way out of their domestic and
BOP wises.
Table 3.2
Production of World Crude Steel
(000’ tones)
Country/region 1997-98 Percentage
change
over 1996-
97
1998-99 Percentage
change
over 1997-
98
1999-2000 Percentage
change
over 1998-
99
Japan 1,04,534 5.8 93,548 -10.5 94,201 0.7
South Korea 42,554 9.4 39,896 -6.2 41,027 2.8
China 1,07,564 7.5 1,14,090 6.1 1,23,155 7.9
India 23,745 8.9 23,782 0.2 24,076 1.2
Asia 3,03,740 8.2 2,96,814 -2.3 3,07,682 3.7
Germany 45,007 13.1 44,047 -2.1 42,036 -4.6
France 19,767 12.1 20,122 1.8 20,217 0.5
Italy 25,790 6.2 25,843 0.2 24,798 -4.0
UK 18,529 2.4 17,286 -6.7 16,626 -3.8
Spain 13,667 12.4 14,704 7.6 15,080 2.6
Eu-15 1,59,737 8.6 1,59,914 0.1 1,55,677 -2.6
Brazil 26,151 3.6 25,758 -1.5 24,969 -3.1
Latin America 37,983 3.9 37,345 -1.7 35,131 -5.9
Maxico 14,283 8.5 14,211 -0.5 15,317 7.8
USA 97,226 3.2 97,294 0.1 96,033 -1.3
N.America 1,27,055 4.0 1,27,436 0.3 1,27,519 0.1
CIS include.
Russia
78,685 2.8 70,696 -10.2 83,114 17.6
Total World 7,78,731 7.1 7,60,203 -2.4 7,70,448 1.3
Source: Joint plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India
Some country/region specific export data is given below,
which might serve to highlight the shifting trade flows up till 1997.
Area specific shifts in the export-import behaviour in the trading
countries can be seen in the Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Comparative Import-Export Volumes of Selected Countries/Region
(mn tonnes
1985 1997Country/region
Export Import Net
Import
Export Import Net
Import
USA 0.9 22.0 21.1 5.5 28.3 22.8
Japan 32.1 2.9 (-)29.2 22.7 6.1 -16.6
EU-15 63.6 38.7 -024.9 99.5 79.3 -20.1
Latin America 10.1 3.9 -6.2 19.2 6.9 -12.3
Africa 3.1 4.4 1.3 4.1 3.8 -0.3
Middle East 1.0 13.6 12.6 2.0 4.9 2.3
Far East 9.2 15.6 6.4 21.8 53.6 31.8
CIS 8.4 10.7 2.3 32.9 6.7 -26.3
East Europe 14.6 9.6 -5.0 16.4 5.7 -10.7
China 0.2 18.4 18.3 7.8 13.5 5.8
Ex-Comm.
World
23.0 38.8 15.6 57.2 27.0 -30.2
Note: net import = net export
Source: World steel Dynamics, 2000.
The table 3.4 clearly shows that the predictions envisaged a
reversal in the falling consumption levels world-wide to begin by
the year 2000. The world capacity, meanwhile, is predicted to grow
marginally between 1998 and 2001.
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Table 3.4
Global Steel : Demand and Supply
Annual growth (%) 1998 1999 2000
Crude Steel Production
US -0.9 5.8 1.3
South America -1.2 -6.1 4.7
EU 0.2 -7.0 2.0
Japan -10.5 -10.4 4.2
Asia (Ex-Japan) 0.6 -3.3 6.6
Global -0.6 - -
Finished Steel Consumption
US 4.3 0.2 0.0
South America -1.9 -11.6 8.5
EU 4.1 1.3 -2.0
Japan -11.9 -3.7 2.7
Asia (ex-Japan) -9.2 2.2 3.0
Global -3.7 -0.8 1.4
Capacity (MnT)
US 112.6 116.2 118.9
South America 42.3 42.4 42.9
EU 178.5 178.4 175.5
Japan 143.5 142.0 140.0
Asia (ex-Japan) 351.0 362.2 361.4
Global 943.1 956.5 950.9
Source: Global Steel Review, Paribgas, April 1999.
Steel Industry of India in Global Perspective
Global Production: Global production stainless steel in 1913
was only a few tonnes. It reached 0.6 Mt in 1938 and further to 2.5
Mt. in 1963. The production crossed the 10 mt. mark in 1986. In
1995, the global production of stainless steel was about 16.2 Mt.
and it increased to 17.2 Mt. in 1998. In 2000, the estimated
production of stainless steel in the world was about 17.9 Mt.
Table 3.6 shows the region-wise production of stainless steel,
in the world during 1995, 1998 and 2000:
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Table 3.5
The Major Steel-Producing Countries, 2000 and 2001
(million metric tonnes crude steel production)
Country 2001 Rank Tonnage 2000 Rank Tonnage
China 1 148.9 1 127.2
Japan 2 102.9 2 106.4
United States 3 90.1 3 101.8
Russia 4 59.0 4 59.1
FR Germany 5 44.8 5 46.4
South Korea 6 43.9 6 43.1
Ukraine 7 33.1 7 31.8
India 8 27.3 9 26.9
Brazil 9 26.7 8 27.9
Italy 10 26.7 10 26.8
France 11 19.3 11 21.0
Taiwan, China 12 17.2 12 16.8
Spain 13 16.5 14 15.9
Canada 14 15.3 13 16.6
Turkey 15 15.0 17 14.3
United Kingdom 16 13.7 16 15.2
Maxico 17 13.3 15 15.6
Belgium 18 10.8 18 11.6
South Africa 19 8.8 20 8.5
Poland 20 8.8 19 10.5
Australia 21 7.0 21 7.1
Iran 22 6.9 22 6.6
Czech Republic 23 6.3 23 6.2
Netherlands 24 6.0 25 5.7
Austria 25 5.9 24 5.7
Sweden 26 5.5 26 5.2
Romania 27 4.9 27 4.8
Kazakistan 28 4.7 28 4.8
Argentina 29 4.1 29 4.5
Slovakia 30 4.0 32 3.7
Finland 31 3.9 30 4.1
Venezuela 32 3.8 31 3.8
Egypt 33 3.8 36 2.8
Saudi Arabia 34 3.4 34 3.0
Indonesia (E) 35 3.0 35 2.8
Luxembourg 36 2.7 37 2.6
Others - 28.8 - 28.8
World - 846.9 - 847.6
Source: World Steel Dynamics, 2001
The Asian Scenario
Regionswise, Asia is the highest global producer of stainless
steel producing about 7.2 Mt. The stainless steel scenario of Asia’s
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leading stainless steel producers namely Japan, China and Korea
are outlined below:
Table 3.6
Region-wise production of stainless steel in the world (000’ tones)
Country 1994-95 1997-98 1999-2000
Europe 6,608 7,126 7,250
Former USSR 259 280 310
North America 2,277 2,150 2,385
South America 180 233 250
Africa 257 430 478
Asia 6,667 6,966 7,256
Total World 16,248 17,185 17,929
Source: World Steel Dynamics, 2001.
Japan
Japan is the highest stainless steel producer in the world. But
its production showed a downtrend at about 3.45 Mt in 1998 from
3.94 Mt. in 1997. The production further declined to 3.35 Mt. in
1999.
To face the situation, the Japanese stainless steel makers have
gone for restructuring the industry. Nippon Steel is in the forefront
of the restructuring programme. They have entered into strategic
alliances with two other companies. The arrangements will lead in
declining Japanese stainless steel capability from 4 Mtpy to 3.3
Mtpy, a reduction of 10 per cent.
Nippon steel has entered into the most important alliance
with Sumitomo Metal Industries (SMI). This will result in the
cutback of much of the excess capacity in the country. SMI has
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closed down on 80 tonne electric furnace and reduced the quantity
of blast furnace hot metal supply to its refining units at Wakayama
Works.
Under the 10-year agreement Nippon will supply 0.35 Mtpy
of mostly hot metal for further processing at SMI’s Kishima Works.
SMI will continue to produce 0.1 Mtpy of Stainless tube and billet
at Wakayama. Some of the lost stainless output will be utilized for
other steel grades.
Nippon’s other strategic alliance is with Nissin Steel. Under
this, the two companies will exchange 0.12 Mtpy of stainless steel
reduced in most efficient units. Nippon Steel will supply ferritic
grades to Nissin. Austenitic grade will follow in the opposite way.
The two alliances will ensure cost reduction and production of
higher quality of stainless steel.
China
China’s stainless steel production in 1995 was 338.000 tonnes
but it declined to low of 220.000 tonnes in 1998.
However, subsequently due to the special thrust given by
the Chinese government to boost the production of stainless steel
in the country, production in 2000 reached about 5,14,000 tonnes
and in 2001, the output was 7,50,000 tonnes, recording a growth of
45.9 per cent over the previous year.
China has become the world’s largest consumer of stainless
steel, overtaking the US and Japan, China’s consumption in 2001
was about 2.25 Mt while that of US was 2 Mt and 1.6 mt in Japan.
While the world’s average growth rate of consumption has been
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between 4 and 7 per cent in the last 10 years. China’s stainless steel
consumption has been growing at an average rate of 17 per cent
during the period.
With the increasing demand for stainless steel in China, the
Chinese government has introduced four new policies to boost
production which are presented below:
• Lending money after deducting the interest for the state-
owned enterprises projects. For example, a 1.3 Mtpy stainless
steel production line set up in Baoshan Iron and Steel and a
0.5 Mtpy capacity expansion in Taiyuan Stainless.
• Encouraging co-operative development in production with
foreign capital. During China’s Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-
2000), the Chinese government helped to bring about joint
ventures of stainless steel between Baoshan Iron and Steel
and Japanese Nission Steel, Zhangjiagang Steel and POSCO
of Korea, shanghai Steel No.10 works and US Steel as well as
between Shanghai Pudong and Thyssen Krupp of Germany.
• Derating taxes of investment in equipment such as cold
rolling mills.
• Striking contraband trade of stainless steel.
According to a forecast of Wang Keqian. DGM, Taiyun
Stainless Steel Company, China’s stainless steel production
capacity is scheduled to soar by 238.2 per cent in 2010 from the
2000 level to reach 2.1 Mtpy by 2010. This will drastically reduce
China’s reliance on imports and by 2010, china output is likely to
have a market share of 77.82 per cent compared to 39.7 per cent in
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2000. It is expected that 600.000 tonnes per year have to be
imported by the time.
Korea
The country’s stainless steel production rose from 1.35 Mt in
1995 to 1.76 Mt in 1998 and in 2001 it reached an estimated 1.85 Mt.
In 1999, Korea’s hot rolled steel demand was 1.31 Mt and
according to POSCO Research Institute (POSRI) the demand was
to reach 1.68 Mt. by 2002 and, further to 1.76 Mt in 2005. POSCO is
presently meeting more than 86 per cent of Korea’s hot rolled
stainless steel demand. POSCO has launched a stainless steel
capacity expansion project at a cost of 585.3 billion (about US$ 518
million at 2000 prices), which will involve the introduction of a
third are furnace for stainless melting, additional casting facilities,
a new annealing and pickling line as well as a 200 Tpy heating
furnace. POSCO will also expand the No.1 HS Mill at Pohang to
handle more stainless steel coils. The projects is scheduled for
completion by September 2003. POSCO claims that the capacity
will reach completed.
Growth of Stainless Steel Industry in India
Production of Stainless steel in India started at the Alloy
Steel Plant (ASP), Durgapur in the late sixties. Production
gradually increased to around 24,000 tonnes in the mid-seventies.
During the end of eighties.,the government changed its policies
allowing the production of all types of steel in the secondary
sector. New capacities were created and the production increased
to about 170,000 Tpy in 1984-85. At this juncture the cold rolling
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mill of Salem Steel Plant was commissioned and the cuntry’s
production of stainless steel reached about 5.27,000 Tpy in 1994-95.
In 2000-01, the production further increased to about 7.50,000
tonnes. The 1980s also saw installation of AOD/VOD processes by
a few EAF units resulting in using high carbon ferro chrome for
the first time in India, which brought down the cost of production.
Small business units started using Induction Furnace route to
melting stainless steel scrap for recycling into usable steel.
Towards the late eighties, two major developments took place.
• The Indian Stainless Steel Development Association (ISSDA)
was founded by seven leading stainless steel producers in
the country with the object of diversifying and boosting the
use of stainless steel.
• Nickel prices shot up to high levels in 1988. To counter this,
the Indian technologies developed low nickel high
manganese austenitic stainless steel. At present, India is the
highest producer of these steels in the world. In the last
decade, there has been a standardization of these grades for
individual application areas to get higher yield and low cost
downstream processing.
Presently, the Indian stainless steel-makers are producing
plates hot rolled coils and sheets, cold rolled coils and sheets, bars,
wire rods, flats, welded and seamless tubes in wide-ranging sizes
and specifications. During the past decade, various mill products
and end products have been exported to the developed countries
and the volume is continuously increasing. After the start of the
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liberalization process in 1991, foreign investments have plunged
into the country, which has led to competition. Indian stainless
steel producers are gearing up to meet the challenge.
Structure of the Indian Stainless Steel industry
The two important features of the Indian stainless steel
industry are mentioned below:
• There are about 18 producers of stainless steel in India with
EAF/IF melting and AOD/VOD refining facilities having
capacities ranging between 10,000 and 250,000 Tpy.
• There are about 17 small induction furnace units of 2 to 3
tonne capacities, which melt stainless steel scrap and
produce pencil ingots without any refining facilities. This
segment has a share of about 20 per cent of India’s total
stainless steel production. Their average annual production
is between 5,000 and 8,000 tonnes per unit.
• Flat and long products.
• Produced through EAF/IF with refining facilities.
• Production through Its without refining facilities-20 per cent.
Sectorwise consumption
The sectorwise consumption of stainless steel in the western
world and India are furnished in Table. 3.7.
Table 3.7
Sectorwise stainless steel consumption
(in per centage)
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Sector Western world India
Consumption 11.6 0.5
Transport 14.9 0.4
Process industries 19.4 11.0
Catering equipment 36.6 75.0
Welded & Seamless
tubes
11.8 4.0
Others 58 9.1
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: World Steel Dynamics 2001.
Exports
About 170.000 tonnes of stainless steel products were
exported in 2000-01. Of these, low nickel high manganese grade
HR and CR products were 20,000 tonnes and utensil/kitchenware
50,000 tonnes. In the 300 series, HR and CR products were about
20,000 tonnes and CR Bars 33,600 tonnes. The export of 400 series
was 9,800 tonnes of which CR Bars were 7,200 tonnes and
wire/coils about 2,400 tonnes.
India exported about 80,000 tonnes of utensils in 2000-01
valued at about US$ 1.7 million to Middle-East, USA, Africa, Latin
America, Far East and Japan.
The future
Though in recent years the growth rate of stainless steel in
the country has been much higher than that of carbon steel, the per
capita consumption has reached about 700 grams as compared to
12.15 kilograms in the western world. There is a great scope of
increasing the domestic consumption. The ISSDA and Nickel
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Development Association are doing commendable work in this
regard.
The notion that stainless steel is a high cost material at the
initial stage is changing gradually giving way to the Life Cycle
Cost Analysis approach. Stainless steel is not only environment
friendly but has a long service life of about 100 years and is cent
percent recyclable. The future of the Indian stainless steel industry
is bright and favourable. Government policies will help its future
growth.
Steel Scenario of India in The Post-Liberalisation Era
After the economic liberalizations of the nineties, the Indian
steel industry was flooded with new investments, which totalled
at an estimated $7.5-8.0 billion. But plagued by the common
problem of any third world economy, the infrastructure sector
lacked the required fund.
Past experiences show, steel consumption growth rate goes
up with adequate and strategic public investments in the field.
Investments in the infrastructure sector are immensely beneficial
for the iron and steel industry as the growth of the steel industry
largely depend on the availability of proper infrastructural
facilities.
A laudable initiative
Indian production of crude and finished steel has been
steadily increasing on a year-on-year basis. In 1995-96, the crude
steel production stood at 24.54 million tonnes, which increased to
30,52 million tonnes in 2001-02. At the same time finished steel
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production, which was recorded at 22.75 million tonnes,
aggregated at around 28 million tonnes in the last financial year.
Analysts predict a growth to the level of 45 million tones of the
domestic steel industry in 2010-11. In the post-liberalisation period
of the economy, the nature of steel consumption in India has
changed considerably and dynamic use of the metal has made it
indispensable in various walks of life. Keeping in pace with the
increasing population and its various needs the steel industry is
shaping itself accordingly.
As a firm step towards this direction, the Tata Iron and Steel
Company has launched a range of steel-intensive houses for region
exposed to storms and earthquakes. These houses will also fight
fire hazards and provide cost effective safer housing to the masses.
Demand of steel for consumer durables like refrigerator, washing
machines, microwave ovens are ever increasing and the transport
sector also consumes huge amounts of steel in India.
Emerging trends
The Indian steel industry came a long way from the days
when steel market suffered from both fund crunch and supply
shortage. After the government decided to stop funding any green
field steel plant the changing face of the steel industry of the
country became clearer. Back to back the policy reforms, private
investments started pouring in and production was up like never
before. This trend prompted the industry to export in larger
quantity after meeting the domestic demand. In the last financial
year the country’s exports of steel were more than 3 million
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tonnes. The government is in favour of exporting steel to the
foreign countries.
The investment in the economy at present is on the other
fronts while the need of the hour remains gross amount of
investment in the infrastructure. Till now, either the government
agencies or companies on their own supplied the necessary
infrastructure of this sector. But as new avenues are being opened
up for investment in various sectors, ideally the steel companies
would concentrate more on steel making now. The state is
gradually being designated to arrange necessary funds for the
infrastructural developments of the steel industry.
Raw materials
The key raw materials for steel making are iron ore, coal and
natural gas. It is not feasible to ascertain the exact amount of iron
ore required for steel making in the country. Although the use of
this raw material depends largely on the technology adopted by
the company concerned.
Coal is a vital input in the steel making process as it is used
for both metallurgical applications and as a source of energy. India
has abundant sources of coking coal but the quality differs in
accordance with the place of availability. Right now the Indian
steel sector depends largely on imported coking coal. The coking
coal available in India is of high ash content and the deteriorating
condition of washeries in the country compels the steel producers
to procure this important ingredient from outside. A new coal
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policy has been formed addressing the issues concerning the iron
and steel industry as well as other sectors.
Natural gas is primarily used by three private sector steel
makers in India for the production of sponge iron. It is highly
priced in the sub-continent due to its non-availability in this part
of the world. The sponge iron industry is disbursed very little of
its requirement of natural gas, the fact which discourages the steel
producers to plan any new-based sponge iron plant for demands
in future.
Ownership modes
In India, one can see two ownership patterns in the steel
industry. The government owned and fully or partially controlled
steel majors and steel companies under private ownership. The
Steel Authority of India Limited and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam
Limited are fully controlled by the government whereas Tata Iron
and Steel Company is the largest private sector steel producers of
India. The public sector management function includes
government intervention in trading of scrap, sponge iron making,
structural engineering, mining and in technological advancement
steel making in India can be divided in another way in accordance
with the categorization of producers, namely, the primary
producers and the secondary producers.
The disinvestment factor
With the passage of time, as the state economy became more
focused and at the same time exposed to the global economy, the
steel industry calls for less government intervention in the policy
119
formation. The industry has a large role to play in the marker
policies of the country and ideally it should be allowed to work
independently for the larger interest of the state. In the process of
doing so, the government should divest the shares of the public
sector undertakings and at the same time should also stop
regulating the management of the steel majors. The major steel
companies worldwide opted for captive infrastructure and for this
have built the necessary transportation arrangements and
additional facilities. In India also, the steel companies build captive
power plants, jetties, road etc. in their bid to solidify the industrial
infrastructure. The Government of India has already divested
parts of SAIL, MECON and MSTC and many PSUs are under
scrutiny of the government authorized agencies for the feasibility
of the disinvestment proposal of the feeble companies.
In the given market situation, in the Indian context which is
a mixed economy with prevailing features of a capitalistic market,
the steel industry has every reason to flourish. Role of the
government is of utmost importance in this regard as major
production components like labour and raw materials are still
under government control here. Keeping in pace with the global
trends Indian steel industry is being visualized as a promising one
by the steel analysts of the country. With  increase in production,
the market for the same also needs to be created to absorb this
gigantic output and policy-makers are of the view that
disinvestments is the key to progress on that path.
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The finished steel production in India has grown from a
mere 1.1 million tonnes in 1951 to 23.372 million tonnes in 1997-98.
During the first two decades of planned economic development,
i.e. 1950-60 and 1960-70 the average annual growth rate of steel
production exceeded 8 per cent. However, this growth rate could
not be maintained in the decades to follow. During 1970-80, the
growth rate in steel production came down to 5.7 per cent per
annum and picked up marginally to 6.4 per cent per annum
during 1980-90. Though India started steel production in 1911,
steel exports from India began only in 1964. Exports in the first five
years were mainly due to recession in the domestic iron and steel
market. Once domestic demand revived, exports declined. India
once again started exporting steel only in 1975 touching a figure of
1 million tonnes of pig iron export and 1.4 million tonnes of steel
export in 1976-77. Thereafter, exports again fell rapidly to meet
rising domestic demand. Only after liberalization of the steel sector
the exports of iron and steel have once again started increasing.
Thought the country’s production of iron and steel is sufficient to
meet the domestic demand, however, some quantity of steel is
always needed to be imported especially those grades and
qualities which are required in small quantities, and therefore do
not justify setting up of production capacities.
The progress of the steel industry has a critical influence on
the pace of India’s development and as such great importance is
attached to capacity expansion in line with expected demand at
cost and prices, which make Indian steel internationally
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competitive. The new economic policies being pursued by the
government have opened up new opportunities for the expansion
of the steel industry. This has changed / enhanced India’s present
steel industry structure.
Manufacturing Process
(a) Integrated Steel Plants (ISPs)
Raw material: Iron ore lumps, sinters and pellets, coke (made
from cooking coal) and fluxes such as limestone, dolomites are the
major raw materials. The main steps in manufacturing process are
as follows:
Melting: Raw materials are charged in a blast furnace where
hot air is pumped to melt iron and fluxes at 1600°C. The melted
metal when cooled and solidified is called pig iron. Alternatively,
it can be further refined to make steel. Slag (fluxes with foreign
matter from ore) is separated, and blended with clinker to make
cement.
Refining: Melted metal from the blast furnace is taken to
steel melting shop where further reduction of impurities is done in
oxygen furnace (LD converter) or open health furnace which is old
technology. The crude steel in liquid form is taken in a ladle for
further refining/addition of Ferro alloys etc.
Casting: The liquid steel is casted into semi-finished
products such as billets, blooms, slabs etc. This process called
continuous casting is different from old technology (still in use in
older plants) where liquid steel is first solidified in large blocks
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called ingots and then rolled into semis, involving higher energy
and waste in re-heating.
Rolling: The semis such as billets, blooms, and slabs are
heated at 1200°C to make metal malleable and then rolled into
finished products. There are different rolling mills for different
products. Rolling mill for long products such as bars, angles,
structural etc. can be part of steel making plant or an independent
small-scale industry. Flat product rolling mills are capital
intensive, as they have to meet strict quality parameters. Rolling
rolls slabs in flat product HR plate/strip/coil by process of heating
the slab followed. HR sheet’s thickness can be further reduced by
cold rolling i.e. rolling in CR mill at room temperature. CR can be
zinc coated in  a galvanizing plant to make galvanized plates or
corrugated sheets (GP/GC), wire rods can be drawn to make
wires.
Industry Structure
Demand
Steel consumption in India over a period of time has
exhibited strong correlation to GDP growth (correlation coefficient
of 0.9855 between 1960-61 to 1996-97) and gross domestic capital
formation (0.981).  The correlation with GDFCF has been 1.0 for
the period FY1994 to FY1999. As investments declined from 1996-
97 onwards, steel consumption has also been stagnating for the last
three years. Often the growth in the cement sector is taken as a
proxy to the likely growth in steel consumption. In India, due to
the low intensity of steel + consumption in retail construction, the
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growth in the two sectors does not have very high correlation.
While over a long period of time (1960-61 to 1998-99), the
correlation is high at 0.968, it falls to 0.89 for the period of 1993-94
to 1998-99. This is also corroborated by the empirical evidence of
the last two years when cement demand growth has been steady,
steel consumption has slipped to exhibit no growth or marginally
negative growth (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8
Apparent Domestic Consumption
(000’ tones)
Particulars 1996-97 Growth
over
previous
year
1997-98 Growth
over
previous
year
1998-99 Growth
over
previous
year
1999-
2000
Growth
over
previous
year
Bars & Rods 7.619 5.7% 7.855 3.1% 7,889 0.4% 81.26 3.0%
Structural 2,564 5.2% 2,472 -3.6% 2,782 12.5% 2,838 2.0%
Plates 1,617 -20.2% 1,568 -3.0% 1,651 5.3% 1,684 2.0%
HR coils 4,864 5.0% 5,204 7.0% 4,978 -4.3% 5,227 5.0%
HR sheets 489 8.4% 440 -10.0% 420 -4.5% 412 -2.0%
CR
coils/sheets
3,080 15.1% 3,467 12.6% 3,387 -2.3% 3,522 4.0%
GP/GC 949 16.3% 1,013 6.7% 965 -4.7% 1,013 5.0%
Elect sheets/
tinplate
490 -3.9% 508 3.7% 402 -20.9% 402 0.0%
Pipes 343 55.9% 302 -12.0% 369 22.2% 376 2.0%
Railway
material
622 4.7% 606 -2.6% 561 -7.4% 544 -3.0%
Total
consumption
22,637 5.0% 23,435 3.5% 23,404 -0.1% 24,144 3.2%
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government India.
After three bad years, we expect that demand growth would
be positive in the current fiscal. We believe that the growth would
be positive in the current fiscal. We believe that the growth would
be mainly led by investments in urban infrastructure, automobiles
especially the commercial vehicles segment and progress in some
key power projects.
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Supply
While domestic demand has been stagnating, supplies in the
domestic market have been growing steadily. The major increase
in supplies has been in flat products, mainly HRC. The demand for
HRC  during 1997-98 is estimated at 9.1 mn tpa. As against this,
supply is estimated at 10.4 mn tpa (including imports). The
companies are in no position to export the balance quantity – as a
result, the producers have seen large build up in inventories and
price wars. The scenario is unlikely to change in FY2000 and
beyond. We have assumed 40 per cent capacity utilization at
Ispat’s first phase of 1.25 Mt pa and 50 per cent at Jindal
Vijaynagar’s 1.25 Mt pa capacity during FY2000, against the
nameplate capacity of 1.5 mtpa for each of the plants. The new
capacities of JVSL and Ispat will take significant time to stabilize.
A Glance on production/consumption
and export/import with a focus on HRC
India has a large domestic demand. This large demand and a
good domestic price has always discouraged the producers from
exporting the steel to the world (Tables 3.9 & 3.10). From there two
tables we infer that the consumption of flat steel, which also
includes HRC, was more than the production in the financial year
1999-2000.
Table 3.9
Key Statistics of Indian’s Finished Steel
(mn tomnes)
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Year Production Import Exports Consumption
1997-98 23.72 1.56 1.62 23.66
1998-99 24.37 1.59 1.88 24.04
1999-2000 33.96 1.10 1.69 33.37
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of India
Table 3.10
Category-wise Break-up for 1999-2000
(mn tones)
Category Production Export Consumption
Semis 7.48 0.15 7.44
Long Steel 11.46 0.47 11.23
Flat Steel 12.03 1.24 12.17
Pig Iron 2.99 0.27 2.70
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government India.
Table 3.11 shows that though the finished steel import had
fallen (it declined around 15% in 1999-2000 over 1998-99) the share
of imports of seconds/defectives in total imports had risen
substantially (36% over the period).
Table 3.11
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Category-wise Break-up for 1999-2000
(in thousand tones)
Volume of ImportsCategory
1998-99 1999-2000
Growth (%)
Semis 227 505 122
Bars & Rods 38 25 (32)
Structurals 10 20 100
Rly. Materials 6 22 266
Plates 177 92 (49)
HR Coils 659 418 (37)
HR Sheets 24 5 (79)
CR Coils/Sheets 293 225 (23)
GP/GC/Coated 16 39 144
Elect. Sheets 82 87 6
Tin Plates 219 149 (32)
Pipes (large dia) 60 50 (17)
Pig Iron 3 2 (33)
Melting
Scrap/Sponge
Iron;
819 882 8
Total Finished
Steel
1,357 1,132 (17)
Total Saleable
Steel
1,584 1,637 3
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government India
In fact this was distorting the price realization in the market.
The ministry, acting on the insistent representation by SAIL and
Essar Steel, imposed a minimum import price at Rs. 14,300 per
tonne for HR coils from the Ukraine and Russia; and Rs. 15,000
and Rs. 22,000 for HR sheets and boiler plates form Ukraine,
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Russia and Kazakhstan. This again diverted the whole of
production to the domestic market.
From the Tables 3.12 and 3.13, we again get the clue that out
of 5.09 million tonnes of HRC/Sheets produced, 4.86 millions
tonnes were consumed domestically, i.e., 95 per cent of the total
HRC/Sheets produced were consumed in the domestic market
itself. This consumption level is expected to rise when TISCO will
start its Cold Rolling Mill, which is due in September 2000. Same
was the case in the FY 1999-2000 where approximately 91 per cent
of total HRC produced were consumed in the domestic market.
Table 3.12
Category-wise Production of Finished Steel
(mn tones)
Category 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
Growth (%)
(97-98/98-99)
HR coils/sheets 4.37 5.09 5.43 5.45 0.36
CR coils 2.58 2.86 2.86 3.12 9.09
Galvanized
products
0.85 0.99 1.4 1.21 9.01
Plate/others 2.29 2.26 2.22 2.26 1.80
Total 10.09 11.2 11.62 12.04 3.61
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Steel, Government of India
Table 3.13
Category-wise Exports of Steel from India
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Category 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 Growth (%)
98-99/99-00
Pig Iron 785 281 290 3.21
Semis 503 174 328 88.50
Bars & Rods 591 454 341 -24.88
Structural 14 15 23 53.34
Plates 376 294 328 11.56
HRC/Sheets 557 634 1,460 130.28
CRC 106 107 161 50.46
GP/GC/sheets 201 250 320 28.00
Pipes 35 18 17 -5.56
Total Saleable
Steel
2,328 1,946 2,990 53.64
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India
Nevertheless, HRC saw a whopping growth of 130.28 per
cent in the last financial year (1999-2000) over the last one. In 1997-
98 and 1998-99, India had exported a total quantity of 1.8 mn
tonnes and 3.73 mn tonnes of steel to the USA, which constituted
approximately 7.6 per cent and 19.2 per cent of the total exports
from India during these two years.
The saleable steel (Pig Iron + Long Steel _ Flat Steel), which
had been on the rise from 1.32 mn tonnes in 1994-95 to 1.99 mn
tonnes in 1996-97, suffered a minor setback in 199798, slipping to
1.88 mn tonnes.
The preliminary figures of exports (Table 3.14) of saleable
steel, at 1.98 mn tones in 1998-99, indicate of a reasonably healthy
performance.  The overall exports of iron and steel appears to have
declined in 1998-99 to 2.67 mn tonnes from 3.03 mn tones in 1997-
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98, as Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd., one of the major producers of pig
iron, suspended production for a part of the year following the
collapse in the export market for pig iron. RINL export only
2,36,000 tonnes of pig iron in 1998-99. But the just over financial
year, 1999-2000, saw a fabulous performance in the total exports of
finished steel. The total exports grew by approximately 50 per cent
in 1999-2000 over the previous year from 1,770.8 thousand tonnes
to 2,670.2 thousand tonnes. SAIL, TISCO and secondary producers
owe the jump in exports volume to a remarkable recovery in the
exports of HR coils/sheets. The total exports of HR C/S grew from
693 thousand tonnes in 1998-99 to 1,467.7 thousand tonnes in 1999-
2000, a growth of approximately 112 per cent. This has been
possible only due to increased steel production in the last financial
year. Steel production increased very sharply in May, 1999.
Finished steel production by two main producers, SAIL and Tisco
increased by 13 per cent from 8 lakh tonnes in May 1998 to a shade
over 9 lakh tones during May, 1999. SAIL scaled 9 per cent rise in
production to 5.4 per cent lakh tonnes. TISCO’s output was higher
by a massive 30 per cent. The rise in the production of SAIL
indicated recovery from a very low level of output reached in May,
1998, a decline of 6.6 per cent. SAIL has also indicated a sharp
increase in sales during the first quarter of fiscal 1999-00.
Table 3.14
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Producer-wise/category-wise exports during 1998-99 and 1999-2000
       000’tonnes
Producer Secondary Producer TotalCategory
1998-
99
1999-
00
% 1998-
99
1999-
00
% 1998-
99
1999-
00
% 1998-
99
1999-
00
% 1998-
99
1999-
00
%
Bars and
Rods
7.2 19.3 - 105.7 59.8 - 156.0 143.0 - 150.0 120.0 - 418.9 342.1 -
Structural 6.0 11.5 - - - - 44.0 11.2 - - - - 50.0 22.7 -
Plates 286.6 328.1 - - - - - - - - - - 286.6 328.1 -
HRC/Sheets 25.8 250.5 87 245.8 367.2 49 - - - 421.4 850.0 101 693.0 1,468 112
CRC/Sheets 5.7 5.5 - - - - - - 83.2 155.0 - 88.9 160.5 -
GP/GC - 0.1 - - - - - - - 215.4 320.0 - 215.4 320.1 -
Tinplates - - - - - - - - - - 17.0 - - 17.0 -
Pipes - - - - - - - - - 18.0 12.0 - 18.0 12.0 -
Total
FIN/ST
331.3 615.0 85.6 351.5 427.0 21 200 154.2 -23 888 1474 66 1771 2,670 50
Pig Iron 45.0 94.1 - - - - 236.0 195.9 - - - - 276.0 290.0 -
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India
The increase in steel production during May was
concentrated in HR coils, skelps and sheets by main producers. HR
coils and skelps production was up by 29 per cent and HR sheets
by 86 per cent. The secondary producers also contributed to
growth in production of HR coils and skelps.
A revival in global demand saw prices in the global market
firming up by $50-$80 per tonne. In India, TISCO, one of the main
producers announced a hike in prices of long products and hot
rolled coils with effect from July 1999. The hike in these products
ranged between Rs.200-500 per tonnes.
Earlier in December, 1998, the DGFT introduced floor price
mechanism for import of flat steel, tinplates and alloy steel. This
was mainly to protect the domestic industry from cheap imports
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from CIS and South East Asian countries. Faced with a poor
consumption growth of around 2.3 per cent in FY1996-97 and
1997-98 and price competition from cheap imports from CIS and
South East Asian countries, which the domestic players claimed as
dumping, domestic steel prices in the those fiscal years had been
subject to hefty discounts and rebates.
In fact, the price quoted by domestic producers earlier $220
to $240 per tonnes was pegged around $240 to $260 per tonnes,
after the hike in floor prices, depending upon the grade of HR coil
was sold. The price quoted by domestic players was nowhere were
the landed cost of HR imports which worked out to around $390
per tonnes under the floor price regime. Ball Park calculations
showed that domestic HR makers reaped an additional benefit of
Rs.150-200 crore during the first three months of the fiscal 1998-99,
nowhere near the potential to generate additional revenue of Rs.
5,000 crore. Some of the developed countries also protected their
domestic industry, so that in the then continuing recession, their
domestic industry did not turn sick in the absence of any tariff
barrier. The US government slapped anti-dumping duty on HR
coils imports from Japan and Brazil and set floor prices of $228 to
$280 per tonnes (FOB) for exports from Russia. EUROFER, the
European Union Manufacturers Association also filed dumping
cases against HR and CR coils exports from Bulgaria, Iran and
India Meanwhile in a bid to mutually resolve growing trade
disputes in steel, India and EU have formed a contact group.
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Comprising of equal members from both the countries, this group
would try to amicably resolve all the current issues bilaterally and
minimize future disputes.
Prospectus Abroad
Among all the uncertainties in the international steel trade,
one thing is certain that the sheltered position of the Indian steel
industry will go away soon. The tariff barriers in India are coming
down. Though it is a different matter that tariff and non-tariff
barriers are being built even in countries like the USA. Therefore,
on a long-term perspective, Indian steel industry would have to be
competitive along with the global steel industry in terms of cost,
quality and product mix.
Cost competitiveness
About 50 per cent of Indian steel comes from the integrated
plants. On the work cost of basic items like hot metal and crude
steel which are quite cost competitive. Even the total cost from our
efficient plants at the rate of 105-110$/t, for hot metal and about
200$/t, for cast slab is quite competitive. Here we do have an
advantage of cheaper iron ore, cheaper in-house power generation.
TISCO has the advantage of captive coal mines also. Low labour
rate is not exactly an advantage due to high manpower and lower
productivity at least compared to steel industries of other
developing countries like South Korea or the Latin America.
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Quality of indigenous coal for companies like SAIL is a distinct
disadvantage due to high ash content and poorer coking
properties. We are blending these with imported coal. Currently
the market prices of these coals are quite low. This advantage is,
however, being shared by many of our competitors who are now
importing coal. In specific locations like Bhilai, the imported coal is
actually cheaper than the indigenous coal but our intake is
restricted by the port facilities and availability of wagons. In the
coming years, we would need flexibility in usage of domestic and
indigenous coal to keep our costs down. Infrastructure facilities
should not pose a hindrance.
Modernization
The Indian steel industry heavily invested in expansion and
modernization during the recent past. SAIL has modernize its
plants with a capital infusion of nearly Rs. 12,000 crore. Heavy
investments have been made in the private sector also in setting up
several new green field plants. The cost of capital is now a
significant portion of the total cost which we would have to realize
from our sales in the domestic and international markets. Interest
rates in India for domestic borrowings are very high.
Table 3.15
Production of Crude Steel (World & India)
(in thousand tonnes)
Country 1998 %
Change
over
1997-98
1999 %
Change
over
1998-99
2000 % Change
over 1999-
2000
Japan 1,04,534 5.8 93,548 -10.5 94.201 0.7
S.Korea 42,554 9.4 39,896 -6.2 41,027 2.8
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China 1,07,564 7.5 1,14,890 6.1 1,23,153 7.9
India 23,745 8.9 23,782 0.2 24,076 1.2
Other Asia 25,343 20.4 25,498 0.6 25,223 -1.1
Asia 3,03,740 8.2 2,96,814 -2.3 3,07,682 3.7
Germany 45,007 13.1 44,047 -2.1 42,036 -4.6
France 19,767 12.1 20,122 1.8 20,217 0.5
Italy 25,790 6.2 25,843 0.2 24,798 -4.0
UK 18,529 2.4 17,286 -6.7 16,626 -3.8
Span 13,667 12.4 14,704 7.6 15,080 2.6
Other EU 36,977 5.3 37,912 2.5 36,920 -2.6
EU-15 1,59,737 8.6 1,59,914 0.1 1,53,677 -2.6
Other W.Europe 2,068 30.9 2,193 6.0 1,428 -34.9
Brazil 26,151 3.6 25,758 -1.5 24,969 -3.1
Other Latin America 11,832 4.5 11,587 -2.1 10,162 -12.3
Latin America 37,983 3.9 37,345 -1.7 35,131 -5.9
Cananda 15,546 5.5 15,931 2.5 16,169 1.5
Mexico 14,283 8.5 14,211 -0.5 15,317 7.8
USA 97,226 3.2 97,294 0.1 96,033 -1.3
N.America 1,27,055 4.0 1,27,436 0.3 1,27,519 0.1
Other W. World 36,334 5.5 35,581 -2.1 34,035 -4.3
Western World 6,66,917 7.2 6,59,283 -1.1 6,61,472 0.3
CIS include. Russia 78,685 2.8 70,696 -10.2 83,114 17.6
Eastern Europe 33,129 16.2 30,224 -8.8 25,862 -14.4
Total World 7,78,731 7.1 7,60,203 -2.4 7,70,448 1.3
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.
Foreign loans on international rates also become costly in the
long run. Due to steady devaluation of Indian rupee against
Dollar/Pound/Mark. For plants like Durgapur Steel Plant in SAIL,
depreciation and interest account for nearly 30 per cent of the total
cost of saleable steel now. This makes export of steel from these
plants very difficult on cost consideration. Otherwise, on work
basis our products remain quite competitive.
Quality
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The recent investments, made in the industry, have helped
us to overcome much of our past problems. From SAIL, for
example, after switching over to continuous costing and
modernization of the hot strip mills, hot strips are being exported
in large quantity. The rail rolling facilities have also undergone
complete revamp to enable us to export all kinds of rails. Similarly,
our competitors is India are already having newly installed
facilities and generally face no problem on this front.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure development in India is closely associated
with the prospects of export growth. This is extremely important
for bulk items like steel. India has problems of inadequate port
facilities, longer waiting time for berthing and loading of vessels
compared to most of the modern ports in the world. This increases
the freight charges and makes Indian steel costlier on a CIF basis.
Urgent attention in these areas will be required.
Trade and tariff barriers
Steady building up of trade barriers in steel – both in tariff as
well as in non-tariff areas in developed countries, led by the USA
and EU (15) are causing concern to all Indian steel exporters. The
recent imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties as
high as 83 per cent by USA on the export of cut to length plates
from India has already shut off one of the most profitable markets
to SAIL. Similar measures had been taken in the case of import of
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stainless steel bars from India to USA. Proceedings are also going
on in EU against import of Hot rolled coils and plates and in
Canada, against plates imported from India. It would be necessary
now for all steel exporters to maintain records as per WTO
procedures. All these trade actions by the developed countries are
likely to restrict the market access of steel exports from India. In
view of the above developments, SAIL is gearing for exports to
new markets. For plate, entry has been made into Taiwan and
Mexico. Efforts are going on for markets of Middle East and South
East Asia. However, these markets are lower priced and quantities
required are low.
SAIL – A Brief History, Its objectives and Business
Prior to the establishment of SAIL, i.e. 1973 the integrated
steel mills like Bhilai, Rourkela, Durgapur and Alloy Steel plant
were under the direct control of Hindustan Steel Limited (HSL).
The volume of investment in paid up capital and borrowings in
HSL went upto Rs. 606.1 crore in 1960-61 from Rs. 655 crore in
1955-56 and gradually reached to Rs. 1,211.75 crores in 1977-78.
The investment in HSL accounted for 63 per cent of the aggregate
investment in the public sector in 1960-61 and declined to 9 per
cent in 1977-78. It implies that investment in other public
enterprises increased to a substantial degree with the progress of
industrialization. The major products of iron and steel are pig Iron,
steel ingots blooms, billets, slabs, sheets, tubes, rails, structures,
and wire, serving as inputs to a network of industries like
automobiles, heavy machinery, and transportation equipment etc.
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Establishment of Steel mills
In pursuance of the industrial policy resolutions, the
integrated steel mills came to be established at Rourkela, Bhillai,
Durgapur and Bokaro. The Indian Iron and Steel Company has
been brought under complete ownership of the Government
Control with effect from 17-07-1976.
The Steel Authority of India Limited, a holding company, set
up in 1973, is entrusted with the responsibility of implementing
the basic policies of Government in the area of iron and steel. The
SAIL is a sick public sector giant with its plants over manned,
outdated and reflected for many years, the task of revitalizing an
organization which employed nearly 1.5 lakh people one that
would daunt the most intrepid manager. Even at the initial stages
when those plants were new and state-of-the-art, they made only
marginal profits because steel prices were pegged low, way below
international prices, subsequent with deteriorating plant
performance cord with paralyzed management doing nothing to
check the rapid downhill slid. SAIL made losses for the years.
It owns and operates five integrate steel plants, two alloy
steel plants, centralized research development, engineering,
technology and training facilities and 25 mining operations that
produce coal from ore, limestone, dolemite, quortnite and fire day-
all of which are located in the eastern part of the country, a head
office in Delhi, 44 sale and marketing offices and 60 stockyards
throughout the country. SAIL’s four integrated steels plants at
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Rourkela, Durgapur, Bhillai and Bokaro have a total capacity of 6.6
million tonnes per annum of salesable steel.
Objective of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Upon a decision of the Government of India in December
1972, SAIL emerged on 24-01-1973 with its registered office in New
Delhi and authorized capital of Rs. 2,000 crore as a holding
company under the Companies Act 1956, acquiring all the shares
of HSL and some others to discharge the following objectives:
1. To plan, promote and organize an integrated and
efficient development of the iron and steel associated
industries in accordance with the national economic
policy by the government from time to time.
2. To coordinate the activities of its subordinates, to
determine their economic and financial objectives, to
review, control guide and direct their performance to
secure optimum utilization of all resources placed at
their disposal.
3. To act as an entrepreneur on behalf of the state to
identify new areas of economic investment and to
undertake or help in the undertaking of such
investment.
4. To formulate and recommend to the Government a
national policy for the development of iron and steel
and related input industries and to advise it in all
policies and technical matters.
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Steel Authority of India Limited adopts this statement of
objectives, based on the important national goals of encouraging
and ensuring rapid economic growth through efficient production
and supply of high quality iron and steel goods and allied
products at reasonable prices.
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) is the flagship of
India’s public sector industry. There are four integrated steel
plants directly under SAIL-Bhilai, Durgapur, Rourkela and
Bokaro. The fifth at Burnpur is a subsidiary of SAIL. These five
have crude steel capacities of 11 million tonnes. Besides integrated
plants, SAIL has alloy and special steel plants at Durgapur and
Salem, Maharashtra Electrosmelt Ltd. and Visvesvarya Iron and
Steel Ltd., producers of special steels and ferro-alloys are also
subsidiaries of SAIL.
SAIL has its own captive mines for meeting iron ore,
limestone and dolomite requirements. The company markets its
products through a country-wide network of stockyards and
distribution centres spread over 49 locations and has a well
equipped Research and Development Centre for Iron and Steel
(RDCIS). Sail provides direct employment to 2.30 lakh employees
and to many more indirectly. It also provides modern township
and community facilities, schools and medical facilities.
SAIL has embarked upon a massive modernization
programme to take its saleable steel making capacities to 15
million tonnes by the turn of the twentieth century. The
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programme is aimed at making the company internationally
competitive by introducing cot effective technologies.
The programme is being implemented in two phases. Under
phase I, SAIL will be clearing the backlog of maintenance,
revamping old equipment, upgrading technology, reducing
energy consumption levels and improving the quality of inputs
and finished steel. Phase II will attempt raising the output of all
the plants to optimum levels. A multi-discipline, multifarious
organization SAIL’s expertise is, however, not restricted to steel. It
extends to research and development in iron and steel projects,
environment management and management training among other
things. SAIL consultancy division offers its technical and
professional expertise, based on decades of steel making
experience to a growing clientele. Responding to the liberalized
economies initiated by the government in July 1991, SAIL has
geared itself to a market-driven economy. In the process, it has
worked towards reducing costs, increasing production and
productivity and improving marketing and management practice
to provide complete customer satisfaction. SAIL has also
modernized the technology and process, leading to dramatic
improvement in capacity utilization, coke rate, energy
consumption and environmental pollution control. But progress
for SAIL is always for the community – never at the cost of it.
Accordingly, it has identified environmental management and
pollution control as thrust areas, investing as much as Rs.1,041
crore for pollution control measures at its various plants units. The
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Environment Management Division chalks out guidelines on
environment management for the organization and their
implementation. In addition, substantial sums have been spent in
providing welfare schemes for employees and people in and
around its areas of operations: housing and township, medical
facilities, family welfare, education and peripheral development.
Guided by a vision to achieving customer satisfaction by
increasing production of value-added steel, cutting production
costs, improve profitability and diversifying into specified areas,
SAIL is all set to meet the challenges of the future. It also has plans
for diversifying into new growth areas.
Adding value for growing markets
Always responsive to market needs and customer
requirements, SAIL has a diverse and versatile mix of products
and services, backed by computerized operations and modern
stockyards to enable quick response to customer needs. It is
continually improving quality, cost and delivery of products,
focusing on customized specifications for total customer
satisfaction. Alongside, SAIL has increased its share of high and
value-added products, leading to a vastly improved performance
and higher profits. Equipped with state-of-art technology to meet
advanced needs and applications, several of SAIL’s plants and
units have received ISO 9002/1 certifications. To provide world
class steel for railways, ship-building, construction, bridges,
automobiles and many vital industrial applications.
Tracking the globe
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Internationally acknowledged and accepted for their quality,
SAIL’s rails and track materials are exported to many countries
around the world.
Building with strength
SAIL’s structural and Thermo-Mechanically Treated (TMT)
bars have helped build bridges, stadium and large commercial and
industrial complexes in India and abroad.
Meeting heavy-duty needs
SAIL is the only producer of extra wide (up to 3200 mm) and
heavy plates – meeting the needs of the construction, automobile,
ship-building, engineering and other sectors.
Packing in freshness for consumables
SAIL steel is widely used in the packing of food products
and other consumer perishables. Fresh possibilities involving the
use of steel are being considered to keep products intact-providing
the versatility of SAIL steel.
A world-class roadrunner
The automotive industry in India is turning exceedingly to
SAIL for its needs of high performance, corrosion-resistant grades
of steel. Working closely with customers, SAIL has developed a
range of special steels that conform to international standards
enabling the country’s automotive sector to make a great leap
forward in its race towards globalization.
Adding value to durables
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SAIL has developed ultra-thin cold rolled sheets less than
0.65 mm thick for use in the production of a wide range of
consumers’ durbles.
In cool company
SAIL’s galvanized steel is extensively used in air-
conditioning, coating, roofing, paneling, industrial sheeting and
structural applications.
A stainless reputation everywhere
ISO 9002 certified stainless steel from SAIL is exported to
and readily accepted in several developed counties—an
affirmation of it international quality.
Giving power to generation
SAIL’s electrical steel produced at its state-of-art Silicon Steel
Mill of international quality to give large capacity motros
generators and other electrical appliances a qualitative edge.
Flowing with the world
SAIL pipes have played a vital role in transporting oil, gas
and water across the country. These sturdy, weatherproof, cost-
effective and world-class pipes enjoy a growing overseas market.
SAIL brands
Some major products of SAIL are being marketed under the
following brand name: SIL Boiler, SAIL NOX, SAIL Marine, SAIL
TOR, SAIL Superform, SAIL Tin, SAIL Press, SAIL Jyoti, SAILMA,
SAILCOR and SALEM Stainless. These products are proving
beneficial to any array of application in diverse fields.
Growth of SAIL
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SAIL started its journey, it may be recalled in 1972-73 (24-01-
1973) as a holding company of RSP, DSP, BSP etc. The total
investment of which was Rs. 1,293.81 crore and production of hot
metal, pig iron, ingot steel and salable steel stod at 4.9 MT, 4.0 MT
and 2.98 MT respectively at that time when it was decided that the
steel plants of Visakapatnam (VSP), Hospet, Salem would also be
carried on by SAIL, as and when formed. The main steel plant of
the company are as given:
Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP):
RSP set up with an initial annual capacity of one million
tonnes of ingot steel was later expanded to 1.8 million tonnes.
Among the various producers rolled out by the plant are flat,
tubular and coated products like wide and heavy plates, hot rolled
coils and sheets, galvanized plan and corrugated sheets,
electrolytic tin plates and electric resistant welded pipes. Rourkela
also produces spirally welded pipes up to 64”diameter, suitable
for the oil sectors, drainage and sewerage system Rourkela’s
sophisticated silicon steel mill produces cold rolled grain-oriented
and cold non-oriented electrical steel sheets
The plant is being bipolarized in two phases: RSP came into
existence in 1957 under the collaboration of Kroops Demang, a
German Company, in the public sector with ingot capcity of 1
MTPA, 40,000 employees, on the basis of iron ore Keyonjhen and
Mayarbhanj, coal of Talcher and Jaria, hydro-electricity of
Hirakund, local manganese, limestone and dolomite, in Orissa It is
the first of its kind and has since been pioneering programme of
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obtaining self-reliance in steel production. It may be recalled that
in India to produce flat products and in Asia to introduce BUF
process, and one amongst a few to adopt the LD converter process.
It produces a wide range of products, viz. hot and cold rolled
coils/steels, galvanized sheets, electrolytic tin plates and SW and
ERW pipes. Continuous technological innovations led to greater
diversification of its product range. A sophisticated silicon steel
project was commissioned in 1988-89 to produce CRNG-oriented
sheets. A singular feature of the plants is its fertilizer plant rated to
produce 0.46 HTPA of CAN (25% N2). The modernization
programme approved in October 1989, due to be completed in two
phases by 1995, involving an investment of Rs. 2,461 crore would
enhance the plants ingot capacity to 1.9 MT. Phase I packages were
well in progress, while under phase II orders for 11 indigenous
packages were finalized and 4 indigenous and 5 global packages
were under evaluation.
Bhillai Steel Plant (BSP):
BSP had an initial capacity of 1 million tonnes of ingot steel.
Today the plant has an annual production capacity of 4 million
tonnes of crude steel and 3.153 million tonnes of saleable steel,
with studies being made to further enhance its capacity to around
5.3 million tonnes of crude steel through modernization and
upgradation. The plant was the first in India to produce wide
(3,600 mm) and heavy plates. A major exporter of steel products,
146
Bhillai specializes in shaped products such as heavy rails, heavy
structural, merchant products and wire rods.
It was set in 1957 under public sector in Madhya Pradesh
under Russian collaboration with an ingot capacity of 1 MTPA and
64,000 employees. It was also shifted from HSL to SAIL in 1972-73.
Its saleable capacity increased from 1,965 MTPA to 3,153 MTPA.
Its first blast furnace was installed on 04-02-1959. The stream has
LD process of steel-making continuous casting of slabs and blooms
and a 3,600 mm-wide plate mill, one of the biggest of its kind in
Asia. The old stream specializes in shopped products, mostly
sections, merchant product, wire rods and heavy rail. The versatile
rail mill in this plant is capable of products rails to meet the most
stringent specifications required by the users. The plant has been
one of the largest exporters of steel products, particularly rails in
the country.
In the earlier period the plant had been gradually becoming
the short significant producer of steel. But since 1969-70, it made a
tremendous progress in capacity utilization. In 1974-75 the
Government of India approved the expansion to 4 MT capacities
that got completed in 1990-91 with commission of:
(i) Blast furnace No.7 with bell-less top charging system and
computerized control, the first in India.
(ii) 7 meter high coke-over butting No.9, the tallest in India.
(iii) VAD in converter ship etc. modern continuous casting
process, the first time in the public sector was also
adopted here. MECON prepared the detailed project
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report for the said expansion. The studies were being
made for furtherance of its capacity to 5.3 MTPA. The
Second Sintering plant was also set up to use the
additional amount of iron ore expected from the Dalli
Mechanised Mines.
Durgapur Steel Plant (DSP):
Durgapur Steel Plant is a major producer of railway
materials like wheel and axles, fishplates and sleepers. It also
produces billets, light and medium sections, merchant sections and
skelps. The capacity of the plant is being increased from 1.15 MT to
1.87 MT through large-scale modernization which includes
sophisticated process technologies with customer- oriented
product mix. Saleable steel output will then go up from 800,000
tonnes to 1.6 MT. It was also commissioned in 1957 in public sector
under department organization in Durgapur with ingot capacity of
1 MTPA under collaboration of ISCON, a British company, on the
strength of coal of Raniganj, iron ore and manganese of Orissa,
water of the Damodar river. Its production started in 1962. To call
up, it also becomes a unit of SAIL simultaneously with RSP and
BSP. It is a major producer of railway products like wheels, axles,
fishplates, and sleepers. It also produces light and medium
sections, merchant sections and skelps. In 1978-79, a number of
schemes were taken up to diversify and improve its products.
Government’s approval to an outlay of Rs. 25 crore to finance the
selection of technologies preparation of basic and detailed
engineering design and finalisation of equipment specifications
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was accorded in October 1984. Its modernization, to augment ingot
capacity to 1.9 MT, scheduled to be carried out through 16 turnkey
packages consultant, started in 1988-89 along with that of RSP. The
backlog of maintenance and obsolescence affected its performance
for a long time. However, the Government of India approved the
definitive cost estimation of Rs. 2,667.6 crore in February 1989 to
revamp and technologically upgrade the plant through
modernization. Orders were placed for all the six global and eight
out of ten indigenous packages by 1988-89. The modernization
programme of the plant, however, was in solid progress. Basic
engineering for major shops was completed and civil wales
including piling and concreting stated by 1989-90 and was in
advanced stage of compilation in 1990-91. The production of the
plant for the period 1990-90 was quite unsatisfactory.
Bokaro Steel Plant (BSP):
Bokaro Steel Plant, situated in the coal belt of Eastern India,
heralds India’s advancement in the design, engineering and
construction of steel plants. Indian engineering and equipment
supplies have played a major role in its construction making it the
first indigenous public sector steel plant in India. With a capacity
of 4 million tonnes, it is designated to produce hot and cold rolled
sheets, coils and silt coils in various specifications and wires. The
plant produces a wide range of hot and cold rolled plates,
galvanized sheets and black sheets. Bokaro’s hot and cold
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developed and developing countries where they have been
exported.
Bokaro Steel Ltd. was erected in 1964 with the collaboration
of the USSR in the public sector on the basis of iron ore of
Singbhum, coal of Bokaro and water of Damodar with ingot
capacity of 1.7 MTPA and saleable capacity of .3 MTPA and pig
iron capacity of 0.88 MTPA. In fact, it heralds India’s progress in
the design engineering and construction of steel plants. It is the
first indigenous public sector steel plant in India. However, it
made a profit of Rs. 1,76 crore in 1976-77 for the first time. It was
also brought under SAIL. It produces flat products. Its expansion
programme to 4 MT stage was taken up after 1970 and completed
in 1990-91. Soviet side submitted the DPR in regard to
modernization of its converter shops and hot strip mills. The
investment proposal was under process for government approval.
Benefits envisaged may be summed up as under:
1. Liquid steel production would rise from 4.08 MTPA to 4.5
MTPA.
2. Income to production of slabs by 0.86 MTPA by
introduction of continuous costing process and increase in
saleable steel by 0.84 MTPA.
3. Savings in energy by elimination of slabbing mills
The total project was expected to be completed in 4½ years
after signing the contract and would be executed by Soviet on a
total ‘turnkey’ basis. Incidentally, it started production early in the
1970s.
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Alloy Steel Plant (ASP), Durgapur:
The Alloy Steel Plant is the largest alloy steel-producing unit
in India. The plant has had its capacity augmented from 1,00,000
tonnes of alloy steel ingot annually to 2,60,000 tonnes. Among due
wide range of alloy and special steels produced here are Armour
plate grade steel and many special grade alloys to meet vital and
strategic needs of the country. Besides ingots, the plant produces
forged products, bars and sheets. The plant is equipped with
VAD/VOD units.
The plant was instituted at Durgapur in 1960 under Japanese
collaboration with ingot capacity of 0.1 MTPA and 7,400 people.
Being the largest of its kind in the country, it went through two
expansion stages completed in 1980-81 and March 1988
respectively. The completion of first stage augmented the ingot
capacity to 0.16 MTPA involving a cost of Rs. 9.3 crore. The
completion of second stage enhanced the capacity (ingot) further
to 0.26 MTPA attracting an expenditure of Rs. 113.25 crore leading
to updating of technology, improvement in utility, a provision for
hot rolled barrels for SSP, installation of a continuous slab/boom
casting machines, a VOD unit and a VAD each of 60 tonnes
capacity. The plant produces, interalia, armour plate grade steel,
many special grade alloys forged products, bars, steels and rods.
Salem Steel Plant (SSP):
Salem Steel Plant has a capacity of 70,000 tonnes of cold
rolled stainless steel strips and wide sheets per annum. With the
proposed switchover from imported hot bands currently being
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used as feedstock to hot bands rolled at Salem (after installation of
stackel mill) Salem will have greater control over its rolling
schedules and deliveries. The plant meets the requirements of the
domestic stainless steel utensils and dairy industries in a big way,
besides a host of specialized highly technical application. During
its ten years of operation the plant has become a symbol of
excellence within the country and abroad. Situated in Tamil Nadu,
SSP represents dispersal of industries and balanced regional
development, brings India the latest sophistication in cold rolling.
It went into production early in the 1980s. It was designed to roll
out 0.032 MTPA of coiled rolled stainless steel strips and wide
sheets in the first stage.
Lignite coal of Naveli, local iron ore, limestone and dolomite
helped a lot to set up the plant. DPR envisaged production of 0.22
MTPA of stainless, electrical and other special steel in the second
stage of expansion. The second sendzimir installed in 1990-91
raised its capacity to 0.17 MTPA. For indigenization of hot bands,
its primary feed material, a comprehensive backward integration
programme was being implemented. As such, a switch over from
the imported hot band to the hot band rolled at BSP and RSP, out
of slabs made at ASP was being resorted to. It can produce
stainless steel to mirror finish. So the plant has established a high
reputation for quality products acclaimed by international markets
also. Its stainless steel finds application in many industries –
Nuclear petroleum, chemicals, fertilizer, cutlery, and dairy etc. The
plant is actively pursuing development activities to promote use of
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stainless steel in new areas, such as coinage, railway coaches,
buildings and architecture etc. In fact, during its only ten years of
operation it became a symbol of excellence within and outside the
country.
Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (IISCO)
Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO), a subsidiary of SAIL
has a wide range of products such as billets, light rails, structural
bars, hot rolled sheets, galvanized sheets and various special
sections. It has a capacity of 1 million tonnes of ingots annually.
Cast iron spun pipes from 80 mm to 1,050 mm diameter, produced
in its units in Kulti and Ujjain are internationally acclaimed. The
plant is engaged in castings of steel, cast iron, non-ferrous and
alloy products. Saleable steel capacity is 8,00,000 tonnes. Efforts are
on to modernize and re-orient the plant to international techno
economic norms. Its subsidiary, IISCO Ujjain Pipe and Foundry
Products are high quality spun pipes.
IISCO was established at Hirapur near Asansol (West
Bengal) in 1918 in private sector to produce long products under
the managing agency of Burn and Company on the strength of
iron ore of Gua at South Singbhum, Bihar, Bagiabura (Keyanjhar
district), Gurumahisanim Sulaipat, Badamhill, Bonaihill all of of
Orissa, Coal of Raniganj, water of the Damodar, manganese of
Mayurbhanj (Orissa) with two blast furnaces of 500 TPA ingot
capacity each.
The Bengal Iron and Steel Company formed in 1874 and
Steel Corporation of Bengal formed in 1937 were amalgamated
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and merged with IISCO in 1936 and 1953 respectively making
IISCO an integrated steel plant.
In view of gradual deterioration of the plant, Government of
India took over its management on 14-07-1972 for two years, later
extended upto three years. A ten-year capital reconstruction and
rehabilitation scheme was launched to hold production at rated
level and to rejuvenate its technical health. In 1976, 57.33 per cent
of equity capital and 57.33 per cent of preference capital were
acquired by the Central Government. IISCO ‘acquisition of shares
Act’ was passed. On 01-05-1978 the acquired shares were
transferred to SAIL making  IISCO  a   subsidiary   of    SAIL.
Subsequently,   on 30-03-1979 the rest of its shares were also
transferred to SAIL, thereby making it a wholly owned subsidiary
of SAIL. On 31-03-1979 its authorized and paid-up capitals were
Rs. 100 crore and Rs. 54.32 crore respectively. The plant is
regarded as one where the foundation of the modern steel
industry in the country was laid. The Government in 1987-88
approved its modernization proposal, in principle, and Rs. 30 crore
was sanctioned in this score for preparation of DPR and enabling
works that were in progress. With the completion of
modernization programme, practically, a new plant would come
up raising its ingot capacity to 2.15 MTPA with the latest state-of-
art technology.
Visvesvarya Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (VISCO)
Visvesvarya Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (VISCO), another
subsidiary of SAIL is a pioneer in the production of high quality
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alloy and special steel and ferro alloys. The steel is produced both
through LD as well as EAF route. The facilities include vacuum
degassing, continuous casting and a modern long forging
machine. It has an installed capacity of 77,000 tonnes of
alloy/special steel, 48,000 tonnes of mild steel and 23,800 tonnes of
ferro-alloys. The plant will undergo an update shortly, which will
further expand its capacity and product range.
VISCO came into existence as Mysore Iron and Steel Works
in 1923 as a department organization of Karnataka State
Government at Benkipur (now Bhadrabati) on the bank of the
Vedra near Simoga with a small furnace based on charcoal with
pig iron capacity of 2,45,000 MTPA on the strength of iron ore
(Haematite) of Komman Gundi at Bababudan Hill, dolomite of
Sankarquoda (Simoga), hydroelectric power of Jog area. The
absence of charcoal posed a serious problem. A small steel plant
and some steel rolling mills were added in 1936. The plant was
modernized in the First Plan. Ferro silicon was produced by using
mild steel in the plant in 1971-72 for the first time in India. In 1976,
the plant was renamed after Sir Visvesvarya, the grand old man of
the south, as Visvesvarya Iron and Steel Ltd. jointly owned by the
state and central government in 3:2 ratio through SAIL. It is one of
the principal producers of alloy and special steel in India. Its other
products are mild steel, cement, ferro-silicon, casting ferro alloys,
spun pipes. On 01-08-1989 SAIL acquired its 60 per cent share
turning it into its subsidiary. On 31-03-1990 its authorized and
paid-up capital, capacity of ingot, saleable, pig iron and mild steel
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stood at Rs. 100 crore, Rs. 81.95 crore, 0.18 MT, 0.18 MT, 0.16 MT,
0.048 MT respectively. The plant was due to be updated shortly.
Maharashtra Elektrosmelt Ltd.:
Maharashtra Elektrosmelt Limited is the largest producer of
high carbon ferro-manganese in India with a capacity of 1,00,000
tonnes per year. Besides this, the plant has a capacity to produce
75,000 tonnes of several grades of steel in billet form. A subsidiary
of SAIL, the plant is actively involved in technology development
through a major thrust in R&D activities. Post-combustion launch
operation in converter, Combined Blowing Technology with
tubers-based system, sintering of MN ore fines, high pressure
sintering unit and bulk commercial production  of medium carbon
ferro-manganese through converter are some of its major
technological innovations.
MEL, India’ largest ferro-manganese producer, with a
licensed capacity of 66,970 tonnes was taken over by SAIL, on 18-
10-1986 when its authorized capital and total investment were Rs.
5 crore and Rs. 4.78 crore respectively, both for utilizing some of its
facilities for its facilities for R & D work and for minimizing its
production for captive use in SAIL plants. It produces several
grades of special steel also. With successful casting of stainless
steel billets in 1988, it entered the stainless steel market. It is now
diversifying into other ferro alloys, low carbon pig iron etc.
Raw Materials Division
The exacting standards that SAIL has set for itself demands
high quality and assured availability of raw materials. Its raw
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materials division controls nine iron ore, five limestone, three
dolomite and three coal-mines. The 19,000 strong workforce
produces 21 million tonnes of iron ore, 6 million tonnes of
limestone, one million tonnes of dolomite and 2.5 million tonnes of
coal annually.
SAIL will require 31 million tonnes of iron ore, 6.53 million
tones of limestone and 3 million tonnes of dolomite by the late
1990s. The division is gearing itself to meet the additional demand
of raw materials as SAIL marches ahead to augment its capacity by
its ongoing modernization programme. This will be achieved by
modernizing the existing mines as well as developing new mines
in various parts of the country.
Research and Development
The Research and Development Centre for Iron and Steel
(RDCIS) was set up in Ranchi to meet the growing needs of the
public sector steel industry in India. Its basic objectives are
development of new process and products, provision of
technological services and creation of an R & D culture for
excellence. The centre has excellent technical and diagnostic
facilities in keeping with the rapidly evolving scientific scenario. It
is also equipped with facilities for conducting pilot scale trials for
establishing technologies and an industrial scale. The centre is also
pursuing basic research programme with principal scientific
institution in India and abroad with its expanded activities, the
centre is now capable of rendering technical assistance and
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undertaking contract research programme in the area of iron and
steel technology both in India and the developing countries.
Centre For Engineering and Technology
Centre For Engineering and Training (CET) is an in-house
Design, Engineering and Consultancy Organization of SAIL with
its headquarters at Ranchi and sub-centres at Bhilai, Rourkela,
Durgapur, Bokaro, Burnpur and Bhadravati.
The range of services provided by CET includes projects
consultancy, designed and engineering projects management,
Technology up gradation and performance improvement
pertaining to steel industry. CET also provides full support in the
export of project and services abroad.
Management Training Institute
The Management Training Institute forms the nucleus of in
house management training in SAIL. It caters to the training,
consultancy and management research requirements of the top
and senior level executives of the company. It has the most
modern facilities required for an in-house training establishment
with a well-stocked library and a computer lab. It also coordinates
the training activities in plants/units and formulates human
resources development plans.
Consulting Services
SAIL is diversifying its activities by bringing together its
special technical and professional expertise, based on three
decades of experience in steel making.
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SAIL can offer the international steel companies with
services in the following areas:
Projects and Engineering Services:
Study reports/Feasibility and detailed project reports.
Project Engineering and Management.
Contracts and Commercial Assistance.
Technical and Management Services
Operation, Maintenance and Technical Services
Marketing and Distribution of Products.
Technology and Know-How Services
Process modelling of optimization of resources.
Process and output.
Energy conservation scheme.
Environment and pollution control.
Waste utilization.
Development of new products.
Technology transfer.
Human Resource Development
Training in Operation and Maintenance.
Management Division Programme for different levels.
Action Leadership Programme.
Custom Specific Training Modules
The Marketing Network
All SAIL products are marketed through its Central
Marketing Organization (CMO), which caters to both domestic
and foreign markets. To ensure quality and prompt despatch of
159
products, the CMO keeps in close touch with the producing units
as well as with the transport and shipping sectors. Today, with
export and import division located in New Delhi and Calcutta(at
present Kolkata), the CMO operates through an expanding
network of stockyards, dockyards, branch sales officer,
consignment agents and extension counters that have helped
established SAIL’s reputation as marketer, makes of the finest steel
projects to as many as 61 countries around the globe. Notable
among them are Australia, Japan, South Korea, China, Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR.
Thus, it is observed that Indian Steel Industry plays an
important role to fulfil the major demand of quality steel as
produced by different steel manufacturing organizations like
SAIL, TISCO, JVSL and RINL. In Global Section, the world crude
steel and finished steel production, exports and imports of steel,
have been accounted to analyze the steel scenario and present
extent of competition in steel industry at global level. Indian steel
industry is expected to be competitive at global level in terms of
cost, quality and product mix. Steel Authority of India Limited
presently a sick public sector giant organization understands the
fact of global competition and adopts the statement of objectives,
based on the important national goals of encouraging and
ensuring rapid economic growth through efficient production and
supply of high quality iron and steel goods and allied products at
reasonable prices. SAIL produces nearly the entire range of steel
products in its different plants and incures heavy investment in
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research and development and to modernize all plants to meet the
future steel demand and compete at global level.
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Overview
Financial statements may be defined as periodic general
purpose accounting statements containing information about a
reporting entry’s performance and financial position which are
released for the various users groups. In India, corporate financial
statements comprises of Profit and Loss Account, Balance Sheet,
and Schedules and notes forming part thereof. In the Companies
Bill, 1993 (now withdrawn) it was proposed to include funds flow
statement as part of the financial statements. In many countries,
financial statements comprise of Profit and Loss Account, Balance
Sheet, Earning Per Share Statement, Cash Flow Statement and
statement of changes in the shareholders’ equity.
Financial statements analysis refers to the process of
judgement which aims to evaluate the current and past financial
positions and the results of operations of an enterprise, with the
primary objective of determining the best possible estimates and
predictions about future viability. In short, it is a meaningful
interpretation of financial statements. Analysis of financial
statements is purposive in the sense it is restricted to a particular
portion of the financial statement.
The term financial management has been defined differently
by various authors. The most acceptable definition of financial
management deals with procurement of funds and their effective
ustilisation in the business. There are, thus, two basic aspects of
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financial management: procurement of funds and an effective use
of these funds in the business.
Procurement of Funds
Funds can be obtained from different sources, each having
different characteristics in terms of risk, cost and control. Equity
capital is the most suitable source of funds. Since there is no
question of repayment of equity capital except when the company
is under liquidation. From the cost point of view, however, equity
capital is usually the most expensive source of funds. This is
because the dividend expectations of shareholders are normally
higher than interest rate and also because dividends are an
appropriation of profit, not allowed as an expense under the
Income-Tax Act. Also the issue of new shares to the public may
dilute the control of the existing shareholders. Debentures as a
source of funds are comparatively cheaper since the interest is
paid out of profits before tax. However, debentures entail a high
degree of risk since they have to be repaid as per the terms of
agreement. Also the interest payment has to be made whether or
not the company makes profits. There are thus risk, cost and
control considerations which a finance manager must consider
while procuring funds. The cost of funds has to be at the minimum
but with proper balancing of risk and control factors.
Funds can also be procured from banks and financial
institutions, which generally provide funds subject to certain
restrictive covenants. These covenants restrict the freedom of the
borrower to raise loans from other sources. The reform process is
164
also moving in the direction of a closer monitoring of ‘end use’ of
resources mobilized through capital markets. Such restrictions are
essential for safety of funds provided by institutions and investors.
The finance manager has to balance the availability of funds and
the restrictive provisions tied with such funds resulting in lack of
flexibility.
Procurement of funds inter alia includes identification of
sources of funds, determination of finance mix, raising of funds,
allocation of profits between dividends and retention of profits i.e.
internal and fund generation.
In the globalized competitive scenario it is not enough to
scout for available ways of raising finance but resource
mobilization has to be undertaken through innovative ways or
financial products which ensure the needs of investors. Multiple
option convertible bonds can be sighted as an example. Funds can
be raised indigenously as well as abroad. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) are two
major routes for raising funds from foreign sources. The
mechanism of procurement of funds has to be modified in the light
of the requirements of foreign investors.
Utilisation of Funds
Finance manager is also responsible for effective utilization
of funds. He is to point out situations where the funds are being
kept idle or proper use of funds is not being made. All funds are
procured at a certain cost and after entailing a certain amount of
risk. If thee funds are not utilized in a manner so that they
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generate an income higher than the cost of procuring them, there is
no point  in running the business. This is also an important
consideration in dividend decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ
the funds properly and profitably. The funds have to be so
invested that the company can produce at its optimum level
without endangering its financial solvency. Thus, financial
implications of each decision to invest in fixed assets are to be
properly analyzed. For this, the finance manager will have to
possess sound knowledge of techniques of capital budgeting. He
must also keep in view the need of adequate working capital, and
ensure that while the firms enjoy an optimum level of working
capital they do not keep too much funds blocked in inventories,
book debts and cash etc.
In the present day scenario deployment of funds for
acquisitions and mergers etc. is also an important financial
activity. Divestment of business and swapping of business
divisions are integral parts of mobilization and deployment of
funds.
Sources of Funds
Two basic financial statements of importance to owners,
management and investors are balance sheet and profit and loss
account. The balance sheet gives a static view of the sources and
uses of finances and profit and loss account is a statement of
revenue items (expenses and incomes).  Important sources of
funds included, issues of shares and debenture, long-term loans,
sale of investment and other fixed assets, funds from operations
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and decrease in working capital. Whereas application of funds
could be purchase of fixed assets and investments, redemption of
debentures, preference shares and repayment of loans, payment of
dividend and tax and increase in working capital.
Consolidated financial position of SAIL as exhibited in Table
4.1 presents a clear picture about financial health of the company.
SAIL which was profit making concern till 2002-03 having profit of
Rs.133 crore has emerged as a loss making organization thereafter.
In 2000-01 net profit to sales ratio was at its highest i.e. 8.97 per
cent but registered a steep decline and reached at 1.02 per cent
during 2002-03. Thereafter, company incurred heavy losses, has
exhibited by the aforesaid ratio which was -11.01 per cent during
the last year of the period under review 2006-07. Similarly return
on net worth which registered a significant increase during first
five years of study also stated declining later on. This return which
declined to       -23.50 per cent during 2003-04 has further
deteriorated to the lowest extent of -75.80 per cent looking at the
broader aspects of capital structure, it is observed that company is
surviving on more loans as compared to shareholders’ funds as
exhibited by total loans to net worth ratio. Capital structure of the
company seems to have worsened to the extent that net worth has
registered a downward trend during the period under review.
Table 4.1
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Financial Position of SAIL
Particular 1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
1999-
2000
2000-
01
2001-
02
2002-
03
2003-
04
2004-
05
2005-
06
2006-
07
Sales 8184 9360 10175 11671 13867 14710 14131 14624 14994 16250 16233 15502
Other Income 511 923 1422 656 346 1027 2057 1788 -31 -974 888 852
Expenditure 7485 8780 9776 10507 11816 13025 13730 13914 13460 14075 14954 15343
Operating
Profit
1210 1503 1821 1820 2397 2712 2458 2498 1503 1202 2167 1011
Depreciation 607 673 727 510 524 585 691 795 1104 1133 1144 1156
Interest &
Finance
Charges
355 463 671 765 710 808 1179 1554 2017 1789 1752 1562
Profit before
tax
248 367 423 545 1163 1319 588 149 -1618 -1720 -729 -1707
Provision for
tax/Income
Tax Refund
3 1 0 0 55 0 73 16 -44 0 0 0
Profit After
tax
245 366 423 545 1108 1319 515 133 -1574 -1720 -729 -1707
Equity Capital 3986 3986 3986 3986 3986 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130
Reserve &
Surplus
690 957 1286 1677 2570 3807 3868 4359 2756 635 34 -1878
Net Worth 4676 4943 5272 5663 6556 7937 7998 8489 6886 4765 4165 2252
Total Loans 5492 7212 9521 11331 12214 14574 17421 20215 21017 15082 14251 14012
Net Fixed
Assets
5222 5381 5398 7011 7557 8771 12624 14137 18307 15873 15177 14798
Ratios
Net Profit to
Sales(%)
3.03 3.92 4.16 4.67 8.39 8.97 4.16 1.02 -10.79 -10.58 -4.49 -11.01
Return on Net
Worth (%)
5.30 7.42 8.02 9.62 17.74 16.62 7.35 1.76 -23.50 -36.10 -17.50 -75.80
(Total Loans
to Net Worth
(%)
1.17 1.46 1.81 2.00 1.86 1.84 2.18 2.36 3.05 3.17 3.42 6.22
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of  India Ltd.
168
Sources of funds of SAIL as shown in Table 4.2 include
shareholder funds and long-term loans. In 1995-96 share capital of
SAIL was Rs. 3,981.51 crore. In 1997-98 there had been an increase
of Rs. 4 crore in this fund. From 1998 to 2000 share capital of SAIL
remained constant i.e. Rs. 3,985,89 crore. In 2000-01 there was an
increase of Rs. 144.51 crore in share capital which remained
constant upto 31st March 2007. In 1995-96 reserves and surplus
were Rs. 757.23 crores. In 2002-03 this fund increased to Rs.
4,427.58 crore i.e. registering an increase of 585 per cent which is
highest amount of reserves and surplus during the period of
study. In 1991 secured loans are Rs. 445.38 crore. In 1998-99
secured loans were Rs. 1,616.41 crore i.e. 363 per cent increase in
the amount of secured loans over 1995-96. In 2003-04 secured loans
increased to Rs. 9,891.64 crore i.e. highest amount of secured loans
during the period of study. After March 2004, SAIL started to
repay secured loans. In 2004-05 SAIL  had repaid Rs. 1,041.68 crore
of secured loans and this amount came down to Rs. 8,849.96 crore.
In 2005-06 SAIL had repaid Rs. 888.94 crore of secured loans and
total amount came down to Rs. 7,961.02 crore. In 2006-07 SAIL had
paid secured loans of an amount Rs. 909.64 crore and secured
loans came down to Rs. 7,051.38 crore i.e. lowest amount as ever,
but still 1583 per cent of 1996 level. On 31st March 1996 unsecured
loans were Rs.5,047.76 crore. After 31st March, 1996 there was
continuous increase in the amount of unsecured loans. In 2003-04
the amount of unsecured loans reached to the highest level i.e. Rs.
11,125.61 crore. In 2003-04 there existed 220 per cent increase in the
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amount of unsecured loans over the period 1995-96. In 2004-05
SAIL had repaid an amount of unsecured loans of Rs. 4,893.16
crore. In 2004-05 there exists 44 per cent decline in the amount of
unsecured loans as compared to 2003-04. In 2005-06 increase in the
amount of unsecured loans i.e. Rs. 57.21 crore had been noticed. In
2006-07 increase in the amount of unsecured loans i.e. Rs.670.59
crore had been significant and the amount of unsecured loans
reached to Rs. 6,960.25 crore which is about 138 per cent.
Table 4.2
Sources of Funds of SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Sources 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
SOURCES
OF FUNDS
Shareholders’
Fund
Share
Capital
3981.51 3981.51 3985.89 3985.89 3085.89 4130.40 4130.40 4130.40 4130.40 4130.40 4130.40 4130.40
Share
Capital
percentage
to total
funds
38.89 32.44 26.68 23.32 21.14 18.20 15.95 14.45 14.74 19.53 21.13 21.39
Share
application
money
pending
allotment
4.39 4.38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reserves
and Surplus
757.23 1,043.29 1,387.19 1,774.91 2,649.68 3978.96 4339.09 4427.58 2852.14 1931.44 1160.21 1159.97
Reserves
Surplus
percentage
to total
funds
7.39 8.50 9.28 10.38 14.05 17.54 16.75 15.49 10.20 9.13 5.93 6.00
Loan Funds
Secured
Loans
445.38 1093.89 2130.21 1616.41 2389.85 4381.30 6783.00 8900.68 9891.64 8849.96 7961.02 7051.38
Unsecured
Loans
5047.76 6146.87 7432.86 9714.15 9824.60 10192.31 10638.21 11113.93 11125.61 6232.45 6289.66 6960.25
Total  loan
funds
5493.14 7240.76 9563.37 11330.56 12214.45 14573.61 17421.21 20014.61 21017.25 15082.41 14250.68 14011.63
Loan funds
% to Total
funds
53.66 59.01 64.02 66.29 64.79 64.24 67.28 70.04 75.04 71.33 72.92 72.59
Total funds 10.236.27 12269.94 14936.45 17091.36 18850.02 22682.97 25890.70 28572.59 28005.79 21144.25 19541.29 19302.00
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of  India Ltd.
Deployment of Funds
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Deployment of total funds available with SAIL as depicted in
Table 4.3 has been in traditional manner between fixed and current
assets. Fixed assets contain net fixed assets and capital work-in-
progress significant amount has also been invested in other
investments. Net fixed assets which were Rs. 5,222.22 crore during
1995-96 had risen upto Rs.14,798.15 crore by the end of 2006-07
registering net increase of 283 per cent. It seems that fixed assets
growth in the company has been significant over the period of
review. Capital work-in-progress has presented a reverse trend.
This head f investment which had a net balance of Rs. 2,542.49
crore during 1995-96 has declined to Rs. 555.94 crore (21.87% over
1995-96) by the end of period of review. It indicates that during the
decades of 1990s SAIL has significantly lowered down investment
in fixed assets. Some surplus funds available with the company
also seem to have been diverted towards other investments. This
head of funds invested as depicted a net increase of 31.14 per cent
at the end of 2006-07. It indicates an important fact that a part from
investment in fixed assets some surplus funds are still available for
meeting the long-term requirements of funds. Second half of the
deployment of funds has been in current assets. The proposition of
funds invested in current and fixed assets has indicated an
intereresting trend. During 1995-96 company had more investment
in current assets than fixed assets. During the year of the total
funds available 51.11 per cent was invested in current assets and
balance in fixed asssets. This trend of more investment in current
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assets has been observed as continuing till half of the period under
review i.e. 2000-01. Thereafter trend has reversed. By the end of
2006-07 investment in fixed assets has been observed as more than
double that of current assets. Major part of the current assets has
been invested in the inventories followed by debtors and loans and
advances. Detailed discussion on composition of current assets has
been given under management of working capital part.
Table 4.3
Deployment of Funds
(Rs.in crore)
Funds 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Net Block
of Fixed
Assets
5222.22
(38.30%)
5381.19
(31.96%)
5398.26
(27.42%)
7010.79
(31.48%)
7556.67
(30.55%)
8770.74
(30.49%)
12624.16
(40.23%)
14136.97
(40.80%)
18307.26
(53.67%)
15872.79
(61.05%)
15177.40
(60.20%)
14798.15
(64.27%)
Capital
Work-in-
Progress
25425.49 4288.64 5733.35 5733.61 7501.76 8481.83 6379.09 6491.20 2588.62 1474.62 1220.59 555.94
Investments 410.72 413,89 414.27 443.85 443.85 498.80 553.47 553.42 386.44 376.62 435.30 538.62
Total
Fixed
Assets and
Investment
8175.43 10083.72 11.545.88 13188.25 15502.28 17751.37 19566.69 121181.59 21282.32 17724.03 16833.29 15892.71
Current
Assets,
Loans &
Advances
7129.92
(52.29%)
8376.02
(49.74%)
8273.48
(42.02%)
12827.92
(57.61%)
13459.96
(54.42%)
11811.27
(41.07%)
11006.33
(35.07%)
9227.02
(26.63%)
9077.81
(26.61%)
8139.23
(31.30%)
6752.69
(26.78%)
5458.99
(23.71%)
Inventories 2981.37 3948.10 4926.25 4,903.77 4651.36 5430.37 6532.67 7589.35 6795.07 4622.99 4518.99 4041.83
Sundry
Debtors
568.16 472.28 895.27 1547.59 1663.32 1985.07 2016.85 1888.88 1921.55 1817.36 1687.59 1389.41
Cash &
Bank
Balances
176.63 341.37 248.19 280.40 239.28 694.30 291.70 620.88 383.90 392.68 667.43 416.37
Interest
Receivables
36.03 86.36 127.17 163.08 187.35 208.91 400.53 521.05 739.74 164.29 174.69 93.52
Loans &
Advances
1696.80 1904.58 1942.35 2182.97 2485.71 2687.68 2569.52 2839.8 2987.66 1276.16 1327.32 1188.79
Total
Assets
13634.42 16836.41 19685.11 22266.06 24729.30 28757.7 31377.96 34641.55 34110.24 25997.51 25209.31 23022.63
Less:
Current
Liabilities
&
Provisions
3465.68 4652.95 4849.55 5272.30 5959.18 6246.27 5958.59 6138.17 6207.23 6150.13 6793.74 6758.90
10168.74 12183.46 14835.56 16993.76 18770.12 22511.43 25419.37 28503.38 27903.01 19847.38 18415.57 16263.73
Misc.
Expenditure
67.53 86.48 100.89 97.60 79.90 171.54 471.33 69.21 102.78 499.97 371.99 577.65
Profit &
Loss A/c
(Dr.Balance
0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 796.90 753.73 2460.62
10236.27 12269.94 14936.45 17091.36 18850.02 22682.97 25890.70 28572.59 28005.79 21144.25 19541.29 19302.00
Note: Figures in Parenthesis are  percentage of Fixed assets to total assets  percentage  of Current assets to Total Assets
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of  India Ltd.
Capital Structure
Capital structure refers to the mix of sources from which the
long-term funds required in a business are raised i.e. the
172
proportions of equity share capital, preference share capital, other
internal sources, debentures and other sources of funds in the total
amount of capital within an undertaking.
Optimum Capital Structure
The capital structure is said to be optimum when the real
cost of each source of finance is identical. With an optimum debt
and equity mix, the cost of capital is minimum and market price
per share is maximum. It is, however, difficult to find out
optimum debt and equity mix where the capital structure would
be optimum because it is difficult to measure a fall in the market
value of equity share on account of increase in the risk due to high
debt content. There are three major consideration i.e. risk, cost and
control which help the finance manager in determining the
proportion in which he can raise funds from various sources.
Capital structure of SAIL has been studied by calculating
two ratios namely debt: equity ratio and long-term debt to total
capitalization. Debt equity ratio as calculated and shown in Table
4.4 exhibits an increasing trend. The ratio which was 1.16 times
during 1995-96 has risen upto 2.65 times by the end 2006-07.
During 2003-04 this ratio was as high as 3.01 times. This way the
ratio is quite above the standard rule of thumb of 2:1 in case of
debt : equity ratio. Long-term debt to total capitalization ratio as
worked out in the same table also exhibit the rising trend. The
ratio which was 0.54 during 1995-96 has gone upto 0.73 verifying
the fact of availability of more long- term debt with the company
as important source of finance.
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Table 4.4
Debt: Equity Ratios in SAIL
Years Debt Equity Ratio
(Total long-term
Debt/Shareholders
funds)
Long-Term Debt to
Total capitalization
Ratios
1995-96 1.16 0.54
1996-97 1.44 0.59
1997-98 1.78 0.64
1998-99 1.97 0.66
1999-2000 1.81 0.65
2000-01 1.80 0.64
2001-02 2.06 0.67
2002-03 2.34 0.70
2003-04 3.01 0.75
2004-05 2.49 0.71
2005-06 2.69 0.73
2006-07 2.65 0.73
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Management of Working Capital
One of the most important areas in the day-to-day
management of the firm is the management of working capital.
Working capital management is the functional area of finance that
covers all the current accounts of the firm. It is concerned with
adequateness of current assets. There are two aspects of financial
management i.e. procurement of funds and utilization of funds.
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Procurement of funds also has aspects, viz. procurement of funds
for financing working capital and for financing fixed assets.
Working capital refers to the funds invested in current
assets, i.e. investment in stocks, sundry debtors, cash and other
current assets. From the point of view of concept, the term
working capital can be used in two different ways i.e. gross
working capital and net working capital.
The gross working capital refers to investment in all the
current assets taken together. Total investment in current assets is
the gross working capital. The net working capital refers to excess
of total current assets over total current liabilities. Similarly on the
basis of time the term working capital can be divided into two
categories namely permanent working capital and temporary
working capital. Permanent working capital refers to the Hardcore
Working Capital. It is that minimum level of investment in the
current assets that is carried by the business at all times to carry
out minimum level of its activities. Temporary working capital
refers to that part of total working capital which is required by a
business over and above permanent working capital. It is also
called variable working capital. Since the volume of temporary
working capital keeps on fluctuating from time to time according
to the business activities, it may be financed from short-term
sources.
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Working Capital analysis
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 reveal that size of current assets and
current liabilities for SAIL show somewhat upward trend upto
2003-04. The current assets which were to the tune Rs. 5.458.99
crore in 1995-96 increased to Rs.13,459.96 crore in 2002-03 showing
as increase of over 146 per cent.
Table 4.5
Current Assets and Trend Analysis of SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Particulars 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Current Assets, Loans &
Advances:
Inventories 2981.37 3948.10 4926.25 4903.77 4651.36 5430.37 6532.67 7589.35 6795.07 4622.99 4518.99 4041.83
Sundry Debtors 568.16 472.28 895.27 1547.59 1663.32 1985.02 2016.85 1888.88 1921.55 1817.36 1687.59 1389.41
Cash & Bank Balances 176.63 341.37 248.19 280.40 239.28 694.30 291.70 620.88 383.90 392.68 667.43 416.37
Interest Receivables 36.03 86.36 127.17 163.08 187.35 208.91 400.53 521.05 739.74 164.29 174.69 93.52
Loans & Advances 1696.80 1904.58 1942.35 2182.97 2485.71 2687.68 2569.52 2839.8 2987.66 1276.16 1327.32 1188.79
Total  Current Assets 5458.99 6762.69 8139.23 9077.81 9227.02 11006.33 11811.27 13459.96 12827.92 8273.48 8376.02 7129.92
Trend of C.A. (%) 100.00 123.70 149.10 166.29 159.02 201.62 216.36 246.57 234.99 151.56 153.44 130.61
% Change Over 1990-91 - 23.70 49.10 66.29 59.02 101.62 116.36 146.57 134.99 51.56 53.44 30.61
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of  India Ltd.
Table 4.6
Current Liabilities and Trend Analysis of SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Particulars 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
2000-
01
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Current
Liabilities
Acceptance
Under Deferred
Payment
0.33 0.36 9.95 1.39 0.14 0.15 66.64 8.24 0.19 0.01 0 0
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Sundry
Creditors
1304.36 1578.28 1463.18 1605.86 1783.1 1979.24 1991.87 2055.77 1984.84 1737.50 1913.58 1849.97
Advance from
Customers
310.84 376.12 274.95 283.47 339.76 356.75 268.91 256.43 295.13 263.34 280.17 256.77
Security
Deposits
103.92 125.74 125.41 124.28 133.53 140.21 155.20 170.18 161.32 171.96 173.34 182.80
Intrest Accrued 664.58 804.14 894.71 1039.34 1172.07 1230.67 1504.31 1614.67 1707.87 1475.44 1240.44 1082.10
Stores 0.24 0.29 17.26 16.10 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.44 0.42 0 0
Other Liabilities 596.14 721.33 1375.12 1273.88 1395.68 1465.46 1035.75 1183.68 1221.51 1191.22 1230.71 1281.52
Provisions 485.27 587.18 688.97 927.98 1134.57 1191.30 935.63 848.88 835.93 1310.24 1955.50 2105.74
2465.68 4193.44 4849.55 5272.30 5959.18 6364.12 5958.59 6138.17 6207.23 6150.13 6793.74 6758.90
Trend of
C.L.(%)
100.00 121.00 139.93 152.13 171.95 183.63 272.93 177.11 179.11 177.46 196.03 195.02
% Change Over
1995-96
- 21.00 39.93 52.13 71.95 83.63 71.93 77.11 79.11 77.46 96.03 95.02
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of  India Ltd.
Current Liabilities which were Rs.3,465.68 crore in 1995-96
increased to Rs.6,138.17 crore in 2002-03, showing an increase of
over 77 per cent. Net working capital as shown in Table 4.7 which
was Rs.1,993.31 crore in 1995-96 increased to Rs. 7,321.79 crore in
2002-03. It started declining thereafter touching Rs. 2,123.35 crore
in 2004-05, which again declined to Rs. 1,582.28 crore in 2005-06
and Rs.371.02 crore in 2006-07. The decline in net working capital
was much in comparison to earlier years. The increase in current
liabilities and provisions was comparatively higher in 2005-06,
2006-07 as compared to previous years which affected the trend in
new working capital which came down to -20.63 per cent and -
81.39 per cent in 2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively. The current
assets show continuous downward trend after 2002-03 and decline
to Rs. 7,129.92 crore in 2006-07 as compared to 2002-03 in which
current assets were Rs. 13,459.96 crore.
Table 4.7
Gross and Net Working Capital in SAIL
(Rs.in Crore)
Year Current
Assets/Gross
Current
Liabilities
Net
Working
Trend (%) % change
over 1995-96
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Working
Capital
Capital
1995-96 5,458.99 3,465.68 1,993.31 100 -
1996-97 6,752.69 4,193.44 2,559.25 128.39 28.39
1997-98 8,139.23 4,849.55 3,289.68 165.04 65.04
1998-99 9,077.81 5,272.30 3,805.51 190.91 90.91
1999-2000 9,227.02 5,459.18 3,267.84 163.94 63.94
2000-01 11,006.33 6,364.12 4,642.20 232.89 132.89
2001-02 11,811.27 5,958.59 5,852.68 293.62 193.62
2002-03 13,459.96 6,138.17 7,321.79 367.32 267.32
2003-04 12.827.92 6,207.23 6,620.69 332.14 232.14
2004-05 8,273.48 6,150.13 2,123.35 106.52 6.52
2005-06 8,376.02 6,793.74 1,582.28 79.37 -20.63
2006-07 7,129.92 6,758.90 371.02 18.61 -81.39
 Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Gross and Net Working Capital
Gross and net working capital position as given in Table 4.7
clarifies that company was in a comfortable working capital
position during first eight years. The trend as worked out exhibits
significant increase in net working capital during these years when
NWC was 367.32 per cent in 2002-03 against 1995-96. Thereafter
working capital position started deteriorating and in 2006-07
company experienced worst negative growth which was -81.39
during 2006-07. It indicates the increase in efficiency in overall
management of working capital and seems to be responsible for
company’s sickness to a great extent.
Ratio of Current Asset to total Assets
To know the relative stock of current assets in total assets of
the SAIL, the above ratio has been computed. Here total assets are
taken inclusive of current assets, fixed assets and investments.
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Purposely investments are not included in current assets as the
nature of investments is not clear.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the proportion of current assets to
total assets in SAIL and other companies for the period of study. In
SAIL current assets which were Rs. 5,458.99 crore in 1995-96
continuously increased to Rs. 13,460 crore in 2002-03. The average
percentage of current assets to total assets came to 48 per cent. It
was 51 per cent in the beginning year of the study which decline to
33 per cent in 2006-07. The average percentage of current assets to
total assets is 34 per cent for last three years in SAIL which was
higher than TISCO and JVSL. The average percentage of current
assets to total assets is 23 per cent in TISCO and 20 per cent in
JVSL. As TISCO is concerned, the current assets were Rs. 3,012.56
crore in 2004-05 which reduced to Rs. 2,983.13 crore in the year
2006-07. The current assets of JVSL is Rs. 906.35 crore in 2004-05
which increase to Rs. 1,650 crore in 2006-07. In case of industry the
average proportion of current assets to total assets is 26 per cent
which is low as compared to SAIL but higher as compared to
TISCO and JVSL. In case of SAIL the average share of current
assets to total assets is higher as compared to TISCO and JVSL for
the last three years. It may be concluded that like other
components current assets are also managed inefficiently in SAIL
as compared to TISCO and JVSL for the last three years.
Table 4.8
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Current Assets to Total Assets Ratio
(Rs.in Crore)
Year Current Assets to Total
asset Ratio
% Current assets to total
assets
1995-96 0.51:1 51
1996-97 0.56:1 56
1997-98 0.60:1 60
1998-99 0.56:1 56
1999-2000 0.55:1 55
2000-01 0.56:1 56
2001-02 0.48:1 48
2002-03 0.49:1 49
2003-04 0.41:1 41
2004-05 0.34:1 34
2005-06 0.36:1 36
2006-07 0.33:1 33
Average Percentage 48
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Table 4.9
Percentage Current Asset to Total Assets in the Selected Iron and Steel Companies
SAIL TISCO JVSLYears
Percentage of
Current Assets to
Total Assets
Percentage of
Current Assets to
Total Assets
Percentage of
Current Assets to
Total Assets
2004-05 34 26 15
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2005-06 36 23 21
2006-07 33 21 23
Average
percentage
34 23 20
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of the selected company.
Liquidity Position
Liquidity of SAIL has been studied under two ratios i.e.
current ratio and acid test ratio. Current ratio as exhibited in Table
4.10 which depicts a fluctuating trend was acceptable level till
2004-05 when it was 2.07 : 1. During first time nine years of the
period under review this ratio was revolving around the standard
rule of thumb of 1.50:1. During last three years the ratio has
declined significantly and reached at the lowest but dangerous
level of (1.05:1) during 2006-07. Acid test ratio which exhibits a
fluctuating trend again has been far away from standard rule of
thumb i.e. 1:1 during the entire period under review. During 2004-
05 and 2006-07 ratio has significantly declined to most dangerous
level (0.46:1). It is, thus, observed that liquidity position of the
company is constantly deteriorating over the years which is a
cause of concern.
Table 4.10
Liquidity Position
(Rs.in crores)
Year Current Ratio Acid Test Ratio
1995-96 1.58:1 0.71:1
1996-97 1.45:1 0.60:1
1997-98 1.68:1 0.66:1
1998-99 1.72:1 0.79:1
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1999-2000 1.55:1 0.77:1
2000-01 1.76:1 0.89:1
2001-02 2.98:1 0.89:1
2002-03 2.19:1 0.96:1
2003-04 2.07:1 0.97:1
2004-05 1.35:1 0.59:1
2005-06 1.23:1 0.57:1
2006-07 1.05:1 0.46:1
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Comparative liquidity position of SAIL, TISCO and JVSL
examined with the help of current ratio given in Table 4.11 exhibits
an interesting pictures. Amongst these three organization, SAIL
seems to following most conservative policy with regard to
management of working capital. TISCO seems to following
aggressive policy and JVSL most aggressive (fragile) working
capital policy. If TISCO and JVSL could sustain with this kind of
scenario with regard to working capital why can’t SAIL. Through
current ratio in SAIL seems to be nearer to standard rule of thumb
i.e. 1.50:1, still they should try to further lower down the ratio to
the level of industry average.
Table 4.11
Short-Term Liquidity Position of SAIL, TISCO & JVSL
Current RatioYears
SAIL TISCO JVSL
2004-05 1:35:1 0.94:1 0.43:1
2005-06 1:26:1 0.923:1 0.48:1
2006-07 1:05:1 0.832:1 0.47:1
Average 1.21:1 0.90:1 0.46:1
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Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of the selected company.
Composition of Working Capital
After considering the size of working capital and share of
current assets to total assets, it becomes relevant to analyse the
proportion of various components of current assets. For the
present study, the current assets are classified in four components
i.e. inventory, sundry debtors, loans and advances and cash and
bank balances in the SAIL.
Management of Inventory
Inventories constitute a major element of working capital. It
is, therefore, important that investment in inventory is properly
controlled. The objectives of inventory management are, to a great
extent, similar to the objectives of cash management. Inventory
management covers a large number of problems including fixation
of minimum and maximum levels, determining the size of
inventory to be carried out, deciding about the issues, receipts and
inspection procedures,, determining the economic order quantity,
proper storage facilities, keeping check over obsolescence and
ensuring control over movement of inventories.
Inventory and Inventory Trend in SAIL
Table 4.12 shows that in 1995-96 total inventory was worth
Rs. 2,981.37 crore which increased to Rs. 5.430.37 crore in 2000-01
and thereafter reaches to the highest in level Rs. 7,589.35 crore in
2002-03 which is 254 per cent of inventory in 1995-96. From the
year 2003-04 lowest level of inventory which is Rs. 4,041.83 crore.
This level is 135 per cent as compared to inventory level in 1995-96.
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The highest percentage change over is 154.56 per cent in 2002-03
which reduced to 35.57 per cent in 2006-07.  This shows that the
investment in inventory is reduced by Rs. 3,547.52 crore in 2006-07.
Table 4.12
Inventory Trend and Percentage change over in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Inventory Trend(%) % change over
1995-96
1995-96 2,981.37 100 -
1996-97 3,948.10 132.43 32.43
1997-98 4,926.25 165.23 65.23
1998-99 4,903.77 164.48 64.48
1999-2000 4,651.36 156.01 56.01
2000-01 5,430.37 182.14 82.14
2001-02 6,532.67 219.12 119.12
2002-03 7,589.35 254.56 154.56
2003-04 6,795.07 227.92 127.92
2004-05 4,622.99 155.06 55.06
2005-06 4,518.99 151.57 51.57
2006-07 4,041.83 135.57 35.57
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Inventory Turnover Ratio
This ratio is also termed as ‘Merchandise Turnover Ratio’.
Inventory Turnover ratio indicates the efficiency of firm’s
inventory management. It is the ratio between cost of goods sold
and inventory and indicates about the number of times the
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inventory has been turned over into sales. This ratio gives an idea
about the speed at which inventories are converted into sales.
Since the inventory is one of the major component of the working
capital, in iron and steel industry, inefficiency in its management
greatly affects the overall efficiency of working capital
management. A high turnover indicates that the firm is conducting
good business with proportionately lower inventories. On the
other hand a low inventory turnover is an indicator of a dull
business and over investment in inventory etc. Therefore, the
management should strive for higher inventory turnover keeping
the volumes of inventory under control to the extent possible. The
average holding period depends upon inventory turnover ratio. It
is calculated by dividing the months in the year by inventory
turnover ratio. Shorter the average holding period, better the
management of inventory in the enterprise and vice-versa.
Inventory Turnover and Inventory Holding Period in SAIL
Table 4.13 shows that in the beginning year of the study the
inventory turnover ratio is 2.75 times of sale which decline to 2.07
times in 1997-98.  Again it increases to 2.98 times in 1999-2000. The
inventory holding period is 121 days in 1999-2000 as compared to
1996, which is 131 days. The inventory holding period is 174 days
185
in 1997-98 which is highest in the first part. In 2002-03 inventory
turnover ratio declines to 1.93 times and inventory holding period
increases to 187 days which is highest in the whole period of
study. In 2004-05 inventory turnover ratio is 3.52 times while
inventory holding period reduced to 102 days. Again in 2006-07
inventory turnover ratio increases to highest level 3.84 times of
sales. In 2006-07 inventory holding period is 94 days which is the
lowest in the whole period of study and is a indicator of good
inventory management. The above analysis shows that in the
beginning period of study the inventory holding period is as
higher as compared to succeeding years. In the last four years the
inventory turnover ratio of SAIL is continuously increasing while
inventory holding period is decreasing which means SAIL has
reduced its investment in inventory to some extent.
Table 4.13
Inventory Turnover Ratio and Inventory Holding Period in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Inventory Ratio
Turnover
Inventory Holding
Period (No. of Days 360)
1995-96 2.75 131
1996-97 2.37 152
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1997-98 2.07 1174
1998-99 2.38 151
1999-2000 2.98 121
2000-01 2.71 133
2001-02 2.16 167
2002-03 1.93 187
2003-04 2.21 163
2004-05 3.52 102
2005-06 3.59 100
2006-07 3.84 94
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Table 4.14 shows a composite analysis in SAIL, TISCO and
JVSL of inventory trend, inventory turnover and inventory
holding period. It is observed that in 2001-02 the inventory in SAIL
has reduced by 13 per cent while it increased by 8 per cent and 59
per cent in TISCO and JVSL respectively.
Table 4.14
Inventory Trend in SAIL, TISCO & JVSL
(Rs. in Crores)
Total
Inventory
Trend (%)` Percentage
Change
Inventory
Turnover
Ratio
Inventory
Holding
Period
(Days)
SAIL
2004-05 4,622.99 100 - 3.52 102
2005-06 4,518.99 98 -2 3.59 100
187
2006-07 4,041.83 87 -13 3.84 94
TISCO
2004-05 944.85 100 - 7.06 51
2005-06 921.77 98 -2 8.18 44
2006-07 1,021.59 108 8 7.20 50
JVSL
2004-05 198.52 100 - 5.42 66
2005-06 179.58 121 21 6.46 56
2006-07 236.21 159 59 7.35 49
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL, TISCO & JVSL.
The inventory turnover ratio in 2004-05 was 3.5 times in
SAIL, 7.1 times in TISCO and 5.4 times in JVSL. In 2006-07 ratio
increased to 3.8 times in SAIL, 7.2 in TISCO, and 7.3 times in JVSL.
In 2004-05 the inventory holding period was 102 days in SAIL, 51
days in TISCO and 66 days in JVSL. In 2006-07 the inventory
holding period was 94 days in SAIL, 50 days in TISCO and 49 days
in JVSL. The above analysis reveals that inventory holding period
is highest in SAIL as compared to TISCO and JVSL. In nutshell, it
means that inventory management is most inefficient in SAIL as
compared to other two organizations in the industry.
Management of Sundry Debtors
The finance manager has an operating responsibility for the
management of investment in receivables. In addition to his role of
supervising the administration of credit, the finance manager is in
a particular strategic position to contribute to top management
decisions relating to the best credit policies of the firm. In the
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beginning finance manger plays an important role in the
determination of credit period and deciding the criteria for
selection of credit applications. Once it has been done and the
management has determined the role of credit in the package of
goods and services offered, the finance manager has relatively
upon the level of receivables. He may, however, limit the amount
of receivables by rejecting occasionally credit applications or he
may speed up the conversion of receivables into cash by
aggressive collection policy. But these activities have smaller effect
upon the level of receivables than the initial and fundamental
decisions regarding the terms of credit and the overall credit
standards laid down by the firm.
There are basically three aspects of management of sundry
debtors. Firstly, the credit policy is to be determined. This involves
a trade off between the profits on additional sales that arise due to
credit being extended on the one hand and the cost of carrying
those debtors and bad debt loses on the other. The second aspect
of management of sundry debtors is credit analysis whereby the
finance managers determines as to how risky it is to advance credit
to a particular party. The third aspect is follow up of debtors and
credit collection. Debtors analysis in SAIL has been done by
calculating debtors trend and percentage change, Debtors turn
over ratio and collection period.
Debtors trend and percentage change over the years has
been exhibited in Table 4.15. Beginning in 1995-96 till 2001-02
debtors have shown an increasing trend in SAIL expect for one
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year i.e. 1996-97. Thereafter magnitude of debtors followed a
declining path, but still the extent seems to be quite high i.e. 244.55
per cent in 2006-07 over 1995-96. This trend testifies that significant
part of companies production is being sold on credit to retain the
marked-share. Debtors Turnover Ratio and Collection period as
worked out as shown in Table 4.16 reveal a fluctuating trend.
Turnover ratio which was highest at 19.82 times during 1996-97
had declined to 7.01 times during 2001-02. Thereafter ratio has
started moving upward and reached at 11.16 times during 2006-07.
Collection period which was lowest at 18 days during 1996-97 at
gone upto 52 days during 2001-02. Thereafter collection period has
revealed a declining trend. In overall, it may be concluded that
debtors management in SAIL seem to be satisfactory has both the
indicators namely turnover ratio and DCP at acceptable level. The
observation as recorded under trend analysis part i.e. very high
magnitude of sales on credit does not hold good. The increase in
overall debtors when compared to growth in sales clarifies that
debtors magnitude at a desired level which is also verified by
turnover ratio and collection period.
 Table 4.15
Trend of Debtors and Percentage Change in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Inventory Trend(%) Percentage
change over
1995-96
1995-96 568.16 100.00 -
1996-97 472.28 83.12 -16.88
1997-98 895.27 157.57 57.57
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1998-99 1,547.59 272.39 172.39
1999-2000 1,663.32 292.76 192.76
2000-01 1,985.07 349.39 249.39
2001-02 2,016.85 354.98 254.98
2002-03 1,888.88 332.46 232.46
2003-04 1,921.55 338.21 238.21
2004-05 1,817.36 319.87 219.87
2005-06 1,687.59 297.03 197.03
2006-07 1,389.41 244.55 144.55
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Table 4.16
Debtors Turn Over Ratio and Collection Period in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Debtor Turnover Ratio Debtors Collection
Period (Days)
1995-96 14.40 25
1996-97 19.82 18
1997-98 11.37 32
1998-99 7.54 48
1999-2000 8.34 44
2000-01 7.41 49
2001-02 7.01 52
2002-03 7.74 47
2003-04 7.80 47
2004-05 8.94 41
2005-06 9.62 38
2006-07 11.16 33
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Loans and Advances
Another important component of current assets namely
loans and advances have been analysed and given in Table 4.17.
This component includes loans and advances to staff, contractors
and suppliers. As given in the table, this component reveals a
fluctuating trend over the years. In 2003-04 increased to 176.08 per
cent over 1995-96, whereas during next year these advances
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significantly reduced 75.21 per cent which further declined to 70.06
per cent during last year of the study. As a percentage of total
current-assets, this component has a significant proportion which
is 23 per cent on an average.
Table 4.17
Loan and Advances in SAIL
(Rs.in Crores)
Year Loans &
Advances
Trend
Percentage
Percentage
change over
% of total
Current
Assets
1995-96 1,696.80 100.00 - 31
1996-97 1,904.58 112.25 12.25 28
1997-98 1,942.35 114.47 14.47 24
1998-99 2,182.97 128.65 28.65 24
1999-2000 2,485.71 146.49 46.49 27
2000-01 2,687.68 138.40 58.40 24
2001-02 2,569.52 151.43 51.43 22
2002-03 2,839.8 167.36 67.36 21
2003-04 2,987.66 176.08 76.08 23
2004-05 2,276.16 75.21 -24.79 16
2005-06 1,327.32 78.22 -21.78 16
2006-07 1,188.79 70.06 -29.94 17
Average Percentage 23
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Cash and Bank Balance
Cash and bank balances, another important component of
current assets, as exhibited  in Table 4.18 shows a fluctuating trend
during the period under review. This component grew to its
maximum level i.e. 393.08 per cent during 2000-01 over 1995-96.
Thereafter, it has declined little but even 2006-07 which is more
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than two times of the level during 1995-96. A very interesting
trend has been observed in this component viz-à-viz net working
capital. As a percentage of net working capital cash and bank
balances which were 8.86 per cent during 1995-96 have risen upto
an alarming level of 112.22 per cent which is an unexpected and a
very strange trend. This testifies the fact that current liabilities of
SAIL have risen upto an unexpected level which has lowered
down the magnitude of net working capital significantly.
Table 4.18
Cash and Bank Balance in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Cash and Bank
Balance
Trend(%) Percentage
change over
1995-96
Percentage
of Net
Working
Capital
1995-96 176.63 100 - 8.86
1996-97 341.37 193.27 93.27 13.36
1997-98 248.19 140.51 40.51 7.55
1998-99 280.40 158.75 58.75 7.37
1999-2000 239.28 135.47 35.47 7.32
2000-01 694.30 393.08 293.08 14.96
2001-02 291.70 165.15 65.15 4.98
2002-03 620.88 351.51 151.51 8.48
2003-04 383.90 217.35 117.35 5.80
2004-05 392.68 222.32 122.32 18.49
2005-06 667.43 377.87 277.87 42.18
2006-07 416.37 235.73 135.73 112.22
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Management of Creditors
Management of creditors happens to be an important
component of overall management of working capital in an
organization. Maintenance of judicious level of current asset and
current liability is one of the foremost requirements of efficient
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management of working capital. After analyzing current assets in
overall and these numerous components its pertinent to have a
look upon one of spontaneous sources of funds for SAIL namely
creditors. Magnitude of creditors and average payment period
demonstrate the strengths as well as weaknesses of any
enterprises. Having a sight on the sundry creditors in SAIL as
given in Table 4.19 one can observe again a fluctuating trend.
Sundry creditors which were on rising trend during first eight
years under review have shown a decline during next four years.
The percentage increase was maximum i.e. 58 during 2002-03 over
1995-96. As a percentage of net working capital this component of
current liability exhibits an interesting trend beginning with 65 per
cent during 1995-96 it came down to 28 per cent during 2002-03
and has reached at a whopping strange level 498 per cent during
2006-07. This trend indicates that SAIL is heading towards
technically insolvency as far as its working capital management is
concerned decline of net working capital level and rise of current
liabilities during recent years testifies that company will face a
serious shortage of cash to honour its short-term obligation. This
situation is described as technical insolvency of a concern and
demands immediate corrective measures.
Table 4.19
Sundry Creditors in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Sundry
Creditors
Trend Percentage
change over
1995-96
Percentage
of Net
Working
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Capital
1995-96 1,304.36 100 - 65
1996-97 1,578.28 121 21 62
1997-98 1,463.18 112 12 45
1998-99 1,605.86 123 23 42
1999-2000 1,783.10 137 37 55
2000-01 1,979.24 152 52 43
2001-02 1,991.87 153 53 34
2002-03 2,055.77 158 58 28
2003-04 1,984.84 152 52 30
2004-05 1,737.50 133 33 82
2005-06 1,913.58 147 47 121
2006-07 1,846.97 142 42 498
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Working Capital Analysis at a Glance
After analyzing various ratio of SAIL, we have now come to
a point where we can make an overall assessment and a
meaningful comparison. For this purpose, the ratios are put
together and an overall assessment is made thereafter. Table 4.20
shows the short-term solvency position of SAIL. The current assets
of SAIL are half of the total assets. The standard norm of current
ratio is 2:1. The current ratio of SAIL is generally below the
standard. In the last year the ratio of current assets and current
liability is 1.05:1. The average current ratio of SAIL is 1.64:1.  The
standard norm of quick ratio is 1:1. Quick ratio is also below the
standard. In 2003-04 quick ratio is 0.9:1 which is nearer to standard
195
norm. In 2006-07 quick ratio is 0.46 which shows that current
liabilities are twice the quick assets.
In 2002-03 inventory turnover ratio of SAIL is 1.93 times
which is lowest turnover of inventory. In 2002-03 inventory
holding period is 187 days. During this period 56 per cent of gross
working capital is blocked in inventory. In 2006-07 inventory
turnover ratio reaches to 3.84 times, which reduced the inventory
holding period up to 94 days. It is an indicator of good inventory
management. In 2001-02 debtors turnover ratio is 7.01 times and
debtors collection period is 52 days. In 2006-07 debtors turnover
ratio reaches to 11.16 times and debtors collection period comes
down to 33 days. During the last years, SAIL has given less credit
period to debtors, which is indicator of good debtors management.
In 1995-96 the working capital turnover ratio is 4.11 times. The
ratio indicates about the number of times, the net working has
turned over in relation to sales during a particular year. In 2006-07
the working capital turnover ratio reaches to 41.78 times. Although
an increasing ratio indicates that working capital is more active
than it has been in the past, but in case of SAIL, it is not a good
indicator because higher working capital turnover ratio is due to
reduction in size of net working capital and not because of
increased sales volume which does not indicate a good sign.
Table 4.20
Working Capital Analysis at a Glance
(Rs.in crore)
Name of the
ratios
1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
1999-
2000
2000-
01
2001-
02
2002-
03
2003-
04
2004-
05
2005-
06
2006-
07
Current assets to
total assets ratio
0.51:1 0.56:1 0.60:1 0.56:1 0.55:1 0.56:1 0.48:1 0.49:1 0.41:1 0.34:1 0.36:1 0.33:1
Current assets 1.50 1.39 1.25 1.29 1.50 1.34 1.20 1.09 1.17 1.96 1.94 2.17
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turnover ratio
Cash ratio 0.051 0.073 0.051 0.05 0.040 0.111 0.049 0.101 0.062 0.064 0.098 0.062
Working Capital
turnover ratio
4.11 3.66 3.09 3.07 4.24 3.17 2.41 2.00 2.26 7.65 10.25 41.78
Inventory turnover
ratio
2.75 2.37 2.07 2.38 2.98 2.71 2.16 1.93 2.21 3.52 3.59 3.84
Debtors turnover
ratio
14.40 19.82 11.37 7.54 8.34 7.41 7.01 7.74 7.80 8.94 9.62 11.16
Current ratio 1.58:1 1.45:1 1.68:1 1.72:1 1.55:1 1.76:1 1.98:1 2.19:1 2.07:1 1.35:1 1.23:1 1.05:1
Quick ratio (Acid
test ratio)
0.71:1 0.60:1 0.66:1 0.79:1 0.77:1 0.89:1 0.89:1 0.96:1 0.97:1 0.59:1 0.57:1 0.46:1
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Profitability Analysis
Profitability implies the profit making ability of a business
enterprise. The term profitability is a combination of two words
‘profit’ and ‘ability’. Profit is the residual of income over expense
whereas ability refers to earning power or operating performance
of the concern. Thus, profitability may be defined as the ability of a
given investment to earn a return form its use. The term profit is
an absolute connotation and profitability is a relative concept.
An analysis of profitability reveals as to how the position of
profit stands as a result of total transactions made during a year.
The profitability is analysed through the computation of various
ratio. The selection of the ratios for profitability analysis is
determined by the nature of data available and the purpose of
analysis. For a concern which wants to judge the overall financial
performance, the focus of analysis will be different in comparison
to a concern which analyze the margin on sales or return to
different interest groups. However, in the present study, the
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analysis of profitability has been made from the point of view of
overall financial performance.
Following ratios have been computed in order to analyze the
profitability of SAIL, the:
(a) Operating Profit Ratio (%)
(b) Net Profit Ratio (%)
(c) Return on Owner’s Equity (%), and
(d) Earning Per share
(a) Operating Profit
Operating profit simply means income from operations
before taking into account non-operational income as well as non-
operational  expenses. Operations here mean the regular major
activities of the business.
Table 4.21 exhibits operating profit ratio of SAIL. The ratio as
shown had registered an increasing end till 2000-01 when it
reached to 18.44  per cent except for 1998-99 when it was 15.59 per
cent, thereafter steeply declined and reached to 6.52 per cent as the
lowest during the period of review. It shows that this decline in
profits may be due to increased cost of production which the
company seems to have not been able to keep under control.
 Table 4.21
Operating Profit Ratio
(Rs.in crore)
Year Sales Operating profit Operating Profit
Ratio (%)
1995-96 8,184 1,210 14.78
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1996-97 9,360 1,503 16.06
1997-98 10,175 1,821 17.90
1998-99 11,671 1,820 15.59
1999-2000 13,867 2,397 17.29
2000-01 14,710 2,172 18.44
2001-02 14,131 2,458 17.39
2002-03 14,624 2,498 17.08
2003-04 14,994 1,503 10.02
2004-05 16,250 1,202 7.40
2005-06 16,233 2,167 13.35
2006-07 15,502 1,011 6.52
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
(b) Net Profit Ratio
Profitability of a business can also be judged well by
calculating the net profit ratio. Net profit ratio refers to net profit
to sales. The net profit can be viewed in two ways i.e. net profit
before tax and net profit after tax. Since the concept of “Net Profit”
is the amount left for the owners, it represents the amount of profit
after tax and before any appropriation for reserves, dividends etc.
While calculating the ratio, the question arises, what type of profit
should be taken in consideration? The answer of this question
depends on the nature of business whether it is corporate business
or non-corporate business. If a particular company runs the
corporate business then net profit after tax is taken into
consideration. Thus in the present context, net profit after tax has
been taken into account. Net profit ratio is the measure of overall
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efficiency of a company to turn each rupee of sales into net profit.
The higher is this ratio, the more is the profitability and better
confidence in the minds of various stakeholders. Profitability of
business can better be appreciated by company’s net profit ratio of
two periods or by comparing the net profit ratio of one unit with
that of another.
Net profit ratio as depicted in Table 4.22 which was though
very insignificant i.e. 3.03 per cent during 1995-96 had increased to
8.97 per cent during 2001-02. Thereafter, constant decrease in net
profits has been noticed which declined to          -11.01 per cent
during 2001-02.
Table 4.22
Net Profit Ratio in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Sales Net Profit Net profit ratio
%
1995-96 8,184 248 3.03
1996-97 9,360 367 3.92
1997-98 10,175 432 4.16
1998-99 11,671 545 4.67
1999-2000 13,867 1,163 8.39
2000-01 14,710 1,319 8.97
2001-02 14,131 588 4.16
2002-03 14,624 149 1.02
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2003-04 14,994 -1,618 -10.79
2004-05 16,250 -1,720 -10.58
2005-06 16,233 -729 -4.49
2006-07 15,502 -1,707 -11.01
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
(c) Return on Owner’s Equity
The return on owners’ equity ratio measures the profitability
from shareholders’ point of view. This ratio is also known as
return on proprietors’ funds or return on net worth. It helps the
proprietors and potential investors to judge the earning capacity of
the company in relation to their funds. This ratio is used for
measuring the overall efficiency of a firm. In every business, it is
always desirable that there should be positive and high rate of
return on owner’s equity. This ratio is of great interest to the
pretend as well as to the prospective shareholders and also great
concern to the management. Inter- firm comparison based on this
ratio determine whether the investment in a given firm is
attractive or not.
Return on owner’s equity as shown in Table 4.23 registered
an increasing trend during first five years of the period under
review had started declining and reached at the worst and lowest
level -75.80 per cent during the next seven years. The fact as
observed in under the study of capital structure where debt: equity
ratio was quite high and more than standard rule of thumb of 2:1
may be due to the trend as depicted by this ratio. As return on
owner’s equity has become negative. Hence, it is not worth to
invest in the share capital of SAIL for anyone. Therefore, company
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has to depend on funded debts for meeting its long-term
requirements.
Table 4.23
Return on Owner’s Equity in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Profit after tax Net worth Return on
owners’ equity
(%)
1995-96 245 4,676 5.30
1996-97 366 4,943 7.42
1997-98 423 5,272 8.02
1998-99 545 5,663 9.62
1999-2000 1,108 6,556 17.74
2000-01 1,319 7,937 16.62
2001-02 515 7,998 7.35
2002-03 133 8,489 1.76
2003-04 -1,574 6,886 -23.50
2004-05 -1,720 4,765 -36.10
2005-06 -729 4,165 -17.50
2006-07 -1,707 2,252 -75.80
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Earning per share (EPS)
The profitability of the common shareholders’ investment
can also be measured in many other ways. One such measure is to
calculate the earning per share, and is calculated by dividing the
profit after tax by the total number of common (ordinary) shares
outstanding.
EPS calculation made over years indicate whether or not the
firm’s earning power on per-share basis has changed over that
period. The EPS of the company should be compared with the
industry average and EPS of other firms. EPS simply shows the
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profitability of the firm on a per-share basis and it does not reflect
how much is paid as dividend and how much is retained in the
business. But as a profitability index, it is a valuable and widely
used ratio.
As shown in Table 4.24, EPS also exhibits a similar trend.
EPS which grew from 61.42 per cent to 319 per cent during first
half of the period under review had registered a declining trend
during second half and reached at the lowest level of -413.31 per
cent during 2006-07. This trend further testifies that SAIL has no
longer been a company which can expect raising of funds through
shares capital. This safest and unchallenging source of funds has
already been choked for the company. For future long-term
requirements, SAIL anyway generates funds from long-term loans.
Hence keeping in view the above discussed four indicators, it may
logically be concluded that company is in the worst state of affairs
and virtually a deeply sick organization.
Table 4.24
Earning Per Share in SAIL
(Rs.in crore)
Year Profit other tax No. of Equity
Shares
Earning per
share (%)
1995-96 245 398.60 61.42
1996-97 366 398.60 91.82
1997-98 423 398.60 106.12
1998-99 545 398.60 136.72
1999-2000 1,108 398.60 277.97
2000-01 1,319 413 319.37
2001-02 515 413 124.69
2002-03 133 413 32.20
2003-04 -1,574 413 -381.11
2004-05 -1,720 413 -416.46
2005-06 -729 413 -176.51
2006-07 -1,707 413 -413.31
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Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
It is, thus, obvious from above observations that in the
globalized competitive scenario, it is not enough to scout for
available ways of raising finance but resources mobilizations has
to be undertaken through innovative ways or financial products
which ensure the need of investors. In an efficient organization
funds should come from diverse sources and no part of funds
should be kept idle. In SAIL, it is found that company is banking
upon only one source of finances i.e. long- term debt from
government and banks. Working capital position presents a
depressing trend where inventories are mounting and liquidity
has incurred heavy losses during later years of study. The obvious
reasons responsible for declining operating profits are increase in
costs and declining sales.
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Overview
Most frequently and widely used tool in practice to assess
the financial performance and condition of a firm are Financial
Ratios. To find their other uses financial ratios have been subjected
to empirical analysis over the past several years. The focus in
empirical study has been mostly on ascertaining the predicting
power of financial ratios which have been investigated in the
following areas.
(i) Corporate sickness/bankruptcy
(ii) Acquisition/merger
(iii) Credit ratings
(iv) Relationship of financial ratios to industry targets.
A large number of ratios have been reported as important in
such (above cited) and other related studies.
A financial analyst can generate large number of ratios from
annual statements namely Balance Sheet and Statement of Profit
and Loss. It is not possible for any decision-maker to make use of
all ratios as developed and created in literature overtime. Further,
it is also not advisable to use all ratios for obtaining information
for the decision in hand of a decision- maker. List of ratios
invented so far is quite long and is becoming longer and longer
with the inventions of new ratios by some scholars at some places
of the world every other day. Presently, the list contains more than
330 ratios. A business manager/financial analyst becomes
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confused in this labyrinth of ratios. In fact, a number of ratios
overlap with each other and therefore same common information
can be obtained by using anyone of the overlapping ratios.
Therefore, obvious and pertinent questions to answer are:
(i) How can one narrow down the set of financial ratios without
much loss of relevant and significant information which the
decision-maker requires?
(ii) How can one determine groups of overlapping ratios?1
An attempt to determine inter-relationship between and
among financial ratios in order to discern few groups of financial
ratios containing the maximum amount of information is an
empirical question. Some studies have been conducted in this
direction in some countries with a fair degree of success.
Non-Parametric Analysis
William Beaver compared the financial ratios of 79
manufacturing firms that subsequently failed with the ratios of 79
firms that remained solvent.2
His study revealed five ratios which could discriminate
between failed and non-failed firms. These ratios are: (i) Cash flow
to total debt, (ii) Net income to total assets, (iii) Total debt to total
assets, (iv) Working capital to total assets, (v) Current ratio. As
expected failed firms had more debt and lower return on assets.
They had less cash but more receivables as well as low current
ratios. They also had low inventories. In Indian context, L.C.
Gupta3 attempted a refinement of Beaver’s method with the
objective of building a four warning system of corporate sickness.
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A simple non-parametric test for measuring the relative
differentiating power of the various financial ratios was used. The
test is based on taking a sample of sick and non-sick companies,
arraying them by the magnitude of each ratio to be tested,
selecting a cut-off point which will divide the array into two
classes with a minimum possible number of misclassification and
then computing the percentage classification error.4 The cut-off
point is determined by visual inspection. The percentage
classification error is determined as number of misclassification
divided by the number in the sample. The ratio which results into
the lowest percentage classification error is the most efficient ratio
(Annexure-III). On the basis of non-parametric analysis, Gupta had
suggested five profit and loss statement ratios and two balance
sheet ratios to study the financial health of a firm.
The profit and loss statement ratios are:
(i) Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes
(EBDIT) to sales,
(ii) Operating Cash Flow (OCF) to sales,
(iii) EBDIT/Total Assets including accumulated
depreciation,
(iv) OCF/Total Assets including accumulated depreciation,
(v) EBDIT/(Interest + 0.25 Debt).
Among the balance sheet ratios only two were found to have
some power of predicting possible sickness, they are:
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(i) Net worth/Debt, including both short- and long-term
debt.
(ii) All outside liabilities/Tangible Assets.
It indicates that incidence of sickness and inadequacy of
equity base are associated. At the same time all liquidity ratio give
very poor results. In order to be classed as healthy as company
should earn a satisfactory gross profit (i.e., profit before
depreciation, interest and taxation) on sales as well as on its total
gross assets; and at the same time, it must also earn a satisfactory
cash profit (i.e., Profit after interest and taxation with depreciation
added back) again on both sales and total gross assets. The
combination seems to be automatically take care, under most
circumstances of vulnerability arising from unduly high debt,
making it unnecessary to test separately for debt servicing
ability”.5
Ratios as identified and suggested by William Beaver under
his initial approach of non-parametric analysis are worked out for
SAIL and exhibited in Table 5.1. It is observed from the trend that
company is a severely sick organization and heading towards
bankruptcy. The trend of cash flow to total debt and net income to
total asset ratios put forward a deeply depressing scenario. Cash
flow to total asset ratios, which was 1.99 times during 1995-96, has
become negative i.e.  -0.01 times during 2005-06. Cash flow during
the year has become negative. Similarly net income to Total Asset
ratio has also been declining at a faster rate. Total debt to total
asset ratio verifies the predictions of Beaver. As remarked by him
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total debt in SAIL is on a constant increase. It has risen up from
0.41 times to 0.62 times during the period of study. Working
capital ratios i.e. Net working capital to total assets and current
ratio though exhibit a fluctuating trend but have been declining
fast during later years of study.
Table 5.1
Non-Parametric Analysis (Initial Approach)
Year Cash Flow to
Total Debt
Net Income to
Total Assets
Total debt
to Total
Assets
Net
Working
Capital to
Total
Assets
Current
Ratio
1995-96 1.99 0.18 0.41 0.15 1.58
1996-97 2.17 0.02 0.44 0.15 1.45
1997-98 -1.03 0.02 0.49 0.17 1.68
1998-99 0.33 0.02 0.51 0.17 1.72
1999-2000 -0.33 0.05 0.50 0.13 1.55
2000-01 0.33 0.05 0.51 0.16 1.76
2001-02 0.02 0.01 0.56 0.18 1.98
2002-03 0.01 0.004 0.58 0.21 2.19
2003-04 -0.01 -0.04 0.62 0.19 2.07
2004-05 5.82 -0.06 0.58 0.08 1.35
2005-06 0.01 -0.02 0.57 0.06 1.23
2006-07 -0.01 -0.07 0.62 0.01 1.05
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Further the ratios as identified and suggested by L.C. Gupta
under his refine approach of non-parametric analysis to gauge the
financial health of a firm have been worked out for SAIL and
shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
210
Table 5.2
Non-Parametric Analysis (Refined Approach)
(Profit & Loss Account Ratio)
Year EBDIT to
Sales
O.C.F* to
Sales
EBDIT to
T.A.**
O.C.F. to
T.A.
EBDIT
to
Interest+
0.25 debt
1995-96 0.14 1.33 0.06 0.62 0.70
1996-97 0.16 1.68 0.07 0.73 0.50
1997-98 0.17 -0.97 0.07 -0.39 0.50
1998-99 0.15 -0.32 0.06 0.13 0.50
1999-2000 0.17 -0.29 0.09 -0.16 0.60
2000-01 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.60
2001-02 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.46
2002-03 0.17 0.02 0.05 7.7 0.38
2003-04 0.10 -0.01 0.03 -5.4 0.20
2004-05 0.07 0.004 0.03 0.004 0.20
2005-06 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.40
2006-07 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.19
*O.C.F.= Operating Cash Flow
**T.A. = Total Assets (Fixed Assets + Capital Work in Progress + Current Assets)
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Table 5.2 exhibits five profit and loss statement ratios. The
trend as revealed in the table testifies the trend as observed under
Beaver’s approach. All the five ratios speak about the depressing
and deteriorating health of SAIL. EBDIT to sales ratio which was
0.14 times during 1995-96 has declined to 0.06 times during 2006-
07. Operating cash flow has also steeply declined as trend shows.
Cash flow, which was 1.33 times during 1995-96, has become
negative i.e. -0.01 times during 2006-07. EBDIT in relation to Total
211
assets has also declined as observed from the trend. Similarly
operating cash flow as compared to total assets exhibits a steeply
declining trend.
OCF, which was 0.62 times during 1995-96, has become
negative i.e. -0.01 times during 2006-07. Moving on the similar path
EBDIT in comparison to interest and part of debt has also
exhibited a declining trend from 0.70 times during 1995-96 to 0.19
times during 2006-07.
Two balance sheet ratios have worked out and shown in
Table 5.3 also testify the apprehension about the sickness of SAIL.
Both the ratios clearly depict that company is in worst state of
financial health. Next worth to total debt, which was 0.85 times
during 1995-96 has steeply declined to 0.16 times during 2006-07.
Likewise all outside liabilities in comparison to tangible assets
exhibit an aggressive trend. Total liabilities of SAIL have reached
to the level of 0.92 times as compared to tangible assets during
2006-07.  This magnitude of debt in SAIL indicates that company is
in vulnerable state of affairs and testifies the observation as made
by L.C.Gupta under his refined approach of non-parametric
analysis.
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Table 5.3
Non-Parametric Analysis (Initial Approach)
(Balance sheet Ratio)
(Rs.in crore)
Year Net worth to Total Debt All outside liabilities to
tangible assets.
1995-96 0.85 067
1996-97 0.68 0.72
1997-98 0.55 0.74
1998-99 0.49 0.76
1999-2000 0.53 0.74
2000-01 0.54 0.73
2001-02 0.45 0.75
2002-03 0.42 0.76
2003-04 0.32 0.80
2004-05 0.31 0.82
2005-06 0.29 0.84
2006-07 0.16 0.92
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Multiple discriminant analysis can be used to classify
companies on the basis of their characteristics as measured by
financial ratios, into two groups: those likely to fail (and go
bankrupt), those not likely to fail. In the literature, the likelihood of
bankruptcy  is associated with financial ratios. For instance, it is
assumed that the probability of bankruptcy is higher for a firm
with a low currently ratio, high debt ratio and low rate of return.
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The empirical studies of Beaver (in USA) and Gupta (in India)
identified ratios which have discriminating power. What is,
however, required from practical point of view is the
understanding of seriousness posed by low performing ratios and
the combined effect of favourable and unfavourable ratios. The use
of MDA helps to consolidate the effects of all ratios. MDA
constructs a boundary line a discriminant function  using historical
data of the financially sick and non-sick firms. Edward Altman6
applied discriminant analysis in finance for studying sickness. His
study helped in identifying five ratios that were efficient in
predicting sickness/bankruptcy. Altman, established a guideline Z
score which can be used to classify firms as ether financially sound
– a score above 2,675 – or headed towards bankruptcy a score
below 2.675. The lower the score, greater the likelihood of
bankruptcy and vise-versa.
Multiple discriminant analysis as carried on for SAIL and
five ratios worked out under analysis are exhibited in Table 5.4.
Having a glance on the ratios on can easily understand the
financial health of the company. All the five ratios present a
depressing trend. Net working capital to total assets ratio, which
was 15 per cent during 1995-96 has steeply declined to a miserable
level of 1.6 per cent during 2006-07. Retained earning though
present a fluctuating trend have started declining during later
years under study as shown by retained earning to total assets
ratio. EBIT as presented in EBIT to total asset ratio exhibits a more
depressing trend as the ratio has become negative (-0.64%) during
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2006-07. Another interesting trend and clear indicator of company
sickness i.e. MVTE/Book Value of Debt presents an interesting but
depressing trend.
Table 5.4
Multiple Discriminant Analysis
N.W.C. to
Total Assets
Retained
Earnings to
Total Assets
EBIT to
T.A.*
MVTE** to
Book
Value of
Debt
Sales to
total
Assets
Year
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
1995-96 15% 5.7% 4.5% 72.4% 0.61
1996-97 15% 6.3% 5.0% 54.9% 0.56
1997-98 17% 7.2% 5.6% 41.6% 0.52
1998-99 17% 8.1% 6.0% 35.1% 0.53
1999-2000 13% 10.9% 7% 32.6% 0.57
2000-01 16% 14.0% 7% 28.3% 0.52
2001-02 18% 14.0% 6% 23.7% 0.45
2002-03 21% 12.9% 4% 20.6% 0.42
2003-04 19% 8.47% 1.0% 19.6% 0.44
2004-05 8% 7.53% 0.26% 27.3% 0.63
2005-06 6% 4.68% 4% 28.9% 0.65
2006-07 1.6% 5.15% -0.64% 29.4% 0.68
*T.A. = Total Assets (Fixed Assets + Capital Work in Progress + Current Assets)
**MVTE = Market Value to Total Equity
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd.
Market value of total equity as compared to debt observed as
presenting a constantly declining trend. During 2006-07 SAIL’s
equity has been observed as 29.4 per cent of Debt. Sales of the
company though have improved during last three years under
study but the overall condition seems to be deteriorating.
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Z score as calculated for SAIL and presented in Table 5.5
testifies the observation that SAIL is in its worst sate of affairs.
Company’s Z score has been constantly declining during the
period under review. During 1995-96 the score was 1.45 (far below
the standard value of 2.675) has further declined to the level of 0.92
during 2006-07.
Table 5.5
Multiplie Discriminant Analysis
(Z Score)
Year Z Score
1995-96 1.45
1996-97 1.29
1997-98 1.23
1998-99 1.23
1999-2000 1.27
2000-01 1.28
2001-02 1.17
2002-03 1.09
2003-04 0.90
2004-05 0.98
2005-06 1.07
2006-07 0.92
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
It is thus observed from the indicators (ratios) as worked out
under non-parametric analysis and multiple discriminant analysis
that SAIL is passing through a very vulnerable situation and has
become truly a sick organization. These indicators and trends call
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upon the various interested groups in SAIL to look into the
constantly deteriorating financial health of the company.
References
1. Pandey I.M., Financial Management, Vikash Publishing House
Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1999, pp. 180-181.
2. Beaver W.H., “Financial Ratios and Predictors of Failure,
Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies”.
Supplement to Journal of Accounting Research, 1966, pp. 77-
111.
3. Gupta L.C. Financial Ratios as Forewarning Indicators of
Corporate Sickness, Bombay : ICICI, 1979.
4. Ibid, p.5
5. Ibid, p.20
6. Altman, E.I., “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis, and
the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy,” Journal of Finance,
Sept. 1968, pp. 589-609.
217
Operational Performance Analysis
• Overview
• Operational Performance Analysis
• Closing Stock
• Raw Material and Its Sources
• Human Resource Management-SAIL
• Components of Cost – A Composite Analysis
• Pricing and Quality Control
Chapter-VI
218
Overview
“It is not the strongest of species that neither survives, nor
the most intelligent, it is the one that is most adaptable to change.”
This is quoted by Charles Darwin,1 who propounded the Theory of
Evolution which explains evolutionary selection as the key to the
survival of species, is equally true for survival of any
professionally managed organization.
The change in the value delivery processes are relatively
slow as compared to changes in the marketplace. In the last few
years, the steel industry has witnessed rapid changes as
globalization has brought steel markets across the world closer
resulting in fierce competition. This has also created an adverse
demand-supply situation in India. The deterioration in industry
fundamentals is attributable to a slowdown in demand from the
key end-user segments for the two broad categories of steel-long
products consisting of bars, rods and channels; and flat products
including hot-rolled and cold-rolled coils and galvanized sheets.
Though additional capacity had been created for flat products,
which were earlier in short supply, demand not only failed to pick
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up as predicted, but there has been a marked slowdown. Again,
growth in the infrastructure sector, which is the prime consumer
for long products, has been sluggish for the last three years not
only in India but in the entire South-East Asian region.
Consequently, given the present level of supply-demand
mismatch, the steel industry will remain highly uncompetitive
even if the economy comes out of the present phase of stagnation.
The profitability of the Indian Steel Industry and SAIL
started declining as a consequence of the general economic
slowdown since the second half of 2001-02. The domestic demand
for steel, showed a buoyant growth trend during the beginning of
the 1995s. It grew at rampant rate of about 22 per cent in 1999-2000
and around 14 per cent in 2000-01, declined to less than 4 per cent
in 2001-02 and was negligible in 2002-03. However, during this
period the net availability of steel in the market grew rapidly due
to the commissioning of a number of fresh capacities. This led to a
declining trend in the prices of steel products. The inflow of
imported steel at throwaway prices – dumped by a number of
countries, particularly CIS – brought prices further down. At the
same time, prices of inputs – coal, power, fuel, railway freight etc.
– increased sharply. For SAIL, the average impact of this rise
during the past two and a half years has been around Rs. 600-700
crore per year, putting enormous pressure on its profit. The
problem has been compounded by the slowdown in the growth of
steel – intensive industries like consumer durables, capital goods
etc.
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In today’s business environment, monitoring production is
of paramount importance, to produce products at optimum cost,
required quality and in time for the customer. Operational
performance in case of SAIL, can be viewed in terms of physical
performance which throws light on the state of productivity.
Productivity refers to a comparison between the quantity of goods
or services produced and the quantity of resources employed in
turning out these goods or services. The business of SAIL is spread
over various production units dispersed all over the country. As a
result, there is a need to maintain synergy of operations.
In the present environment to improve the operational
efficiency of an organization like SAIL—having multiple plants
and manufacturing units, focus must be on the following
important points.
1. Formulation of production strategy.
2. Optimization of cost-reduction areas in consultation
with plants.
3. Monitoring of operation related parameters for
benchmarking.
4. Intervention for ensuring input/infrastructure support
to plants for target fulfilment.
5. Inter-plant transfer of materials for value addition and
resource optimization.
6. providing inputs on operations-related areas to other
corporate functions such as long-term business plans,
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cash management, business restructuring, project
management, etc.
7. Inter unit lateral transfer of knowledge for optimizing
efficiency and techno-economics.
8. Coordinating at Government level for inter-ministerial
issues relating to SAIL operations.
9. Ensuring supply of coking coal in required quantities
and quality.
10. Stable and cost-effective management of power in steel
plants.
11. Coordinating supply of wagons for inward/outward
movement as per requirement.
To ensure the effective implementation of these points, SAIL
has an independent division known as Operations Directorate.
This directorate facilitates the smoothening of infrastructural
difficulties faced by the company’s plants by providing necessary
interfacing with the Railway Board, the Power, Coal and Steel
Ministries. Such interfacing activities are more intense because
growth of industry has taken over the growth of infrastructure in
the country.
The activities of the directorate are delegated to specialized
desks to ensure close coordination and monitoring the related
areas. In a nutshell, the major activities undertaken at the
directorate are related to cost reduction, monitoring of plant
performance, techno-economics and quality and inputs and basic
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infrastructures. A summarized view of Directorate’s functions has
been given in the Table 6.1.
Table 6.1
Operations Directorate
Desk Area
Plant desks Functioning of individual integrated
plants
Special steels Functioning of ASP, MEL, SSP & VISL
Coal & raw materials Supply of coal & raw materials and
procurement of fluxes from Rajasthan
through a liaison office at Jaisalmer
Rail Movement Cell (Kolkata) Movement of inputs/outputs of plants
by rail
Planning & MIS Production plans, MIS and
coordination with external agencies
Techno-economics & efficiency Techno-economic & efficiency
parameters
Power Supply of power to plants and
monitoring of supplies from
Government utilities through SLCC,
Kolkata
Energy Analyses of energy usage in plants and
benchmarking for improvement
Coke ovens & coal chemicals Activities relating to coke & coal
chemical
Maintenance Activities related to maintenance &
locomotives
Refractory Activities related to refractory, one of
most expensive stores item having
significant bearing on cost of
production
CCSO (Dhanbad) Coordinate supply of indigenous
coking/boiler coal
Monitoring Cell Continuous status of plant operations
Source: SAIL News, vol.30, 2002
Product Structure of SAIL
SAIL and its associates, manufacture various products
namely long products and flat products. In long products –Semis
(Billets and Slabs), Rails, Structurals, Rounds, Bars and Rods,
Sleepers, Wheel and Axle are the major products manufactured. In
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flat products – Plates and Skelp, HR Coil/Plates, CR Coil/Plates,
HR Sheets and GP/GC Sheets are the other products which are
manufactured by different plants of SAIL. Company also
manufactures pet products like ETP, CRGO/CRNO, ERW Pipes,
SW Pipes which are manufactured at Rourkela plants only. In
chart 6.1 the product structure is explained with the plants where
all products are manufactured.
Chart-6.1
Products of SAIL and its associates
Finished Products (Saleable) Steel)
Long Products                   Flat Products                           Pet Products
-Semis                                    -Plates                                    -ETP
 (All Plants)                           (Bhilai)
-Rails                                     -Skelp                                    -CRGO/CRNO
  (Bhilai)                                 (Rourkela, Durgapur)
-Structurals                          -HR Coil/Plates                   -ERW Pipes
 (Durgapur)                          (RSP, Bokaro Steel Plant)
-Rounds                                -HR Sheets                             -SW Pipes
  (Durgapur, Bhilai)             (Bokaro Steel Plant)               (Rourkela)
-Sleepers                                -GP/GC Sheets
 (Durgapur)                           (Bokaro Steel Plant
                                                 Rourkela)
-Wheel
  (Durgapur)
-Axle
  (Durgapur)
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Note: (i) Pig Iron, Crude and Hot Metal are raw products of SAIL.
          (ii) Brackets show the plants where the product is manufactured.
Source: Corporate House, Ispat Bhawan, New Delhi
Operational Performance Analysis
To review the operational performance of a manufacturing
organization numerous indicators could be used. With reference to
present study to review the operational performance of SAIL
important indicators as have been used are production capacity
utilization, plant-wise production, sales vis-à-vis production,
closing stock position, raw material and its sources, human
resource cost and productivity, power and fuel, depreciation and
excise duty as components of total cost have been used. Some brief
references of pricing and quality control process have also been
given. Pricing being a secrete affair of any organization not much
information could be extracted from the company.
Capacity Utilisation
To view at the overall operational performance of any
manufacturing organization the extent of utilization of capacity
installed would be an important indicator. At the project planning
stage production capacity is decided keeping in view the overall
demand and supply scenario. If the production unit produces at
minimum cost and supplyies the product at competitive prices,
penetration of the market will never be a problem. On the other
hand if cost reduction strategies are not implemented, production
will hardly come out of store. The problem seriously affects the
production process and organization can not except the effective
capacity utilization. In the present study, this indicator has been
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used to have an idea about production efficiency of SAIL. Table 6.2
exhibits the installed and utilized production capacity in SAIL.
Table 6.2
Installed and Utilised Production Capacity in SAIL (per cent)
 Quantity in Tonnes
Particular 1995-96 1999-2000 2003-04 2006-07
Own Products Installed
capacity
Actual
production
Capacity
utilization
(%)
Installed
capacity
Actual
production
Capacity
utilization
(%)
Installed
capacity
Actual
production
Capacity
utilizatio
n (%)
Installed
capacity
Actual
production
Capaci
ty
utilizat
ion
(%)
Main Steel Plants
Pig iron 1885000 565142 29.98 1885000 750068 39.79 1797000 731459 40.70    797000 353242 19.66
Crude Steel 1410000 8437959 74.01 114000
000
9821307 86.15 11627000 9857679 84.78   11987000 10466919 87.32
Saleable
steel
8773000 7035580 80.19 8773000 8630850 98.37 9566000 8326530 87.04   10190000 9463747 92.87
Alloy Steel Plants
Pig Iron - - - - - - 205000 44497 21.70 205000 21544 10.50
Crude Steel 260000 202163 77.75 260000 219106 84.27 401078 215258 53.66 301078 209838 69.69
Saleable
Steel
253000 186582 73.75 253000 210190 83.07 435000 275498 63.33 435000 233660 53.71
Others
Calcium
Ammonium
Nitrate
460000 174326 37.89 360000 221393 61.49 360000 92186 25.60 360000 315 .0875
(in terms of
25%N)
Notes: (i)  “Licensed Capacity”, Not applicable (NA) in terms of Government of India
                   Notification No.S.O.477(E) dated 25th July, 1991.
           (ii)   Crude Steel Installed Capacity is in terms of solid steel as per IISI requirements.
Source:      Annual Reports of SAIL
It is observed that in the main steel plants out of the three
products manufactured saleable steel has been the successful
product of the company followed by crude steel and pig iron.
Production capacity of saleable steel has been utilized at maximum
i.e. 98.37 per cent during 1999-2000 followed 92.87 per cent during
2006-07. During other two years also capacity utilization in respect
of saleable steel has never been below 80 per cent. In case of crude
steel also capacity utilization exhibit an excellent trend. During
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three out of four years installed capacity has been utilized above
80 per cent. Pig iron does not seem to be a favourable product of
the main plants of the company. Capacity utilization with regard
to pig iron seems to have been at insignificant level i.e. 40.70 per
cent (maximum) in 2003-04 during the period under study. Almost
similar trend has been observed in the Alloy steel plants also.
Alloy steel plants also present a healthy trend in saleable steel and
crude steel but crude steel has been produced more. Untill 1999-
2000 installed capacity was utilised significantly as 77.75 per cent
during 1995-96 and 84.27 per cent during 1999-2000. During the
next two years use of installed capacity has declined as far as the
crude steel production is concerned. Similar trend is also observed
about saleable steel. Capacity utilization for this product which
was 83.07 per cent during 1999-2000 has significantly declined to
the level of 63.33 per cnet during 2003-04 and 53.71 per cent during
2006-07. Pig iron like main steel plants seems to be an
unfavourable product of alloy steel plants also.
Composite Steel Production
Table 6.3 shows, in 1995-96 total production of saleable steel
has been 7,222 thousands tonnes. There is continuous increase in
the quantity of total saleable steel during the first half of study. In
2001-02 there is 28 per cent increase in total saleable steel as
compared to 1995-96. During 2005-06 total production of saleable
steel has been 9,703 thousands tonnes i.e. highest of total saleable
steel during he period of study. In 2005-06 increase in total saleable
steel as compared to 1995-96 has been 34.30 per cent.
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Table 6.3
Composite Steel Production of SAIL
(Quantity in Thousand Tonnes)
ItemsYear
HOT
Metal
Crude
Steel
Pig iron Semi
finished
Finished
Steel
Saleable
Steel
Trend of
total
saleable
steel (%)
Percentage
Change
1995-96 9,144 8,438 566 1,037 5,998 7,222 - -
1996-97 9,784 9,267 456 1,227 6,414 7,843 109.5 8.5
1997-98 9,918 9,464 335 1,321 6,616 8,136 112.6 12.6
1998-99 10,172 9,506 586 1,434 6,877 8,517 117.9 17.9
1999-
2000
10,868 9,821 750 1,680 6,951 8,841 122.4 22.4
2000-01 10,901 9,986 574 1,784 7,139 9,159 126.8 26.8
2001-02 11,393 10,319 673 2,104 6,798 9,235 127.8 27.8
2002-03 11,615 10,297 772 3,110 5,602 9,043 135.2 25.2
2003-04 11,180 9,858 731 2,293 6,034 8,602 119.1 19.1
2004-05 10,939 9,788 574 2,592 6,637 9,530 131.9 31.9
2005-06 11,202 10,306 358 2,141 7,269 9,703 134.3 34.3
2006-07 11,327 10,467 353 2,149 7,315 9,697 134.2 34.2
Source: Annual Reports of SAIL
Plant-wise Production
Plant-wise production of crude steel, pig iron, saleable steel
and finished steel has been given in Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. The
analysis of production has been carried on for a period of ten years
i.e. 1995-96 to 2004-05 due to non-availability of relevant data.
Sincere efforts were made to procure data till 2007 but in vain, as
company has not finalized the plant-wise production statistics.
Plant-wise production of crude steel is given in Table 6.4. It is
observed that in the annual production of crude steel at Bhillai
steel plant has taken a lead followed by Bokaro, RSP, DSP and
IISCO. In BSP and Bokaro the production seems to be revolving
around 40 per cent and 35 per cent of the total production of crude
steel. RSP produces around 12 to 14 per cent, DSP 10 to 14 per cent
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and contribution of IISCO seems to be dismal i.e. about 3-4 per
cent of total production annually. Total production of crude steel
by SAIL as a group presents a fluctuating trend. It grew upto 121.8
per cent during 2001-02 over 1995-96 and has further declined to
115 per cent. In the five units of SAIL producing crude steel
performance of IISCO needs review.
Table 6.4
Plantwise Production of Crude Steel (Mild)
(000’ tonnes)
Year BSP DSP RSP Bokaro IISCO Total
SAIL
Group
Trend
(%)
Percentage
Change
1995-96 3,512
(40.08)
875
(9.9)
1,246
(14.2)
2,806
(32.02)
323
(3.8)
8,762 - -
1996-97 3,673
(38.42)
871
(9.11)
1,234
(12.90)
3,417
(35.74)
364
(3.83)
9,559 109.0 9.0
1997-98 3,865
(39.64)
676
(6.93)
1,257
(12.89)
3,589
(36.82)
363
(3.82)
9,750 111.2 11.2
1998-99 3,953
( 40.53)
618
(6.72)
1,148
(11.37)
3,712
(38.06)
322
(3.32)
9,753 111.3 11.3
1999-
2000
4,051
(39.85)
936
(9.23)
1,178
(11.58)
3,656
(35.96)
344
(3.38)
10,165 116.01 16.01
2000-01 4,073
(39.51)
1,024
(9.93)
1,205
(11.68)
3,680
(35.69)
329
(3.19)
10,311 117.6 17.6
2001-02 4,188
(39.23)
1,245
(11.56)
1,248
(11.69)
3,644
(34.04)
353
(2.38)
10,673 121.8 21.8
2002-03 4,223
(39.85)
1,365
(12.88)
1,176
(11.09)
3,534
(33.35)
298
(2.83)
10,596 120.9 20.9
2003-04 4,151
(40.84)
1,428
(14.08)
1,195
(11.75)
3,085
(30.35)
303
(2.98)
10,162 115.9 15.9
2004-05 3745
(37.15)
1500
(14.88)
1,189
(11.75)
3,353
(33.26)
293
(2.94)
10,080 115.0 15.0
Figure in parentheses are as percentage of total production in SAIL during a year
Source: Steel Scenario, Year book, 2005
Table 6.5
Plantwise Production of Pig iron
(000’ tonnes)
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Year BSP DSP RSP Bokaro IISCO VISL Total
SAIL
Group
Trend
(%)
Percentage
Change
1995-96 96
(10.99)
87
(9.96)
50
(5.72)
332
(38.05)
308
(35.28)
- 873 - -
1996-97 175
(20.68)
70
(0.08)
41
(4.84)
171
(20.42)
389
(45.98)
- 846 96.90 -3.1
1997-98 135
(17.64)
17
(2.22)
30
(3.92)
153
(20.00)
430
(56.22)
- 765 87.62 -12.38
1998-99 300
(30.24)
35
(3.52)
48
(4.83)
203
(20.46)
406
(40.95)
- 992 113.6 13.6
1999-
2000
278
(24.09)
182
(15.70)
35
(3.04)
256
(22.18)
403
(34.92)
- 1,154 132.18 32.18
2000-01 272
(26.10)
103
(9.88)
14
(1.34)
154
(14.70)
421
(40.43)
78
(7.48)
1,042 119.35 19.35
2001-02 243
(22.58)
115
(10.68)
54
(5.01)
260
(24.16)
352
932.74)
52
(4.83)
1,076 123.25 23.25
2002-03 324
(26.82)
69
(5.71)
30
(2.48)
348
(28.80)
406
933.63)
31
(2.56)
1,208 138.37 38.37
2003-04 232
(20.51)
58
(5.12)
32
(2.82)
399
(35.27)
367
(32.44)
43
(3.84)
1,131 129.5 29.5
2004-05 223
(22.68)
55
(5.59)
20
(2.06)
279
(28.38)
378
(38.45)
28
(2.84)
983 112.6 12.6
Figure in parentheses are as percentage of total production in SAIL during a year
Source: Steel Scenario, Year book, 2005
Plant-wise and total annual a production of pig iron in SAIL
has been depicted in Table 6.5. It is observed that IISCO takes a
lead in the production of pig iron followed by Bokaro and BSP.
IISCO produces  about 40 per cent of total production on an
average. Bokaro produces about 25 to 30 per cent and BSP between
20 to 25 per cent of the total production of pig iron on an average.
The other three plants DSP, RSP and VISL contribute the rest of the
production. Trend of total production by the group as a whole
presents a fluctuating trend when the maximum production has
gone upto 138 per cent during 2002-03 over 1995-96. During the
year 1997-98, and 1998-99 company experienced a negative growth
in its annual production which was recovered during later years.
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Table 6.6 contains plant-wise as well as total annual
production of the SAIL group. It is observed that BSP and Bokaro
contribute the significant part of production like crude steel. BSP
contributes about 38 per cent and Bokaro about 35 per cent on the
total production on an average annually. RSP’s contribution is
found to be about 13 per cent and DSP contributes about 10 to 12
per cent on an average. Contribution of  IISCO   is   observed   as
marginal like the trend as observed
Table 6.6
Plantwise Production of Saleable Steel (Mild)
(000’ tonnes)
Year BSP DSP RSP Bokaro IISCO Total
SAIL
Group
Trend
(%)
Percentage
1995-96 2,795
(37.95)
727
(9.87)
1,087
(14.76)
2,426
(32.96)
329
(4.46)
7,364 - -
1996-97 3,104
(38.66)
682
(8.49)
1,125
(14.01)
2,730
(34.00)
387
(4.84)
8,028 109.0 9.0
1997-98 3, 118
(37.40)
641
(7.69)
1,179
(14.16)
2,999
(35.98)
398
(4.77)
8,335 113.1 13.1
1998-99 3,335
(38.58)
641
(7.43)
1,130
(13.07)
3,205
(37.07)
333
(3.85)
8,644 117.3 17.3
1999-
2000
3,409
(38.03)
853
(9.51)
1,200
(13.38)
3,168
(935.34)
332
(3.74)
8,926 121.2 21.2
2000-01 3,495
(37.89)
947
(10.28)
1,148
(12.44)
3,330
(36.12)
302
(3.27)
9,222 125.2 25.2
2001-02 3,582
(38.76)
1,093
(11.85)
1,180
(12.77)
3,046
(32.96)
339
(3.66)
9,240 125.4 25.4
2002-03 3,523
(39.05)
1,259
(13.94)
1,181
(13.08)
2,749
(30.45)
315
(3.48)
9,027 122.5 22.5
2003-04 3,352
(38.91)
1,319
(15.32)
1,114
(12.93)
2,542
(29.51)
287
(3.33)
9,614 116.9 16.9
2004-05 3,411
(35.96)
1,402
(14.78)
1,171
(12.34)
3,247
(34.24)
252
(2.68)
9,483 128.7 28.7
Source: Steel Scenario, Year book, 2005
in case of crude steel. Finished steel production (Plant-wise and
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whole group) is presented in Table 6.7. It is observed that Bokaro
contributes maximum i.e. about 40 per cent followed by BSP about
32 per cent on an average, RSP produces about 16 per cent of total
production followed by DSP i.e. 8 per cent on an average. Like
crude steel and saleable steel IISCO contributes marginally i.e.
about 4 per cent in the production of finished steel also. The trend
of annual production of the group as a whole does not depict an
impressive growth. Rate of growth has been about 10 per cent
during the period of the study. Maximum growth of 18 per cent
has been observed during 2000-01 over 1995-96.
Table 6.7
Plant-wise Production of Finished Steel
(000’ tonnes)
Year BSP DSP RSP Bokaro IISCO Total
SAIL
Group
Trend
(%)
Percentage
1995-96 2,061
(32.86)
559
(8.93)
1,058
(16.86)
2,331
(37.16)
263
(4.19)
6,272 - -
1996-97 2,149
(32.02)
511
(7.61)
1,093
(16.28)
2,645
(39.40)
322
(4.69)
6,710 106.9 6.9
1997-98 2,138
(30.85)
454
(6.55)
1,151
(16.62)
2,865
(41.34)
322
(4.64)
6,930 110.4 10.4
1998-99 2,189
(30.70)
500
(7.01)
1,104
(15.48)
3,083
(43.25)
254
(3.56)
7,130 113.6 13.6
1999-
2000
2,195
(30.40)
582
(8.06)
1,162
(16.09)
2,998
(41.52)
282
(3.93)
7,219 115.0 15.0
2000-01 2,342
(31.63)
565
(7.63)
1,101
(14.87)
3,127
(42.23)
268
(3.64)
7,403 118.0 18.0
2001-02 2,388
(33.75)
590
(8.340
1,115
(15.76)
2,701
(38.18)
280
(3.97)
7,074 112.7 12.7
2002-03 2,301
(32.92)
600
(8.78)
1,144
(16.57)
2,637
(37.77)
256
(3.96)
6,988 111.4 11.4
2003-04 2,132
(33.83)
541
(8.58)
1,081
(17.15)
2,280
(36.18)
267
(4.26)
6,301 100.4 0.4
2004-05 2,091
(30.60)
590
(8.63)
1,085
(15.88)
2,826
(41.36)
240
(3.53)
6,832 108.9 8.9
Source: Steel Scenario, Year book, 2005
Sales viz-à-viz Production
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Sales viz-à-viz production in SAIL over the years has been
given in Table 6.8 while studying the SAIL’s performance the
whole group has been divided into three parts i.e. main steel
plants, alloy steel plants and others. The sale of pig iron from main
plants, which was 69.91 pr cent of production during 1995-96, has
risen upto 72.60 per cent during 2006-07. Though it has declined
upto 57.56 per cent during 1999-2000 but has further picked up
and reached about 70 per cent during the last year of the study.
SAIL sells no crude steel being important raw material for finished
product. In case of saleable steel the performance is found to be
good where during all four years it was above 70 per cent and for
three out of four years it was about 80 per cent of total production.
In the alloy steel plants performance seem to be unsatisfactory but
improving.
The sales of pig iron which has been shown only for two
years i.e. 2003-04 and 2005-06 is found to be excellent. In 2003-04
these plants have sold 110.37 per cent of total production. Sales
performance of saleable steel from these plants is poor. SAIL could
sell only about 30 to 38 per cent of saleable steel produced by
ASP’s. This performance has improved over the next two yeas
when sales to production percentage improved to 65 per cent
during 2003-04 and 68 per cent during 2006-07. Like main steel
plants no steel is sold from ASP’s also.
Table 6.8
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Sales and Production Performance of Different Plants in SAIL
( Quantity in tones)
1995-96 1999-2000 2003-04 2006-07Own
Products
Sales from
current
Production
Production Sales in
comparison
to
production
Sales from
current
Production
Production Salesin
comparison
to production
Sales
from
current
Producti
on
Production Sales in
compariso
n to
production
Sales
from
current
Producti
on
Product
ion
Sales
in
compa
rison
to
produ
ction
Main Steel
Plants:
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Pig iron 395119 565142 69..91 431758 750068 57.56 453924 731459 62.05 256456 353242 72.60
Crude Steel NIL 8437959 NIL NIL 9821309 NIL NIL 9857679 NIL
Saleable
steel
5568473 7035580 79.15 653586
7
8630850 75.72 600784
0
8326530 72.15 792647
8
946374
7
83.75
Alloy Steel
Plants:
Pig Iron - - Nil - - Nil 49113 44497 110.37 20630 21544 95.75
Crude Steel Nil 202163 Nil Nil 219106 Nil Nil 215258 Nil Nil 209838 Nil
Saleable
Steel
71585 186582 38.36 63486 210190 30.20 151148 275498 64.86 158032 233660 67.63
Others:
Calcium
Ammonium
Nitrate
166535 174326 95.53 173120 221393 78.19 92187 92186 100.0 Nil 315 Nil
Notes: (i)  “Licensed Capacity”, Not applicable (NA) in terms of Government of India
                   Notification No.S.O.477(E) dated 25th July, 1991.
           (ii)   Crude Steel Installed Capacity is in terms of solid steel as per IISI requirements.
Source:      Annual Reports of SAIL
Closing Stock
View at the closing stock position has been given in Table
6.9. It is observed that closing inventories in SAIL are mounting.
The trend as given depicts that growth in inventories has been
upto about 300 per cent during the period under review. During
2001-02 it was 385.52 per cent over 1995-96. Stocks have started
declining during the later years as it had gone down to 181.03 per
cent over 1995-96. But  still the inventory position in the company
needs to be improved. Closing stock to sales position as depicted
in Table 6.10 also present a depressing trend. Closing stock which
was about 17 per cent during 1995-96 has risen upto 36-40 per cent
during 2002-03. Thereafter it has declined but not less than 15 per
cent of sales in any case. In a gaint organization like SAIL where
value of annual sales happens to be above rupees15 thousand
crores annually, 15 per cent or more inventory works out as a
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significant figure. It is therefore opined that closing stock position
in the company is alarming.
Table 6.9
Closing Stock Position
(Rs. in crore)
Year Closing Stock Trend (%) Percentage
Change over
1995-96
1995-96 1,381.02 100 -
1996-97 2,015.67 145.95 45.95
1997-98 2,937.94 212.73 112.73
1998-99 3,011.07 218.03 118.03
1999-2000 2,707.16 196.02 96.02
2000-01 3,034.93 219.76 119.76
2001-02 4,264.14 308.76 208.76
2002-03 5,324.12 385.52 285.52
2003-04 4,781.60 346.23 246.23
2004-05 2,818.57 204.09 104.09
2005-06 2,922.50 211.61 111.61
2006-07 2,500.12 181.03 81.03
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Table 6.10
Closing Stock to Sales
(Rs. in crore)
Year Sales Closing Stock Percentage of
closing stock to
Sales
1995-96 8,184.00 1,381.02 16.87
1996-97 9,360.00 2,015.67 21.53
1997-98 10,175.00 2,937.94 28.87
1998-99 11,671.00 3,011.07 25.79
1999-2000 13,867.00 2,707.16 19.52
2000-01 14,710.00 3,034.93 20.63
2001-02 14,114.01 4,264.14 30.21
2002-03 14,624.07 5,324.12 36.40
2003-04 14,993.85 4,781.60 31.89
2004-05 16,250.16 2,818.57 17.34
2005-06 16,232.63 2,922.50 18.00
2006-07 15,502.00 2,500.12 16.12
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
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Raw Material and Its Sources
Raw Material Division – Source of Strength
In 1994 SAIL launched a separate unit i.e. the Raw Material
Division – and brought all its captive mines in the eastern sector
under its umbrella. The avowed purpose was to rationalize supply
of raw materials to different SAIL steel plants in the eastern sector
and achieve systematic reduction in purchase of iron ore from
non-captive sources. Today, the RMD boasts of achieving this
prime objective by complete elimination of purchase of iron ore
from outside sources, which had touched almost 11.1 per cent of
the total iron ore requirement.
The company met almost total requirement of its iron ore
and half of fluxes requirement from captive sources. SAIL captive
mines produced 19.16 million tonnes of iron ore (lumps & fines)
during 2001-02 which was the highest ever production till that
year. Flux production was 2.5 million tonnes. Company fulfils 60
per cent requirement of coal as raw material from own captive
mines and remaining 40 per cent requirement is fulfilled from
Imported coal. Tasra Coking Coal Block has been allocated by
Ministry of Coal to SAIL for captive mining.
The total iron ore production from the Company’s Captive
mines during 2002-03 was the highest ever at 20.75 million tonnes.
Flux production was 2.65 million tonnes. During the year 2005-06,
the total iron ore and flux production from captive mines was
18.85 million tonnes and 2.68 million tonnes respectively. Almost
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the total requirement of iron ore for different plants was met from
company’s own captive sources.
The Rowghat mines have been identified by the company to
meet the requirement of iron for its Bhilai Steel Plant in the near
future. For transportation of ore to Bhilai Steel Plant,
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Rowghat rail line
project has been signed on 2nd April, 2003 between ministry of
Railways, M.P. Government, SAIL and NMDC.
The Division had succeeded in ensuring that the SAIL’s steel
plants in the eastern sector did not have to purchase iron ore from
external sources. Considering that for eight years since 1994-95, an
average of 7,30,000 tonnes of iron ore had been purchased from
outside sources every year, RMD had enabled SAIL once again to
make a huge saving on this account.
SAIL is the second largest mining network in the country
after that of Coal India Ltd. The Captive mines of the SAIL plants
at Rourkela, Durgapur and Bokaro were brought under the
umbrella of the RMD in 2003.  The mines attached to Bhilai Steel
Plant were kept out of the RMD ambit due to their locational
disadvantage viz-à-viz the eastern plants.
During the decade of its existence, the RMD infrastructure
has been progressively strengthened so that it would be able to
achieve the purpose for which formed within a short time. As a
result, a majority of the RMD mines are now mechanized and
automation has replaced many manual processes. A new ore
processing plant (OPP) was made operational at Bolani as a Part of
237
DSP modernization A crushing plant at Satna was added under
RSP modernization. A central base repair shop was established at
Bolani to cater to all mines for engine and transmission
overhauling and other projects. Computerized mine planning,
central procurement of important items like explosives, tyres, belt
conveyors etc., centralized liaison with the Ministry of
Environment & Forests and related state departments, networking
of mines, etc. were also undertaken and these have yielded
encouraging results.
With rationalization of raw material supplies after formation
of RMD, the purchase of iron ore from non-captive sources
progressively declined. Form a whopping level of around 17 per
cent of the eastern sector plants, total iron ore consumption in
1994-95, the purchase of iron ore from outside sources has been
totally eliminated today.
With the objective to know the component of raw material in
the total cost of production of steel in SAIL, percentage of raw
material cost in V.O.P. has been worked out and depicted in Table
6.11. As a percentage of V.O.P. cost of raw material has been found
to be within controllable limit but it has been observed as growing
over the years. During 1995-96 material cost was 30 per cent of
value of production which has risen upto 37.5 per cent by the end
of 2006-07. In any manufacturing organization cost of raw material
upto 50 to 55 per cent is considered normal. Keeping that rule of
thumbs in mind this cost in SAIL seems to be within acceptable
level but growth in the cost should not be ignored.
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Table 6.11
Raw Material Cost to V.O.P.
(Rs. in crore)
Year V.O.P. Cost of Raw
Material
% Raw Material
Cost V.O.P.
1995-96 8,311.95 2,500.76 30.08
1996-97 9,994.65 3,070.34 30.71
1997-98 11,097.27 3,425.03 30.86
1998-99 11,744.13 3,531.65 30.07
1999-2000 13,563.09 4,484.35 33.06
2000-01 15,037.77 5,012.17 33.33
2001-02 15,343.22 5,587.49 36.41
2002-03 15,684.05 5,410.98 34.49
2003-04 14,451.33 5,224.26 36.15
2004-05 14,287.13 4,979.10 34.85
2005-06 16,336.56 5,420.20 33.17
2006-07 15,079.5 5,652.44 37.48
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Human Resource Management – SAIL
Human resource is one of the most important resources and
company continues to work for its development. SAIL continued
its efforts to enhance and maximize the contribution of the human
resources towards organizational excellence. Several on-going
motivational schemes have been utilised to maintain the morale of
the workforce. Proper utilization of human resources and
rightsizing to make the company healthy are some important pre-
requisites for effective human resource management.
The SAIL’s manpower strength as on 31st March 2007 was
1,47,601 comprising of 16,003 executives and 131,598 non-
executives registering a reduction of 9,118 employees during the
year. In the analysis of last years it is noted that the company
reducing its manpower strength continuously.
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The manpower productivity at 111 tonnes of crude steel per
man per year registered increase of 6 per cent, over the previous
year.
To make incentive and reward schemes more meaningful, a
modified scheme was implemented during 2006-07 giving greater
thrust on profitability as a parameter. Need based training was
provided to employees to equip them to meet the challenges of the
competitive environment. Over 70,000 employees were trained
during the year 2006-07.
HRD initiatives in the company are directed towards the
vision of the company and creating and nurturing a culture that
supports flexibility, learning and is proactive to change. It also
strives to work towards charting a challenging career for
employees with opportunities and rewards. Through its actions
and beliefs, it is committed to make a meaningful difference in the
employees’ lives.
There was overall improvement in the safety performance of
the company during the year. The declining trend of all categories
of accidents was maintained. Adequate emphasis was laid upon
assets of the company along with production and productivity.
Systematic approach to safety management was adopted through
close monitoring of adherence to safety norms and procedures. A
conducive and congenial work environment was maintained
through the support and co-operation of the trade unions and
officers’ association.
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Various welfare measures for the benefits of the employees,
like free medical services (including extending medi-claim
schemes to retired employees), housing, education for children,
facilities of cooperative societies as well as providing avenues for
socio-cultural activities were undertaken.
Despite being a better human resources management and
acceptable work environment, company is suffering from very
heavy workforce, which is required to be shortened. It has been
observed that in deteriorating the company’s health this factor has
a major role.
With a view to optimizing the manpower and reducing the
labour cost, a voluntary retirement scheme based on Department
of Public Enterprises (DPE) guidelines with lumpsum payment
was launched, whereby over 6,500 employees separated during
the year 2006-2008. Further efforts on manpower rationalization
through Voluntary Retirement Scheme are continuing in the
current years also.
Table 6.12 shows that in 1995-96 total number of employees
was 1,93,639 and total human resource cost is Rs. 1,11,573 lakh. In
1995-96 average human resource cost was 0.58 lakh. There is
continuous increase in the total human resources cost during the
period of study. From 1999-2000 onwards-continuous decline in
the total number of employees and continuous rise in average
human resource cost per employee has been observed. In 2006-07
total number of employees was 1,47,601 and total human resource
cost was Rs. 3,24,978 lakh. In 2006-08 average human resource cost
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per employee has risen upto Rs.2.20 lakh i.e. highest average cost
during the period of study.
Table 6.12
Average Cost of Human Resources per Employee
Year Total No. of
Employees
Total H.R.
Cost (Lakhs)
Average H.R.
Cost Per
Employee
(lakhs)
1995-96 1,93,639 1,11,573 0.57619
1996-97 1,91,646 1,33,026 0.69412
1997-98 1,90,282 1,42,454 0.74865
1998-99 1,87,900 1,64,576 0.87587
1999-2000 1,89,506 1,68,118 0.88713
2000-01 1,87,504 2,10,654 1.12346
2001-02 1,83,340 2,11,397 1.15303
2002-03 1,76,147 2,20,132 1.24970
2003-04 1,74,736 2,38,145 1.36288
2004-05 1,59,940 2,73,467 1.70980
2005-06 1,56,719 3,10,588 1.98181
2006-07 1,47,601 3,24,978 2.20173
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Human resource cost in relation to V.O.P. has been given in
Table 6.13. As observed from the trend of HR cost as percentage of
value of production has been rising over the year. This cost has
risen upto 22 per cent of value of production as against about 13
per cent during 1995-96. This continuous and sustained growth in
the HR cost seems to affect the overall financial position of the
company.
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Table 6.13
Human Resources Cost to V.O.P.
(Rs. in crore)
Year V.P.P. H.R. Cost % (HRC to
V.O.P)
1995-96 8,311.95 1,115.73 13.42
1996-97 9,994.65 1,330.26 13.30
1997-98 11,097.27 1,424.54 12.83
1998-99 11,744.13 1,645.76 14.01
1999-2000 13,563.09 1,681.18 12.39
2000-01 15,037.77 2,106.54 14.00
2001-02 15,343.22 2,113.97 13.77
2002-03 15,684.05 2,201.32 14.03
2003-04 14,451.33 2,381.45 16.47
2004-05 14,287.13 2,734.67 19.14
2005-06 16,336.56 3,105.88 19.01
2006-07 15,079.5 3,249.78 21.55
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Another important indicator i.e. manpower productivity
ratio as worked out and given in Table 6.14 presents an interesting
but encouraging trend. Manpower productivity ratio depicts a
continuous and sustained growth. During 1995-96 the productivity
which was 73.62 tonnes per person per year has grown upto 129.81
tonnes per man per year. Total manpower strength has been going
down over the years and productivity going up. But this reduction
in manpower has to be accelerated further if company wishes to
come out of present state of sickness.
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Table 6.14
Manpower Productivity
(Production in thousand tonnes)
Year Total Steel
Production
Total
manpower
Strength
Man Power
Productivity
Ratio
1995-96 14,257 1,93,639 73.62
1996-97 15,484 1,91,646 80.79
1997-98 16,073 1,90,282 84.46
1998-99 16,828 1,87,900 89.55
1999-2000 17,472 1,89,506 92.19
2000-01 18,079 1,87,504 96.41
2001-02 18,137 1,83,340 98.92
2002-03 17,755 1,76,147 100.79
2003-04 16,929 1,74,736 96.88
2004-05 18,759 1,59,940 117.28
2005-06 19,113 1,56,719 121.95
2006-07 19,161 1,47,601 129.81
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Power and Fuel
Power and Fuel is one of the important components of cost
in a steel manufacturing organization like SAIL. Coke and coal are
used as source of power and fuel in steel manufacturing
organizations. To improve the production efficiency this
component of cost must be within control. The position of this
component in SAIL is worked out and given in Table 6.15. During
1995-96 power and fuel cost was about 7 per cent as a value of
production which has risen more than 11 per cent during 2006-07.
As a component of total cost it is not found to be on the hire side
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but like material cost its proportion is growing. The low cost of
power and fuel in SAIL may be due to availability of coal from its
captive mines.
Table 6.15
Power and Fuel Cost in V.O.P.
(Rs. in Crores)
Year V.O.P. Power and
Fuel
consumed
% (Power and
Fuel costs
v.o.p.)
1995-96 8,311.95 589.47 7.09
1996-97 9,994.65 687.98 6.88
1997-98 11,097.27 779.64 7.02
1998-99 11,744.13 926.422 7.88
1999-2000 13,563.09 1,048.16 7.72
2000-01 15,037.77 1,163.46 7.73
2001-02 15,343.22 1,383.63 9.01
2002-03 15,684.05 1,468.48 9.36
2003-04 14,451.33 1,348.48 9.33
2004-05 14,287.13 1,464.89 10.25
2005-06 16,336.56 1,579.68 9.66
2006-07 15,079.5 1,700.67 11.27
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Depreciation and Excise Duty
Depreciation though non-cash expanse, the proportion of it
in total cost of production is desirable to be worked out under
operational analysis. As given in Table 6.16 depreciation as a
percentage of V.O.P. has never been more than 7 per cent. In some
years i.e. 1999-2000 and 2000-01 it was around 4 per cent. During
2006-07 though V.O.P. has declined as compared to previous year
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but depreciation has gone up. Excise Duty as a proportion of
V.O.P. also exhibits a growing trend.
Table 6.16
Depreciation and Excise duty to Value of Production
(Rs. in crore)
Year % (Depreciation to V.O.P.) % (Excise duty to
value of
Production)
1995-96 7.30 7.53
1996-97 6.73 7.61
1997-98 6.55 9.50
1998-99 4.34 10.22
1999-2000 3.86 11.36
2000-01 3.88 12.05
2001-02 4.50 12.83
2002-03 5.06 12.20
2003-04 7.63 12.84
2004-05 7.92 13.56
2005-06 7.00 12.99
2006-07 7.66 13.14
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
This contribution to the national exchequer which was more
than 7 per cent during 1995-96 has risen upto more than 13 per
cent by the end of period under study. During 2005-06 though
value of production was maximum but excise duty has declined as
compared to previous year.
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Components of Cost – A Composite Analysis
To understand the overall operational performance of SAIL,
its cost of production (different components) has been compared
with other two organizations in the private sector manufacturing
steel. The five components worked out and given in Table 6.17
under composite analysis of three companies constitute about 85
per cent of V.O.P. in SAIL. Looking at the components and their
percentage of V.O.P. as given one can easily understand the
operational inefficiency of the company. SAIL has more cost of
human resources and power and fuel as compared to other two
companies. Raw material cost though highest in JVSL presents a
reverse trend as compared to SAIL. During 2004-05 raw material
cost which was 74.56 per cent in JVSL has declined to 59.84 per
cent to V.O.P. during 2006-07. In SAIL it presents an increasing
trend from about 35 per cent during 2004-05 to about 38 per cent
by the end of 2006-07. In TISCO this trend seems to fluctuating.
HR cost has been found to be maximum in SAIL where it was
about 22 per cent to V.O.P. during year 2006-07. JVSL has
remarkably controlled this cost being about 2 per cent of V.O.P. In
TISCO, HR cost about 15 per cent is also well below the expected
level. Power and fuel cost is again highest in SAIL followed by
TISCO and JVSL. This cost which was 10.25 per cent during 2004-
05 has risen upto 11.25 per cent during 2006-07. A strange growth
in this component of cost has been observed in JVSL which has
gone up by more than three times over last three years. This high
level of cost of power and fuel in SAIL is undesirable as company
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owns its own sources of coke and coal. The other two components
i.e. depreciation and excise duty are found to be highest in JVSL
followed by SAIL and TISCO. SAIL seems to have been
depreciating its fixed assets at a rate lesser than the industry rate.
In excise duty all the three companies have been contributing to
national exchequer a significant portion ranging between 12 per
cent to 16 per cent as a percentage of value of their production.
Table 6.17
Components of Cost to Value of Production
Composite Analysis of SAIL, TISCO and JVSL
Raw Material Cost as %
to V.O.P.
HR Cost as % to V.O.P. Power & Fuel as % to
V.O.P.
Depreciation as % to
V.O.P.
Excise  Duty as % to V.O.P.
Year SAIL TISCO JVSL SAIL TISCO JVSL SAIL TISCO JVSL SAIL TISCO JVSL SAIL TISCO JVSL
2004-
05
34.85 24.0 74.56 19.14 14.41 0.46 10.25 9.59 4.0 7.92 6.42 9.64 13.5 12.00 14.67
2005-
06
33.17 23.48 71.67 19.01 12.33 0.57 9.66 9.20 2.38 7.00 6.57 6.76 12.9 12.30 16.33
2006-
07
37.48 25.7 59.84 21.55 14.93 1.62 11.27 9.78 13.63 7.66 7.13 11.78 13.1 12.24 15.26
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority of India Ltd., Tata Iron & Steel Co., Jindal Vijay Nagar Steel Ltd.
Relevant Operational Ratios
Three relevant operational performance ratios as shown in
Table 6.18 namely raw material inventory turnover, fixed assets
turnover and total assets turnover ratios have also been worked
out to gauge the operational performance of SAIL. These ratios
speak about the depressing state of affairs in the company. Except
raw material turnover ratio other two ratios are far below the
desired level. Raw material turnover ratio which was about 8.09
times during 1995-96 has gone up to about 11.08 times during
2006-07.  Total assets turnover ratio has been found to be
fluctuating between about 0.40 times and 0.67 times by the end of
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the period under review, similarly fixed assets turnover ratio
which was 1.56 times during 1995-96 has miserably declined to
1.04 times. These two ratios are far below the desired rule of
thumbs and verify the deteriorating operational performance in
SAIL.
Table 6.18
Relevant Operational Performance Ratios
(Rs. in Crores)
Year Raw Material
Inventory
Turnover
Fixed asset
Turnover
Ratio
Total Assets
Turnover
Ratio
1995-96 8.09 1.56 0.60
1996-97 8.87 1.73 0.55
1997-98 9.60 1.88 0.51
1998-99 7.96 1.66 0.52
1999-2000 11.32 1.83 0.56
2000-01 10.06 1.67 0.51
2001-02 9.22 1.11 0.44
2002-03 8.38 1.03 -.422
2003-04 8.20 0.81 0.43
2004-05 8.61 1.02 0.62
2005-06 10.31 1.06 0.64
2006-07 11.08 1.04 0.67
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Pricing and Quality Control
Pricing
The main issues characterizing the year 2007 have been the
extensive adoption of trade protecting measures and considerable
consolidation (‘correction’ as per the industry) of steel prices. The
global economy has not depicted any additional vibrancy, but
crude steel production in the first ten months of the year 2007 has
registered increase except the European Union, where there has
been a slight decrease. The US and West European Markets have
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kept dull till now, the only hope arises from a better demand in
Asia, particularly China, which is showing considerable appetite
for steel.
According to unconfirmed news from Japanese mills
including Nippon Steel, successfully negotiated for a 5 per cent
price rise with automobile manufactures. If such price rise is
implemented then it will be the first increase in five years.
Comparable deals have already been made with shipbuilding and
home appliances industry. In Japan, total inventories of flats – hot,
cold and surface treated products, as of end September 2007,
decreased by 1.9 per cent from the previous month. As regards
long products, demand for construction steel has not been as good
as is usually anticipated during the period autumn to winter. The
long producers are also facing the problem of higher scrap costs
caused due to inadequate supply and high demand in China and
South Korea.
The South Korean steel industry is doing well with a positive
economic situation prevailing there. However, sale of long
products are predicted to fall to some extent there during this
winter period.
In the European Union, the steel mills are trying hard to
sustain the price levels attained during the year 2007. In the face of
bearish demand, the mills are adopting strict measures to justify
stocks. The factors from where they can draw optimism are high
global price levels and protection for the domestic industry from
cheap imports. However, a weakening currency the Euro against
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the US Dollar coupled with export restrictions to the Chinese
market may pose as major concerns for the steel mills there. As
regards long products, there have been some small downward
movements of the price levels, which have been attributed to
seasoned changes only.
In US, the situation is not better. With unbalanced high
inventory in the backdrop of slackening demand, the mills are
mostly planning to go for production cuts in the fourth quarter.
The only good news from the US market is that the annual contract
prices with auto-makers for 2008 is rising following seven years of
decline. With no pick up of construction activities, the long
product demand is also stagnant.
The stagnant scenario in the global steel market as discussed
above has shown its impact on Indian steel market also. For the
last about five years steel market in India has been sluggish. With
influx of many players in the private sector manufacturing steel,
the supply has considerably gone up not supported by demand.
This has affected the steel prices negatively. Pricing being a secret
affair in any manufacturing organization not much information
could be extracted from the records of SAIL. But still an attempt
has been made to take an idea about current steel prices in the
major markets in the country. Prices as given in Table 6.19 would
help to form an opinion about their growth or decline and possible
impact or ecline and possible impact or major steel manufactures
in India including SAIL. Last three months’ prices of different
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products in steel prevalent in four major retail exhibit a stable
trend. Not much increase  has been observed in these prices.
Table 6.19
Retail Market Price of Iron and Steel of Kolkata, Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad for
Mid October, November and December 2007
Kolkata DelhiProduct in
mm Oct. Nov. Dec. Price
Trend
(%)
Oct. Nov. Dec. Price
Trend
(%)
Pencil Ingots 12,200 12,050 12,500 102.4 12,750 12,750 12,00 100.0
Blooms
150X150
12,200 12,500 12,500 102.4 12,750 12,550 13,000 101.9
Tor Steel 8
mm
15,400 15,000 15,000 97.4 16,900 16,900 17,700 104.7
Wire rods 8
mm
16,500 15,300 15,300 92.7 16,000 16,500 17,000 106.2
Angles
35x35x4/5
16,000 15,600 15,600 97.5 15,600 15,600 15,600 100.0
Channels
75x40
16,000 15,500 15,500 96.8 16,000 16,000 16,000 100.0
Plates 8 mm 19,000 18,300 19,000 100.0 18,700 18,700 18,850 100.8
HR Sheets
2.00 mm
20,000 19,500 20,500 102.5 20,500 20,000 20,600 100.4
HR Coils 2.55
mm
18,500 18,000 19,500 105.4 20,000 19,000 19,700 98.5
GP Sheets .80
mm
23,500 24,500 24,500 104.2 24,500 24,500 25,000 102.0
Pig iron 9,400 9,500 9,500 101.0 9,800 9,100 9,900 101.02
Sponge iron 6,600 7,600 7,600 115.1 7,000 8,000 8,000 114.2
Melting Scrap 8,100 8,200 8,200 101.2 8,300 8,300 8,200 98.7
Rerollable
Scrap
10,200 11,500 11,500 112.7 9,250 9,250 8,990 96.2
Mumbai HyderabadProduct in
mm Oct. Nov. Dec. Price
Trend
(%)
Oct. Nov. Dec. Price
Trend
(%)
Pencil Ingots 12,600 12,600 11,000 87.3 12,200 12,200 12,200 100.0
Blooms
150X150
12,600 12,600 13,000 103.1 12,300 12,300 11,800 95.0
Tor Steel 8
mm
15,600 15,600 17,000 108.9 16,500 16,000 16,500 100.0
Wire rods 8
mm
16,500 16,500 16,700 101.2 16,500 16,500 16,400 99.3
Angles
35x35x4/5
15,800 15,700 15,700 99.3 15,700 15,700 15,700 100.0
Channels
75x40
15,800 16,000 15,600 98.7 15,800 15,800 15,800 100.0
Plates 8 mm 19,700 18,500 19,800 100.5 19,500 18,600 19,500 100.0
HR Sheets
2.00 mm
20,000 20,000 21,000 105.0 20,500 20,500 20,500 100.0
HR Coils 2.55
mm
20,500 19,500 19,000 96.0 20,000 20,000 21,000 105.0
GP Sheets .80 25,000 25,000 25,000 100.0 25,000 25,000 25,000 100.0
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mm
Pig iron 9,000 9,600 9,800 108.8 9,100 9,200 9,200 101.0
Sponge iron 7,000 7,600 7,600 108.5 7,000 7,250 7,300 104.2
Melting Scrap 8,200 8,100 8,100 98.7 8,300 8,100 7,500 90.3
Rerollable
Scrap
10,000 10,000 9,850 98.5 10,100 9,900 10,000 99.0
Source: Annual Reports of Steel Authority India Ltd.
Coefficient of range of percentage change in the prices of
different steel products as given in Table 6.20 also testifies the fact.
The values of coefficient of range have been found to be far below
a particular level i.e. 0.11 for Kolkata, 0.09 for Delhi, 0.06 for
Mumbai and 0.06 for Hyderabad market. This trend conveys that
prices of steel will remain stale and significant growth is not
expected. Hence all manufacturers of steel in the country including
SAIL shall have to control the cost of production to improve their
financial health.
Table 6.20
Co-efficient of range of percentage change in the price of different products
in steel in four major markets
Kolkata Delhi Mumbai Hyderabad
Co-efficient 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.06
See Annexure-IV
Total Quality Control
Total Quality Control process is a never ending journey to
enhance the performance of the organization. In the last years a
perceptible change of SAIL’s image has taken place on quality
form because of the commitment within SAIL towards total
customer satisfaction. A corporate quality process was formulated.
This in essence is the basis to build and sustain an organization,
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which is customer-oriented, innovative and where quality is the
hallmark of every operation. While in the earlier years, emphasis
was on Total Quality Awareness, in the current years emphasis
has shifted to quality improvement projects. Seven units of the
company viz Plate mill of RSP, Hot Dip Galvanizing Complex of
BSL, Merchant Mill of DSP, Alloy Steel Plant, Management
Training Institute, Centre for Engineering & Technology and
Research & Development Centre for Iron & Steel have achieved
the stringent ISO-9000 Standards during 2000-2005. Interplant
quality system audit has been introduced in SAIL to maintain the
quality standards and monitor its effectiveness. Efforts to involve
employees at all levels in bringing about improvement in their
areas of work continued through quality circle activities.
Galvanizing lines of RSP received ISO-9002 certification during
2000-01.
SAIL plants were recognized in the area of quality at the
national level. Bhilai steel plant was awarded the Golden Peacock
National Quality Award, 2001, instituted by the Institute of
Directors. Bokaro Steel Plant was adjudged the best plant in
having the maximum number of employees covered under QC
activities. The Institute of Directors conferred its coveted Golden
Peacock National Quality Award to Bokaro Steel Plant (Runners –
up in large manufacturing category), RDCIS (Winners in special
category of education, Research & Development and Training),
MTI and CET (winners and runners –up respectively in small
service category). While Alloy Steel Plant won the National
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Quality Award (special steel) instituted by the Indian Institute of
Metals, Bhilai Steel Plant was the runners-up among the integrated
steel plants. The Hot Rolling Mill of SSP, Wheel & Axle Plant, Basic
Oxygen Furnace, Steel Melting shop and continuous Casting Plant
of DSP, Silicon Steel Mill (CRNO Stream) of RSP and Steel Melting
shop No.1, Blooming & Billet mill and Rail & Structural Mill of
BSP achieved ISO 9002 certification.
During last year, the merchant mill and wire rod mill of BSP,
Cold Rolling mill of BSL, Steel Melting Shop-1, Oxygen Plant -1
and Oxygen Plant-II of RSP, Branch Transport & Shipping office
(BTSO), Vijay of CMO & Light Castings and Steel Foundry,
Growth Division, Kulti works also have achieved ISO-9002
certification. During 2005-06, Steel Melting Shop–I & II,
Continuous Casting Shop & Slapping mill at BSL received ISO –
9002 certification. SAIL has taken all appropriate steps for
maintaining the ISO-9000 certified  Quality appearance systems in
all plants/units.
It is thus obvious from the above observation that the Steel
Authority of India Ltd. in the present competition scenario
requires to focus greatly on capacity utilization, cost over-run
factors, right sizing manpower and quality improvement
programmes to make the organization viable at global level.
Various components of cost like raw material, HR cost, power and
fuel and others have been found much above the industry average.
Prices of steel being sluggish for quite some time, company had
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control cost of production to earn margins. Quality improvement
has to be paid desired attention.
Reference:
1. Darwin Charles, On the Origin of Species by Means of
Natural Selection, Nov.24, 1859.
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The present Indian economic structure is often characterized
as ‘mixed economy’. There are two fields of production in the
structure – the public sector and the private sector. The presence of
public sector in the Indian economy is by no means a novel
experiment. Even in the capitalist countries of the West, the State
has not only interfered in the economic life at times, but also
participated directly in the production and distribution activities.
Especially in those countries where the process of industrialization
was initiated quite late, the role of state in economic development
has been very significant. The contribution of state in
industrialization has been important even in countries like Japan,
Germany and the USA. Indian experience of state participation in
business through public sector has not been a successful venture
unlike these economies. Over a short span of 50 years giant public
sector organizations have become sick and rather than becoming
the instruments of industrial and economic development, have
started eating upon national resources. In the wake of
globalization Government is compelled to come out with
corrective measures with regard to these undertakings which may
be restructuring, disinvestment, privatization and closure.
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Corporate restructuring has been dominant global business
theme from the mid-seventies. It has been fuelled by a variety of
forces like global competition, technological breakthroughs,
managerial innovations, regulatory changes, transformation of
formerly centrally planned socialistic and communistic economies,
and expansion of international trade.
By and large corporate restructuring has been a resounding
success. It has led to dramatic improvement in corporate
performance. What can this be attributed to? Observers of
corporate restructuring believe that the gains are attributable to
synergetic benefits, sharper forces, better corporate governance,
improvement in managerial incentives and motivations, greater
disciplining power of debt, and elimination of cross subsidies.
Numerous reasons are assigned, why companies go for
restructuring: The globalization of business has compelled
corporate to open new export houses to meet global competition.
Global market concept has necessitated many companies to
restructure because lowest cost producers only can survive in the
competitive global markets. Changed fiscal and Government
policies like deregulation/decontrol has led many companies to go
for newer markets and customer segments. Revolution in
information technology has made it necessary for companies to
adapt new changes in the communication/information technology
for improving corporate performance. Many companies have
divisionalised into smaller business. Product divisions which do
not fit into the company’s main line of business are being divested.
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Fierce competition is forcing Indian companies also to re-launch
themselves. Improved productivity and cost reduction has
necessitated downsizing of the work force – both at works and
managerial level, besides, convertibility of rupee has attracted
medium – sized companies to operate in the global markets.
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) is India’s largest and
the world’s ninth largest steel producer with a turnover of over
Rs.14,000 crore.
Its five integrated steel plants at Bhilai, Durgapur, Rourkela,
Bokaro and Burnpur have a total capacity of producing 12 milliion
tonnes of crude steel. Three plants at Salem, Drgapur and
Bhadravati are engaged in production of Special and Alloy Steels
and a plant at Chandrapur, Maharashtra is a bulk producer of
ferror-alloys.
SAIL’s vast portfolio of long and flat-products is marketed
both within and outside India by its own Central Marketing
Organization and International Trade Division, respectively. Its
Raw Materials Division is locatd at Kolkata.
To develop new technologies for the steel industry and
achieve world standards in steel, SAIL has a well-equipped
Research and Development Centre for Iron and Steel. Besides, it
has own in house centre for Engineering and Technology,
Management Training Institute and Safety Organization at Ranchi.
The Environment Management Division and Growth Division of
SAIL also operate form their headquarters at Kolkata.
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Despite the existence of many positive factors as discussed
above due to company’s bad state of affairs, it has become
virtually a sick organization. Even having attained Navrattan
Status company’s position has deteriorated over the time
particularly after late eighties and during the whole decade of
nineties. Financial health of the company has worsened due to
absence of technology of its plants and very heavy manpower. In
the present study an attempt has been made to review the
performance of Selected Central Public Sector Undertakings in
general and Steel Authority of India Ltd. in particular.
Main Findings and Suggestions
Performance of Selected Central Public Sector Undertakings
After attaining independence public sector was created with
diverse objectives like gaining control of commanding heights of
economy, promoting critical, development in terms of social gains
and to provide commercial surplus to financé economic
development. Sustain growth of this sector has taken place under
planned process of development. Every five year plan has
contributed in the development and growth of central public
sector. By the end of third year of ninth five year plan i.e. 31-03-
2000 total investment in central public enterprises had risen upto
worth Rs. 2,52,554 crore in 240 CPSUs. This investment had come
from different sources like equity of central and state
governments, holding companies, banks and financial institutions
and foreign investors. Significant part of total investment had also
come as loan form different quarters as stated above. The
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important cognate groups under which these organizations had
come up are in both, production as well as services sectors. In the
production sector important industries are steel, petroleum,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, construction and fertilizers and
power. In services sector financial services and telecommunication
services figure as important.
The performance of these undertakings though had not been
excellent but not even unsatisfactory as observed from trend of
sales. Sales have grown an up about 15 per cent during the period
of present study. Percentage of sales to capital employed has also
registered upward trend. Group-wise sales turnover has been
observed as excellent in transport equipments i.e. 79.72 per cent
during 2004-05 over 2003-04 followed by petroleum 43.45 per cent,
medium and light engineering 23.87 per cent, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals 23.64 per cent and others like-wise. In the services
sector financial services and technical consultancy have grown up
at an excellent rate of more than 15 per cent during the year. It is
further observed that significant part of sales by CPSUs comes
from top ten companies which contribute 66.45 per cent of  total
sales.
Foreign exchange earnings by way of exports and
investments has also been found good i.e. about Rs. 20,000 crore by
the end of year 2005.
Total profit after tax as earned by these PSUs has gone up
more than six times during the decade of the 1990s. About Rs.
8,000 crore have been contributed to national exchequer in the
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form of tax by them during the decade. In the group-wise
performance steel, fertilizers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
textiles, consumer goods and agro based industries have been
found to be very poor and units in these six sectors have incurred
heavy losses i.e. more than Rs.6,500 crore during the year 2003-04.
Under services sector tourism has not been found performing
satisfactorily. This sector has incurred a loss of more than Rs. 3
crore during the year. In the top ten organizations from
profitability point of view, ONGC has been ranked as number one
and Northern Coal Fields Ltd. as last. In top ten CPSUs making
losses, SAIL has been ranked as number one and CCI Limited as
last. Besides contribution to national exchequer CPSUs have
declared handsome amount of dividend i.e. over Rs. 5,000 crore
during the period under study. Total contribution to national
exchequer in the form of corporate tax and excise and customs
duty these units have contributed more than Rs. 47,000 crore. On
the employment front the support of sector has been remarkable as
18.54 lakh employees have been found to be working in these units
by the end of 2004-2005 with Rs.1.77 lakh average annual
emoluments per employee. Besides that many social welfare
measures like providing employment to scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes have been undertaken.
Despite numerous positive and strengthful achievements, all
CPSUs cannot be considered as performing upto the mark. In
between top ten profit-making and ten loss-making organizations
there are many units in between that are not performing
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satisfactorily. Many PSUs are sick and this proportion of sickness
has been going-up. The magnitude of voluntary retirement availed
by employees during the decade of 1990s which was about 1.5 lakh
employees speak about the extent of sickness.
To deal with this situation and improve the overall
performance of these undertakings Government has introduced
two important tools namely MOU system and Disinvestment.
Memorandum of understanding with CPSUs has been introduced
in 1988 to review the performance of CPSUs and make these units
responsible, accountable and autonomous. On the basis of
outcome after review, these units can expect any help and support
from government. Till year 2005, 107 PSEs have been evaluated
under MOU system with 49 rated as excellent, 26 very good, 12
good, 12 fair and 7 poor performers.
The disinvestment process as started during 1990s has been
with the main objective of awakening these units CPSUs from long
sleep. Government cannot sustain losses of these units for
unlimited number of years. Under the restructuring policy of
Government disinvestment has been declared for those units
which are neither strategic nor healthy. Government has decided
to withdraw from business and consequently those sectors in
which public sector organizations have not been doing well.
Restructuring policy of the Government clearly specifies that with
regard to revival of public sector undertakings only potentially
viable units will be restructured and those which cannot be
restructured will be closed down. In non-strategic units
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Government equity will be brought down to 26 per cent or lower,
if necessary. Despite a clear and well defined disinvestment
process, it has not been possible to achieve target of disinvestment
in all the years in 90s except 1996-97 and 1999-2000. During 2004-
2005 proceeds from disinvestment of CPSUs were of the order of
Rs. 1,829 crore against a target of Rs. 10,000 crore.
In the light of above observations about the performance of
CPSUs, following measures are suggested to be taken to improve
the overall performance of these undertakings.
(i) The Government should review the restructuring
process and firmly stick to policy statement where the
potentially viable PSUs should be revived and
restructured within public sector and bring down the
equity to 26 per cent in phased manner in some non-
strategic sector PSUs, if felt necessary. Only those PSUs
should be closed down which cannot be revived at all
and the interest of employee working in these units
should be protected effectively.
(ii) Restructuring should be given priority over
privatization. Restructuring can be done without
privatization. Some of the areas of restructuring
identified are business restructuring, financial
restructuring, organizational restructuring and labour
restructuring. Restructuring on these lines will enhance
the value of enterprise and enable Government to get a
better value of shares.
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(iii) In case of restructuring of financial sector, institution
more prominently the public sector, banks’ expansion
mode (mergers and acquisitions) would prove to be
beneficial. By consolidation of financially strong and
weak banks and big and small will help to improve
their performance. For regional rural banks either they
should be consolidated with one another or merged
with their sponsoring banks.
(iv) At the place of disinvestment department, Government
should establish Restructuring Commission to work
out modalities of restructuring, so as to make the
process transparent and open. Government should
quickly act upon the recommendations of this
commission. The commission, after making
recommendations should also oversee the
implementation of its suggestions which can sped up
the process of restructuring. Also the Commission
should identify the sick PSUs which need to be
restructured.
(v) The reasons for poor performance of large number of
PSUs are due to political interference coupled with
excess labour and militant trade unionism. Most of
PSUs whether profitable or not suffer from over-
staffing. For instance, comparing IPCL’s performances
with private sector Reliance, it cautioned that former’s
employee cost is 9.2 per cent as against 2.3 per cent of
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the latter. In the process of restructuring Government
should attempt to deal with the problem of over-
staffing for which VRS may be made more attractive.
(vi) The Government should resist the temptation to use
disinvestment funds for revenue generation alone. The
disinvestment should not be linked with the budgetary
support. Atleast 50 per cent of the proceeds should be
used in raising capital for viable PSUs. For minimizing
fiscal deficit, the Government should minimize the
subsides, lower down expenditure on governance and
follow financial discipline.
(vii) The Government should set up a restructuring fund
and 50 per cent of the disinvestment receipts should be
transferred to this fund. This would be an enlarged
version of disinvestment fund. The respective budget
outlay for PSUs and VRS should be transferred to the
enlarged fund. The fund would meet the fiscal needs of
PSUs so that their dependence on government goes
down to zero in three years.
(viii) To make PSUs independent and free from political
interference, a National Shareholding Trust should be
set up and all Government shares in PSUs should be
transferred to this body. The trust would keep 51 per
cent of the share with itself and protect the government
interest. The rest could be disinvested in a phased
manner if need arises.
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(ix) In case of disinvestment of on strategic units, auction
to the highest bidder route should be adopted which
will help to fetch the highest possible price for shares
of these units.
Global Steel Industry and SAIL
To have an idea about performance of steel industry in India
it is pertinent to review the performance of world steel industry.
Over the years steel production around the world and its trade
will help to gauge the performance of Indian steel industry. It is
with this objective, the performance of world steel industry has
been reviewed in comparison with Indian steel industry. During
past 20 years steel production in India being 35 per cent of world
steel production has been far below the satisfactory level.
Reviewing the growth of world finished steel production for
about past three decades, it has been observed that compound
average growth rate of steel production has been at meager about
1.5 per cent. Trade of steel (exports) around the world have also
not grown at a faster rate till the beginning of 1990s as depicted by
meager CARG of 2.7 per cent. It has grown up at a significant rate
of 7.3 per cent during 1990s. The production of crude steel has also
not grown up at faster rate. China and Maxico have increased the
production of crude steel at the rate of above 7 per cent during
2004-2005 over 2002-03. Many countries namely Germany, Italy,
U.K., Brazil, U.S.A. and many more have registered a decline in
the production of crude steel. Looking at the import export
scenario of the steel around the world it is observed that countries
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like USA, China and some countries in the middle and far east
have been major importers of steel. It is further observed from
global steel demand and supply scenario that crude steel
production will grow at an average rate of 5 per cent and
economies like US, South Africa, Japan and some Asian countries
(ex-Japan) will be potential markets for sale of steel. Looking at the
overall performance of different countries with regard to
production of steel, China, Japan and US have scored first, second
and third positions followed by Russia, Germany, South-Korea
and others. India has been ranked at 8th position in the steel
production in the world. In the region-wise world steel
production, Asia has taken a lead with the production of 7,256
thousand tonnes during 2004-05 followed by Europe and North–
America and others. In Asia, China, Japan and Korea have been
the frontrunners in the production of steel.
In India production of stainless steel started at alloy steel
plant and Durgapur in late 1960s. Production gradually increased
to around 24 thousand tonnes per annum in mid 1970s. During the
end of 1980s the Government changed its policy allowing the
production of all types of steel in the secondary sector. New
capacities were created and the production increased to about 170
thousand TPY in 1984-85. In 2005-06 the production further
increased to about 750 thousand TPY. There are about 18
producers of steel in India and 17 small induction furnace units of
two to three tonne capacity. Sector-wise consumption is found to
be maximum in catering equipments followed by process
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industries consumption and transport. At the export front India
exported about 80 thousand tones of stainless steel in 2005-06 to
Middle East, U.S.A., Africa and Japan.
In the post-liberalisation scenario in India the steel industry
has been flooded with new investments worth $ 7.5 to 8 billion.
Indian production of crude and finished steel has been increasing
on a year on year basis which increased to 3,052 million tonnes in
2006-07. As per one estimate growth of steel production is
predicted to the level of 45 million tonnes in 2005-06. With regard
to finished steel scenario in India, production was more than
consumption and part of the production was exported also. This
has been possible due to allowing the private sector units to
manufacture steel. In the present scenario steel production is
undertaken by public and private sector organizations but a
significant proportion is manufactured by public sector giant
organization SAIL and its associates. In the different products of
steel CR coils and galvanized products have maximum growth
rate i.e. above 9 per cent.
Looking at the trend of steel exports from India, secondary
producers have taken a lead. SAIL and RINL have also exported
some basic products like bars and rods, structures and plates.
TISCO and other producer in the private sector like JVSL, ESSAR
and Lyods Steels have not contributed much in export of finished
steel during the last part of decades of 1990s. In overall world
scenario the performance of India in the production of crude steel
has been quite satisfactory. Only problem observed is with regard
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to production and export of finished steel. Some important
bottleneck observed in this regard are lack of cost competitiveness,
inferior technology, uncompetitive quality and poor infrastructure.
Besides that trade and tariffs barriers as created by US and
European Union are causing concern to all Indian steel exporters.
Steel Authority of India Ltd. has been the major producer of crude
as well as finished and stainless steel in India. Till the beginning of
1990s this company was steel maker to the nation and only major
exporter. Established in 1973 SAIL has five integrated plants, four
special and alloy steel and ferro alloy units and three subsidiary
companies.
In view of the observations made as above some important
suggestions with respect to global steel scenario and Indian Steel
Industry may be:
1. Al players in Indian Steel Industry (Public and Private)
have to work jointly to fight with the international
competition prominently with regard to price and quality.
2. Keeping in view the total demand for all products of steel
around the world, it is observed that sufficient demand
exists in economies like USA, Middle and Far East, China,
South Africa and Japan. Indian producers if expand the
international marketing network could capture the
significant portion of these markets. In the domestic
markets also, SAIL particularly must go for marketing
strategies as its competitors in the private sector have
been following.
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3. Crude steel exports from India must be replaced by
finished steel in this era of liberalization and global
sourcing.
4. With regard to SAIL, it has been observed that its five
integrated plants have their independent integrated
operations based on completely different manufacturing
technology. Due to this fact company is not able to enjoy
the economies of large scale production. To lower down
the cost of finished steel, company must seriously work
towards replacement of independent and obsolete
technology.
5. SAIL has defined customers. With them also company is
loosing significant market share. To expand its market
SAIL must come out with liberalized and proactive
marketing policies in India and abroad.
6. Indian steel exporters have been facing stiff trade and
tariff barriers in international markets, particularly in US
and G-15 countries after 1998 nuclear test. To fight out
this situation Government of India must take up the
matter at international level.
7. Modernisation of the technology as JVSL (Asia’s first high
tech steel plant) has adopted must also be adopted by
other players particularly SAIL.
Financial Performance Analysis-I
Financial performance analysis of any organization helps to
understand its financial health. While analyzing the financial
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position one must not focus on only one aspect of profitability but
its overall contribution to all interest groups associated. Financial
performance analysis in case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. has
been carried on under three broad aspects namely procurement
and utilization of funds, capital structure, working capital analysis
and profitability. In SAIL total funds come from diverse sources
i.e. internal and external. In the internal sources share capital and
reserve and surpluses are prominent, in external sources, funds
come from secured and unsecured loans. In the internal sources,
the trend of share capital as well as reserves has been found
declining. During the period of study significant decline in the
share capital i.e. more than 17 per cent has been observed.
Retained Earnings which were more than 17 per cent during 2000-
01 have constantly declined to 6 per cent of total funds by the end
of 2006-07. In the external Sources total funds from long-term
loans both secured and unsecured have significantly gone up. A
significant increase of about 20 per cent in this source has been
observed during the period of study. It is thus concluded that
significant proportion of total long-term funds required in SAIL
come from long-term loans which has been observed as third-
fourth of total funds.
Capital structure studied with the help of two important
ratios i.e. Debt equity and long-term debt to total capitalization
also confirm the observations. These two ratios have been
observed as 2.65 times and 0.73 times respectively.
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With regard to deployment of funds it is observed that funds
are deployed in SAIL in a traditional manner to acquire fixed and
current assets. Part of the funds has also been found to be invested
into long-term instruments. Fixed assets in SAIL have grown
considerably i.e. about 30 per cent during the period under study
64.27 per cent assets have been found as fixed. Current assets trend
has registered a significant decline from above 52 per cent to about
24 per cent of total assets between 1995-96 and 2006-07. This seems
to be a healthy development as minimum funds are required to be
invested in current assets. Long-term investments have also been
found as growing significantly. Growth in this component of
deployment of funds has been observed as more than 30 per cent
during the period of study.
Working capital analysis includes observation of trend of
gross and net working capital, management of individual current
assets and analysis of liquidity position. In the gross working
capital the trend of current assets has been found as fluctuating
during the period of study. In some years increase in the current
assets has been found as more than 100 per cent over 1995-96.
Gross working capital has been observed as 30 per cent above the
level of 1995-96. The trend of net working capital though has been
observed as fluctuating but it has significantly declined during the
later years of the period under study. During last two years a
negative growth has been observed in the net working capital as
compared to its level in 1995-96. In isolation this trend may be
termed as healthy but in SAIL it is quite alarming. The reason for
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this is constantly rising level of current liabilities. The gap between
current assets and current liabilities, significantly narrowed in the
company thereby reducing the level of net working capital. The
component proportion in the current asset reveals that inventories
constitute highest part followed by sundry debtors and cash and
bank balances. Short-term loans and advances also exist in a
significant proportion. In the current liabilities, component
analysis reveals that sundry creditors and interest accrued
constitute the significant proportion. Current assets as proportion
of total assets have also been found presenting a declining trend
over the years. But despite a constant reduction in current assets as
percentage of total assets still this proportion seems to be highest
as compared to other companies in the private sector i.e. TISCO
and JVSL.
Liquidity position in SAIL has been studied with the help of
current ratio and acid test ratio. It has been observed that liquidity
in SAIL is declining over the years. Two ratios as cited above have
been found constantly declining during the period under study.
This trend indicates that company is passing through severe
liquidity problem. On the other hand, looking at the composite
liquidity position in the industry, it is observed that liquidity
position in SAIL is better than other two companies in private
sector namely TISCO and JVSL. Average current ratio for past
three years has been found as best in SAIL only. In the component-
wise analysis of working capital inventory which was following a
growing trend till 2001-02 has started declining thereafter. During
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2006-07 inventory was found as about 35 per cent above the level
in 1995-96. Inventory turnover ratio though has improved over the
years and inventory holding time has come down but still it is at
94 days. Industry-wise inventory turnover ratio and inventory
holding period have been found as worst in SAIL as compared to
TISCO and JVSL. Next important component namely debtors
exhibits a sleep rise in trend.
Debtors in 2006-07 have become more than double as
compared to 1995-96. Debtors collection period i.e. 33 days in 2006-
07 has been found declining during later years of period under
study. Short-term loans and advances though declining but still
are found at a comparatively higher level in the company.
Similarly cash and bank balances are also found in a significant
proportion and the short-term liabilities trend has been found
rapidly growing. Sundry creditors which form significant
proportion have been constantly growing over the years. This
shows that purchases on credit by SAIL have been going up.
Third important aspect examined to understand the financial
health of SAIL has been profitability. Profitability has been studied
with the help of operating profit and net profit ratios, returns on
owner equity and earning per share.
Operating and net profit in the company have been found as
constantly declining over the years. Operating profit as a
percentage of sales has declined from 14.78 per cent during 1995-
96 to 6.52 per cent during 2006-07. Similarly net profit which was
at meager rate of 3.03 per cent of sales during 1995-96 as become
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negative i.e. -11.01 per cent during 2006-07. Return on equity has
also registered a steep declining trend. This return which was 5.30
per cent during 1995-96 has become negative at a substantial rate
of -75.80 per cent during 2006-07. Similarly EPS which depicted an
insignificant increase initially has also steeply declined and has
become negative i.e. -4.13 per cent during 2006-07.
Financial Performance Analysis-II
Financial performance of SAIL as examined with the help of
study of important aspects like sources and deployment of funds,
working capital and profitability testifies the fact that SAIL is in
worse state of affairs and virtually a sick organization. Still an
attempt has been made to further examine the financial
performance of the company with the help of two important
statistical tools namely non-parametric analysis and multiple
discriminant analysis. Non-parametric analysis as  developed by
W.H. Beaver and further refined by L.C. Gupta has been used.
Two groups of financial ratios as suggested by both the researchers
under NPA have been worked out. A clear trend of deteriorating
financial position of the company has been observed in both the
cases. In the original approach all the five ratios suggested to be
worked out present a declining trend. Cash flow to total debt and
net income to total assets ratios have been observed as
insignificant during early years and negative during later years.
Total debt to total asset ratios reveals a rising trend. Working
capital ratios i.e. net working capital to total assets and current
ratio have been found constantly declining and depicting the poor
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liquidity position in the company. Seven new ratios as worked out
under refined approach of NPA also present a depressing trend.
Out of five profit and loss account ratios operating cash flow to
sales and EBDIT to sales are found constantly declining. Cash flow
has become negative during later years under study. Similarly
EBDIT and O.C.F. as compared to total assets also presents a
depressing and declining trend. Debt servicing capacity of the
company has been declining steeply as indicated by EBDIT to
interest and proportionate debt ratio.
Two balance sheet ratios also verify the sickness of SAIL. Net
worth to total debt ratio has registered a constantly declining trend
from 0.85 times during 1995-96 to 0.16 times during 2006-07. On
the other hand all outside liabilities to tangible assets ratio has
depicted a rising trend from 0.67 times during 1995-96 to 0.92
times during 2006-07. Hence both the sets of ratios have worked
out under non-parametric analysis convey the extent of sickness in
SAIL.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis and group of ratios worked
out under this analysis speak the depressing story of financial
position of SAIL.
Z score, worked out under this analysis has been found
constantly going down during all the years of period under study.
Z score which was 1.45 during 1995-96 has declined to 0.92 during
2006-07 which is far below the standard rule of thumb of 2.765.
The detailed and rigorous analysis of financial performance
of SAIL evidently conveys that company is passing through a
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serious state of affairs and demand a complete turnaround before
collapses. The hypothesis as framed that financial planning and
control in SAIL is effective with respect to: (i) Procurement and
deployment of funds between fixed and current assets; (ii)
Management of working capital; and (iii) Profitability does not
hold truth. In view of this situation following measures are
suggested to be taken up without the further loss of time to
improve the overall financial performance of SAIL.
1. Capital structure of the company needs to be restructured.
High component of debt and very low equity has
significant role in the present position of SAIL. Eroding
capital base needs to be corrected and debt equity ratio
should exactly be 2:1.
2. In the current assets magnitude of inventory has been
found as very high and constantly mounting. This
indicates the inability of the company to sell its finished
products. Innovative and effective marketing policies are
required to be designed with a thrust towards moving
into international markets.
3. Liquidity position needs to be improved and present very
high level of current liabilities brought down. This will
help to save sufficient funds paid as interest.
4.  Modernization of company’s plants should be completed
on priority, so as to improve the quality of production
and reduce the price. If these two objectives are achieved,
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company can expect a better market share in the markets
abroad.
5. Following time over-runs during modernization the asset
value of SAIL plants will go up on account of accretion of
capitalized interest without corresponding increase in
income generation. The value of these fixed assets either
to be written down to the extent of capital interest accrued
along with the writing-off of loans and advances to its
subsidiaries.
6. Another remedy to this problem could be that an amount
of about Rs. 4,000 crore required for modernization be
generated through share capital, for which Government
must support the capital issue of the company.
7. To improve the sales and consequently the profit
company must enter into long-term sales contracts with
the buyers in Middle and Far East countries, where
sufficient demand for SAIL’s steel has been experienced
in the past. For this purpose a channelising agency must
be established in those countries.
Operational Performance
Operational performance of SAIL has been gauged with the
help of important indicators like capacity utilization, plant-wise
production, sales as compared to production, closing stock
position, raw material and its sources, human resource cost and
productivity and some other cost components like power and fuel,
depreciation and others. Brief reference of pricing and quality
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control also has been given with regard to capacity utilization
main as well as alloy steel plants having found working far below
the installed capacity. In manufacturing of pig iron only about 20
per cent capacity has been used during 2006-07 in the main plants.
In alloy plants capacity utilization with respect to this product has
only been around 11 per cent during the year. In manufacturing of
crude as well as saleable steel capacity utilization has been far
below the installed level i.e. about 70 per cent and 54 per cent. In
the composite production of saleable steel though growth has been
observed but it has not been significant. Production of saleable
steel has increased only by about 30 per cent during the period
under study. In the plant-wise production of different products of
steel only two plants namely Bhillai and Bokaro have been found
as contributing significant proportion.
Sales viz-à-viz production performance has also been
observed on a satisfactory level. On an average company’s sales
have been found as about 75 per cent of production in main as well
as alloy steel plants. Closing stock of finished products position
has also been found as challenging. During the later years of the
period under study though closing stock has registered a decline
but still it is found as 200 per cent of the level during 1995-96. In
some years like 2002-03 the closing stock had gone up to the level
of 400 per cent as compared to 1995-96. In the different component
of cost though the company is enjoying low cost of material due to
its own captive mines of iron ore but the HR cost has been found
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as very high raw material cost has been found as ranging between
30 per cent to 38 per cent of the value of production. HR cost has
been found as very high i.e. about 22 per cent during 2006-08. A
constant rising trend in this component of cost has been observed
during the period under study. Manpower productivity ratio
though has improved from 73 per cent during 1995-96 to about 130
but still it is far below from the level of expectations. Power and
fuel as a component of cost has also registered an increasing trend.
One interesting trend has been observed in depreciation.
Percentage of depreciation to value of production has been found
very low i.e. between 7.30 per cent during 1995 to 7.66 per cent.
While comparing these different components of cost of
production with other players in the industry prominently TISCO
and JVSL it is observed that SAIL bears more HR and power and
fuel cost. Raw material cost is found highest in JVSL followed by
SAIL and TISCO. In depreciation also a similar trend is observed.
Finally, viewing the operational performance of SAIL with the
help of three important ratios namely raw material, fixed assets
and total assets turnover, a very much depressing trend has been
observed.
With regard to quality improvement and control, company
has put in some efforts by establishing its own research and
development division and getting ISO-9002 certification but still
much more is required to be done.
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Hence keeping in view the operation performance of SAIL
studied with the help of diverse indicators it is concluded that
company is performing far below the level of its size and
capabilities. This poor operational performance has been
responsible for deteriorating financial performance and therefore,
be corrected without the loss of any more time. The hypothesis as
framed in the research design that: (i) Company has been
effectively achieving its targets with respect to production and
sales; (ii) Strength of human resources of the company is judicious
viz-à-viz its manufacturing and sales operations, do not hold true.
Following suggestions may lead to improve the present position of
SAIL:
1. Production process in the company needs to be activated
and installed capacity in all main and alloy plants be used
to its fullest extent. Company must go for unrestricted
volumes of production to meet the rising demand.
2. To improve sales performance company is required to
identify its permanent and strategic customers those who
buy high quantity and higher value items or may have
very high potential strategic value. These customers
should be served well in respect of technology,
production and delivery aspects by keeping in mind the
status of the company.
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3. information base in terms of order status, future material
availability, acceptable delivery condition at SAIL plants
and competitive pricing need to be strengthened.
4. Research and development activities must be improved
on a large scale. This will help in improving the
production capacity, enrichment of product mix,
reduction in cost and improvement in quality.
5. The component of finished steel in the total saleable steel
must be increased.
6. HR and power cost has been found very high in the
company. To make its product cost competitive, human
resource cost is recommended to be brought down from
present level of about 22 per cent to an acceptable level of
about 16 per cent of value of production. For this VRS
should be effectively implemented and Government may
provide financial assistance from disinvestment fund.
7.  With regard to depreciation company has not been found
following a right policy. It is observed that non-
availability of funds for modernization process may be
due to insufficient depreciation charged in the past. It is,
thus, strongly recommended that company must review
Depreciation policy and take corrective measures
accordingly. Restructuring process as recommended
under relevant aspects has been presented in the
following part in the pictorial form so as to make it more
convincing. At the same time the models presented may
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prove to be useful not only for the restructuring of SAIL
but many other central public sector organization also.
A giant public sector organization like SAIL, which was steel
maker to the nation till the beginning of 1990s has lost its  status
afterwards. The possible reasons for this downfall may be the bad
financial and operational health of the company and influx of
many companies in the private sector in steel manufacturing
industry. After going through the organizational, financial and
operational structure of the company it has become evident that
country cannot expect better results from this giant public sector
organization accorded the status of one of the Navarattans of India.
A serious restructuring exercise with regard to financial
restructuring, organizational restructuring, operational
restructuring and technological restructuring is required to be
initiated without the loss of any more time. Going through the
different aspects of the company during the present study it is
strongly recommended that revival should be undertaken through
restructuring and not by any other mode. Disinvestment of the
company is deliberately not recommended due to large size of its
operations and very heavy strength of human resources. Besides,
many weaknesses, company has remarkable strengths also, hence,
it is recommended to be restructured within public sector only.
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Annexure-I
Schedule of Questions
1. In the changing economic scenario how do you rate the
performance of SAIL?
2. Till the beginning of decade of 90’s SAIL was steel maker
to the nation, why not today?
3. Have steel units come up in the private sector like Essar
and Loyad Steel in Western region of India and Jindal
Vijaynagar Steel in Southern region affected the
performance of SAIL?
4. Do you think private sector steel units are giving you stiff
competition?
5. What are major products of SAIL?
6. What are the important raw materials SAIL uses.
7. What are important sources of raw material?
8. Does SAIL import any raw materials?
9. What are important sources of energy that SAIL uses and
what about their availability?
10. Since SAIL has been loosing market share in Indian
market. Has it started looking for markets aboard?
11. What could be potential export markets for SAIL?
12. In the total long-term funds in SAIL, Debt has substantial
portion as compared to equity, why so?
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13. Do you agree  that equity base of SAIL is eroding fast ?
14. In short-term funds parts, company is suffering from
illiquidity, why?
15. Inventories in SAIL are mounting. Do you agree that
company is loosing market?
16. Operating profits in SAIL have declined due to high cost
of production. Do you agree?
17. What reasons you hold responsible for increasing looses
of SAIL?
18. Human resources most in SAIL is quite high, why?
19. Are these any efforts being made to lower down this cost?
20. Has SAIL introduced VRS Scheme?
21. How people have opted for it?
22. SAIL’s production Technology has become obsolete, what
efforts have been made or are on cards to renovate the old
plants?
23. Complete overhauling of company’s plants, it  requires
about Rs. 3000 crore, what could be other important
sources of funds?
24. Do you agree that SAIL in the present times is a sick
organization?
25. What could be the possible remedies to this state of affairs
in SAIL?
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Annexure-II
CGR has been computed using the following exponential function:
Y=abx
The function when translated into logarithmic form gives
Log Y=Log a+Log b
To obtain the value of ‘a’ and ‘b’ two normal equations were
solved:
Log Y=N log a+log b Σ x
(X log Y) = log a Σ x + log b Σ x2
log b = growth rate, antilog of log b gives value of b
Value of ‘b’ is used in following equation:
b=1 + r
where r = CGR
On multiplying ‘r’ with 100, it gives CGR in per cent form i.e.
CGR = Antilog of log b, x 100-100
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Annexure-III
Non-Parametric Analysis
Assume that the ratio R for a sample of 16 companies – 8
being sick (S) and 8 being non-sick (N) – is computed. The
companies are arrayed according to the ratio in descending order:
              N    N    N    (S)   N    N    (S)    N    N        S      S    S    S    (N)    S    S
Rank     1      2     3      4     5     6      7       8     9         10  11   12  13    14    15  16
                                                                     Cut-off point
The number of misclassifications is 3, which is, 18.75 per cent of the sample.
The number of misclassifications would have been greater for any other cut-
off point chosen.
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Annexure-IV
Co-efficient of Range in average time and cost over-runs have been
worked by using the formula as:
Co-efficient of Range =
where,
L = Largest item in average time over-run per scheme and
largest item average cost over-run per housing unit,
S =  Smallest item in average time over-runs per scheme
and smallest in average cost over-run per housing unit.
L - S
L + S
